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EXHIBIT "A" 
61-1-6 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities Key Numbers. — Licenses «= 18V2 (37); Se-
Regulation — State § 18. cunties Regulation «=* 272. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion § 196. 
61-1-6. Denial, suspension, or revocation of registration — 
Grounds — Procedure — Examination. 
(1) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, suspend-
ing, or revoking any agent, broker-dealer, or investment adviser registration 
if he finds that the order is in the public interest and that the applicant or 
registrant or, in the case of a broker-dealer or investment adviser, any part-
ner, officer, or director, or any person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or indirectly controlling the broker-
dealer or investment adviser: 
(a) filed an application for registration that was incomplete in any 
material respect or contained any statement that was, in light of the 
circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading with respect 
to any material fact; 
(b) willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with any provision of 
this chapter or a predecessor act or any rule or order under this chapter or 
a predecessor act; 
(c) was convicted, within the past ten years, of any misdemeanor in-
volving a security or any aspect of the securities business, or any felony; 
(d) is permanently or temporarily enjoined by any court of competent 
jurisdiction from engaging in or continuing any conduct or practice in-
volving any aspect of the securities business; 
(e) is the subject of an order of the executive director or any predecessor 
denying, suspending, or revoking registration as a broker-dealer, agent, 
or investment adviser; 
(f) (i) is the subject of an order entered within the past five years by 
the securities administrator of any other state or by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission denying or revoking registration as a 
broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser, or the substantial equiv-
alent of those terms as defined in this chapter, or is the subject of an 
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission suspending or ex-
pelling him from a national securities exchange or national securities 
association registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or 
is the subject of a United States Post Office fraud order. 
(ii) The division may not institute a revocation or suspension pro-
ceeding under this Subsection (0 more than one year from the date of 
the order relied on, and the executive director may not enter an order 
under this Subsection (f) on the basis of an order under another state 
act unless that order was based on facts that would currently consti-
tute a ground for an order under this section; 
(g) engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities busi-
ness; 
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(h) is insolvent, either in the sense that his liabilities exceed his assets 
or in the sense that he cannot meet his obligations as they mature. How-
ever, the executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer or investment adviser under this Subsection (h) without a finding 
of insolvency as to the broker-dealer or investment adviser; or 
(i) is not qualified on the basis of such factors as training, experience, 
and knowledge of the securities business, except as otherwise provided in 
Subsection (3). 
(2) (a) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Secu-
rities Advisory Board, the executive director may issue an order denying, 
suspending, or revoking any registration, if he finds that the order is in 
the public interest and that the applicant or registrant: 
(i) has failed reasonably to supervise his agents if he is a broker-
dealer or his employees if he is an investment adviser; or 
(ii) has failed to pay the proper filing fee. 
(b) The division may enter a denial order under this subsection, but 
shall vacate the order when the deficiency has been corrected. 
(c) The division may not institute a suspension or revocation proceed-
ing on the basis of a fact or transaction known to it when registration 
became effective unless the proceeding is instituted within the next 30 
days. 
(3) The following provisions govern the application of Subsection 
61-1-6(1X1): 
(a) The executive director may not enter an order against a broker-
dealer on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other than 
the broker-dealer himself if he is an individual or an agent of the broker-
dealer. 
(b) The executive director may not enter an order against an invest-
ment adviser on the basis of the lack of qualification of any person other 
than the investment adviser himself if he is an individual or any other 
person who represents the investment adviser in doing any of the acts 
which make him an investment adviser. 
(c) The executive director may not enter an order solely on the basis of 
lack of experience if the applicant or registrant is qualified by training or 
knowledge. 
(d) The executive director shall consider that an agent who will work 
under the supervision of a registered broker-dealer need not have the 
same qualifications as a broker-dealer. 
(e) The executive director shall consider that an investment adviser is 
not necessarily qualified solely on the basis of experience as a broker-
dealer or agent. When he finds that an applicant for initial or renewal 
registration as a broker-dealer is not qualified as an investment adviser, 
he may by order condition the applicant's registration as a broker-dealer 
upon his not transacting business in this state as an investment adviser. 
(f) The division shall by rule provide for examinations, which may be 
written or oral or both, to be taken by all applicants. 
(4) The division may take emergency action with respect to registration 
applications according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63. 
(5) If the division finds that any registrant or applicant for registration is 
no longer in existence, has ceased to do business as a broker-dealer, agent, or 
9 
61-1-6 SECURITIES DIVISION—REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
investment adviser, is subject to an adjudication of mental incompetence or to 
the control of a committee, conservator, or guardian, or cannot be located after 
reasonable search, the division may by order cancel the registration or appli-
cation according to the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63. 
(6) (a) Withdrawal from registration as a broker-dealer, agent, or invest-
ment adviser becomes effective 30 days after receipt of an application to 
withdraw or within such shorter period of time as the division may deter-
mine, unless a revocation or suspension proceeding is pending when the 
application is filed or a proceeding to revoke or suspend or to impose 
conditions upon the withdrawal is instituted within 30 days after the 
application is filed. 
(b) If a proceeding is pending or instituted, the division shall designate 
by order when the withdrawal becomes effective. 
(c) (i) If no proceeding is pending or instituted, and withdrawal auto-
matically becomes effective, the division may initiate a revocation or 
suspension proceeding under Subsection 61-l-6(l)(b) within one year 
after withdrawal became effective. 
(ii) If the division decides to issue a revocation or suspension order, 
the executive director shall enter the order as of the last date on 
which registration was effective. 
(7) The division, board, and executive director shall comply with the proce-
dures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, before issuing any order 
under any part of this section. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-6, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 9; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 233. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1988, rewrote Sub-
section (4) to such an extent as to make a de-
tailed analysis impracticable; in Subsection (5) 
added "according to the procedures and re-
quirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63"; in Sub-
section (6) added the internal subsection desig-
nations and in Subsection (b) substituted "the 
division shall designate by order when the 
Scope of inquiry. 
Commission had authority to inquire into 
applicant's or registrant's conduct with respect 
to unworthiness to carry on business that he or 
it was registered to carry on, irrespective of 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur. 2d Securities 
Regulation — State §§ 19 to 24. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula-
tion §§ 223 to 226. 
A.L.R. — Churning: stockbroker's liability 
for allegedly "churning" or engaging cus-
tomer's account in excessive activity, 32 
A.L.R.3d 635. 
Law practice: what activities of stock or se-
withdrawal becomes effective" for "withdrawal 
becomes effective at such time and upon such 
conditions as the division by order deter-
mines"; rewrote Subsection (7) to such an ex-
tent as to make a detailed analysis impractica-
ble; and made minor changes in style and 
phraseology throughout the section. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. — The 
federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, re-
ferred to in Subsection (l)(f), appears as 15 
U.S.C. § 78a et seq. 
fact that securities to which inquiry was specif-
ically directed did not need to be registered. 
Lauren W. Gibbs, Inc. v. Monson, 102 Utah 
234, 129 P.2d 887 (1942) (decided under former 
law). 
curity broker constitute unauthorized practice 
of law, 34 A.L.R.3d 1305. 
Mistake: effect, as between stockbroker and 
customer, of broker's mistaken sale of stock or 
other security other than that intended by cus-
tomer, 48 A.L.R.3d 513. 
Key Numbers. — Licenses <s= 18V2 (38), 38; 
Securities Regulation «=» 270, 274, 277. 
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be prepared and filed in accordance with the 
following requirements: 
(A) T h e financial s ta tements shall be 
certified by an independent certified public 
a c c o u n t a n t or an i n d e p e n d e n t pub l i c 
accountant. 
(B) T h e audit shall be made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards; 
the examination shall include a review of 
t h e a c c o u n t i n g s y s t e m , t h e i n t e r n a l 
accounting controls and procedures for the 
s a f e g u a r d i n g of s e c u r i t i e s and funds 
including appropriate tests thereof since the 
prior examination. 
(C) T h e audit shall be accompanied by an 
unqualified opinion of the accountant as to 
the financial condition. In addition, the 
accountant shall submit as a supplementary 
opinion any comments, based upon the 
audit, as to any material inadequacies found 
to exist in the accounting system, the 
internal accounting controls and procedures 
for safeguarding securities and shall indicate 
any corrective action taken or proposed. 
(3) T h e financial statements required by 
this section shall be filed within 90 days 
following the end of the broker-dealer's 
fiscal year. 
(b) Investment Adviser Required 
Financial Reports. (1) Every investment 
adviser who has custody or possession of 
c l ient ' s funds or securit ies or requires 
payment of advisory fees six months or 
more in advance and in excess of $500 per 
client shall file with the Division audited 
financial s tatements as of the end of the 
investment adviser's fiscal year. 
(2) E a c h f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t filed 
pursuant to this section shall be prepared 
and filed in accordance with the following 
requirements: 
(A) T h e audit shall be certified by an 
independent certified public accountant or 
independent public accountant. 
(B) T h e audit shall be made in accordance 
with generally accepted auditing standards; 
the examination shall include a review of 
t h e a c c o u n t i n g s y s t e m , t h e i n t e r n a l 
accounting controls and procedures for the 
s a f e g u a r d i n g of s e c u r i t i e s and funds 
including appropriate tests thereof since the 
prior examination. 
(C) T h e audit shall be accompanied by an 
unqualified opinion of the accountant as to 
t h e r epor t of f inancial c o n d i t i o n . In 
addition, the accountant shall submit as a 
supplementary opinion any comments based 
upon audit, as to any material inadequacies 
found to exist in the accounting system, the 
internal accounting controls and procedures 
for safeguarding securities and funds, and 
shall indicate any corrective action taken or 
proposed. 
(3) T h e financial s ta tements required by 
this section shall be filed with the Division 
within 90 days following the end of the 
investment adviser's fiscal year. 
(Adopted eff. 2-15-86.] 
[1 57,403] 
R177-6- lg . Rules of conduct for 
broker-dealers, investment advisers 
and agents. 
Preliminary Notes: 1. Rl77-6-lg is intended to 
define certain acts and practices which the Utah 
Securities Division (the "Division") deems 
violative of Section 6(lXg) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (the "Act"). The list contained 
herein should not be considered to be all-inclusive 
of acts and practices which violate that section, 
but rather is intended to act as a guide to broker-
dealers and agents as to the types of conduct which 
are prohibited. 
2. Broker-dealers and agents are reminded that 
conduct which violated Section 1 of the Act may 
also be considered to violate Section 6(1 Kg) under 
certain circumstances. 
3 This Rule is patterned after well-established 
standards in the industry which have been 
adopted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the NASD, NASAA, the national 
exchanges and various courts. It represents one of 
the purposes of the securities lavss: to create viable 
securities markets m which those persons involved 
are held to a high standard of fairness with respect 
to their dealings with the public. 
(a) Broker-Dealers. T h e following acts and 
practices, when performed by a broker-
dealer or a person over whom the broker-
dea l e r has supe rv i so ry a u t h o r i t y , a re 
considered contrary to Section 6(1 )(g) of the 
Utah Uniform Securi t ies Act and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or 
revocation of registration. 
(1) Engaging in a pat tern of unreasonable 
and unjustifiable delays in the delivery of 
securities purchased by any of its customers 
a n d / o r in the payment, upon request, of free 
c r e d i t b a l a n c e s r e f l e c t i n g c o m p l e t e d 
transactions of any of its customers. 
(2) Inducing t rad ing in a cus tomer ' s 
account wh ich is excessive in size or 
frequency in view of the financial resources 
and character of the account. 
(3) Recommending to a customer the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any security 
without reasonable grounds to believe tha t 
such t ransact ion or recommendat ion is 
suitable for the customer based upon rea-
Blue Sky Law Reports 
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sonahle inquiry concerning the customer's 
investment objectives, financial situation 
and n e e d s , a n d a n y o t h e r r e l e v a n t 
information known by the broker-dealer. 
(4) Executing a transaction on behalf of a 
customer without prior authorization to do 
so. 
(5) Exercising any discretionary power in 
effecting a transaction for a customer's 
account wi thout first obtaining writ ten 
discretionary authori ty from the customer, 
unless the discretionary power relates solely 
to the time a n d / o r price for the execution of 
orders. 
(6) Executing any transaction in a margin 
account without securing from the customer 
a p r o p e r l y e x e c u t e d w r i t t e n m a r g i n 
a g r e e m e n t p r o m p t l y af ter t h e in i t i a l 
transaction in the account. 
(7) Failing to segregate customers' free 
securities or securities held in safekeeping. 
(8) Hypothecating a customer's securities 
without having a lien thereon unless the 
broker-dealer secures from the customer a 
properly executed written consent promptly 
after the ini t ial t ransact ion, except as 
permitted by the rules and regulations of 
the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
(9) Entering into a transaction with or for 
a customer at a price not reasonably related 
to the current market price of the security 
or receiving an unreasonable commission or 
profit. 
(10) Failing to furnish to a customer 
purchasing securities m an offering, no later 
t h a n t h e da te of conf i rmat ion of t he 
transaction, either a final prospectus or a 
preliminary prospectus and an additional 
d o c u m e n t , which toge the r include all 
i n f o r m a t i o n se t f o r t h in t h e f i na l 
prospectus. 
(11) Charging fees for services without 
prior notification to a customer as to the 
nature and amount of the fees. 
(12 ) C h a r g i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d 
inequitable lees for services performed, 
including miscellaneous services such as 
collection of monies due for principal, 
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer 
of securities, appraisals, safekeeping, or 
custody of securities and other services 
related to its securities business 
(13) Offering to buy from or sell to any 
person any security at a stated price unless 
such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase 
or sell, as the case may be. at surh price and 
under such conditions as are stated at the 
time of such offer to buv or sell. 
(14) Representing tha t a security is being 
offered to a customer "at the marke t" or a 
price relevant to the market price unless 
such broker-dealer knows or has reasonable 
grounds to believe tha t a market for such 
secur i ty exis ts o t h e r t h a n t h a t made, 
created or controlled by such broker-dealer, 
or by any person for whom he is acting or 
with whom he is associated in such dis-
t r ibut ion, or any person controlled by, 
controlling or under common control with 
such broker-dealer. 
(15) Effecting any t ransact ion in, or 
inducing the pu rchase or sale of, any 
security by means of any manipulative, 
deceptive or fraudulent device, practice, 
plan, program, design or contrivance, which 
may include but not be limited to: 
(A) Effecting any transaction in a security 
which involves no change in the beneficial 
ownership thereof; 
(B) Entering an order or orders for the 
purchase or sale of any security with the 
knowledge t h a t an o rde r or orders of 
substantially the same size, at substantially 
the same time and substantially the same 
price, for the sale of any such security, has 
been or will be entered by or for the same or 
different parties for the purpose of creating 
a false or misleading appearance of active 
t r a d i n g in t h e s e c u r i t y or a false or 
misleading appearance with respect to the 
market for the security; provided, however, 
nothing in this subsection (B) shall prohibit 
a broker-dealer from entering bona fide 
agency cross transactions for its customers; 
or 
(C) Effecting, alone or with one or more 
other persons, a series of transactions in any 
security creating actual or apparent active 
t rad ing in such secur i ty or raising or 
depressing the price of such security, for the 
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of 
such security by others . 
(16) Guaranteeing a customer against loss 
in any securities account of such customer 
carried by the broker-dealer or in any 
securities transaction effected by the broker-
dealer with or for such customer. 
(17) Publishing or circulating, or causing 
to be published or circulated, any notice, 
circular, advert isement, newspaper article, 
investment service, or communication of 
any kind which: (A) purports to report any 
transaction as a purchase or sale of any 
security unless such broker-dealer believes 
t ha t such t ransac t ion was a bona fide 
purchase or sale of such security; or (B) 
purports to quote the bid price or asked 
price for any security, unless such broker-
H 57,403 1988, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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d e a l e r b e l i e v e s t h a t s u c h q u o t a t i o n 
represents a bona fide bid for, or offer of, 
such security. 
(18) Using any a d v e r t i s i n g or sales 
presentation in such a fashion as to be 
deceptive or misleading. An example of such 
pract ice would be d i s t r ibu t ion of any 
nonfactual data, material or presentation 
b a s e d on c o n j e c t u r e , u n f o u n d e d o r 
unreal is t ic claims or assert ions in any 
b r o c h u r e , flyer, or d isp lay by words , 
pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to 
supplement , de t rac t from, supersede or 
de fea t t h e p u r p o s e or effect of a n y 
prospectus or disclosure. 
(19) Failing to disclose to a customer tha t 
t h e b r o k e r - d e a l e r is c o n t r o l l e d by , 
c o n t r o l l i n g , a f f i l i a t ed w i t h or u n d e r 
common control with the issuer of any 
security before entering into any contract 
with or for a customer for the purchase or 
sale of such security, and if such disclosure is 
n o t m a d e in w r i t i n g , i t s h a l l be 
supplemented by the giving or sending of 
w r i t t e n d i s c l o s u r e a t or be fo re t h e 
completion of the transaction. 
(20) Failing to make a bona fide public 
offering of all of the securities allotted to a 
broker-dealer for d is t r ibut ion , w h e t h e r 
acquired as an underwriter, a selling group 
member, or from a member participating in 
the distribution as an underwriter or selling 
group member. 
(21) Fa i lu re or refusal to furnish a 
c u s t o m e r , u p o n r e a s o n a b l e r e q u e s t , 
information to which he is entitled, or to 
respond to a formal written request or 
complaint. 
(22) Permi t t ing a person to open an 
account for ano the r person or transact 
business in such account unless there is on 
file written authorization for such action 
from the person in whose name the account 
is carried. 
(23) Pe rmi t t i ng a person to open or 
transact business in a fictitious account. 
(24) Permi t t ing an agent to open or 
transact business in an account other than 
his own. unless disclosed in writing (to 
include the reason therefor) to the broker-
dealer or issuer he represents. 
(b) Agents. T h e fol lowing ac t s and 
practices, when performed by agents of 
broker-dealers or agents of issuers, are 
considered contrary to Section 6(1 )(g) of the 
Utah Uniform Securit ies Act and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or 
revocation of registration. 
(1) Engaging in the practice of lending or 
borrowing money or secur i t ies from a 
customer, or acting as a custodian for 
money, securi t ies or an executed stock 
power of a customer. 
(2) Effecting securities transactions not 
recorded on the regular books or records of 
t h e b r o k e r - d e a l e r w h i c h t h e a g e n t 
represents, in the case of agents of broker-
d e a l e r s , u n l e s s t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e 
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer 
prior to execution of the transaction. 
(3) Establishing or maintaining an account 
containing fictitious information in order to 
execute transactions which would otherwise 
be prohibited. 
(4) Sharing directly or indirectly in profits 
or losses in the account of any customer 
without the prior written authorization of 
the customer and the broker-dealer which 
the agent represents. 
(5) Dividing or otherwise splitting the 
a g e n t ' s c o m m i s s i o n s , p ro f i t s or o t h e r 
compensation from the purchase or sale of 
s e c u r i t i e s w i t h a n y p e r s o n not a lso 
registered as an agent for the same broker-
dealer, or for a broker-dealer under direct or 
indirect common control. 
(6) Engaging in conduct specified in 
subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6). 
(a)(9), (a)(10), (a)(15), (a)(16). (a)(17), or (a)(18). 
[1157,404] 
R 1 7 7 - 9 - 1 . R e g i s t r a t i o n b y 
c o o r d i n a t i o n , (a) Who May File. Any 
security for which a registration statement 
or a notification under Regulation A has 
been filed under the Securities Act of 1933 
in connection with the same offering may be 
registered by coordinat ion pursuant to 
Section 9 of the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act (the "Act"). 
(b) Documents to Be Filed. Applicant shall 
file one copy each of the following and the 
appropriate fee pursuant to Rl77-18-4: 
(1) Uniform consent to service of process; 
(2) One copy of the disclosure statement, 
i n c l u d i n g e x h i b i t s , t o g e t h e r w i t h all 
amendments as filed with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission under the Securities 
Act of 1933; 
(3) An application on Form U-l which 
c o n t a i n s t h e u n d e r t a k i n g required by 
Section 9(1 )(d) of the Act. 
(c) Additional Documents T h e applicant 
shall provide to the Division any additional 
Blue Sky Law Reports U 57,404 
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such stock. Guaranty Mtg. Co. v. Wilcox, 62 time of gift that there would be an assessment 
Utah 184, 218 P. 133, 30 A.L.R. 1324 (1923). did not transform transaction into sale, where 
"Sale" did not include a gift of stock because donees were not liable to pay the assessment, 
of use of words'Tor value." Therefore an agree- Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 
ment with a statistician to promote the disposi- (1935), afTd on rehearing in 89 Utah 73, 57 
tion of such stock was not in violation of the p 2d 702 (1936). 
Blue Sky Law. Fact that it was understood at 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Securities Law and issuers not made in course of successive trans-
the Franchise Agreement, 1980 Utah L. Rev. actions, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 1425. 
311. Investment contract: what constitutes an 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am. Jur . 2d Securities "investment contract" within the meaning of 
Regulation — State §§ 16, 26 to 29, 31, 69 to state Blue Sky Laws, 47 A.L.R.3d 1375. 
85, 102. "Common enterprise" element of Howey test 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Supp. Securities Regula- to determine existence of investment contract 
tion §§ 201 to 221. regulable as "security" within meaning of fed-
A.L.R. — Sales as "isolated" or "successive" eral Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et 
or the like under state securities acts, 1 seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
A.L.R.3d 614. USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 90 A.L.R. Fed. 825. 
Dealer: who is "dealer" under state securi- Key Numbers. — Licenses *=> I8V2 (5) to 
ties acts exempting sales by owners other than (30); Securities Regulation «=» 248 to 269. 
61-1-14. Exemptions. 
(1) The following securities are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 61-1-15: 
(a) any security, including a revenue obligation, issued or guaranteed 
by the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state, or any 
agency or corporate or other instrumentality of one or more of the forego-
ing, or any certificate of deposit for any of the foregoing; 
(b) any security issued or guaranteed by Canada, any Canadian prov-
ince, any political subdivision of any such province, any agency or corpo-
rate or other instrumentality of one or more of the foregoing, or any other 
foreign government with which the United States currently maintains 
diplomatic relations, if the security is recognized as a valid obligation by 
the issuer or guarantor; 
(c) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any bank organized under the laws of the United 
States, or any bank, savings institution, or trust company supervised 
under the laws of any state; 
(d) any security issued by and representing an interest in or a debt of, 
or guaranteed by, any federal savings and loan association, or any build-
ing and loan or similar association organized under the laws of any state 
and authorized to do business in this state; 
(e) any security issued or guaranteed by any federal credit union or 
any credit union, industrial loan association, or similar association orga-
nized and supervised under the laws of this state; 
(f) any security issued or guaranteed by any railroad, other common 
carrier, public utility, or holding company which is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission; a registered holding com-
pany under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or a subsid-
iary of such a company within the meaning of that act; regulated in 
respect of its rates or in its issuance by a governmental authority of the 
United States, any state, Canada, or any Canadian province; 
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(g) any security listed on the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System, the New York Stock Exchange, 
the American Stock Exchange, or on any other stock exchange or medium 
approved by the division, provided that the division may at any time 
suspend or revoke this exemption for any particular stock exchange, me-
dium, security, or securities under Subsection 61-1-14(3); any other secu-
rity of the same issuer which is of senior or substantially equal rank to 
any security so listed and approved by the division; any security called for 
by subscription rights or warrants so listed or approved; or any warrant 
or right to purchase or subscribe to any of the foregoing; 
(h) any security issued by any person organized and operated not for 
private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, chari-
table, fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber 
of commerce or trade or professional association; and any security issued 
by a corporation organized under Chapter 1, Title 3 and any security 
issued by a corporation to which the provisions of such chapter are made 
applicable by compliance with the requirements of Section 3-1-21; 
(i) any commercial paper which arises out of a current transaction or 
the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, 
and which evidences an obligation to pay cash within nine months of the 
date of issuance, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal, guarantee, or 
guarantee of renewal of the paper which is likewise limited; 
(j) any investment contract issued in connection with an employees' 
stock purchase, savings, pension, profit-sharing, or similar benefit plan; 
(k) any security as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(2) The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7 and 
61-1-15: 
(a) any isolated transaction, whether effected through a broker-dealer 
or not; 
(b) any nonissuer transaction in an outstanding security if: (i) it is 
listed in a recognized securities manual such as Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's securities manuals where the listing contains the names of the 
issuer's officers and directors, a balance sheet of the issuer as of a date 
within 18 months, and a profit and loss statement for either the fiscal 
year preceding that date or the most recent year of operations; or (ii) the 
security has a fixed maturity or a fixed interest or dividend provision and 
there has been no default during the current fiscal year or within the 
three preceding fiscal years, or during the existence of the issuer and any 
predecessors if less than three years, in the payment of principal, interest, 
or dividends on the security. The division may by rule or order approve 
certain manuals as recognized within the meaning of this subsection; 
(c) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or offer to buy; 
(d) any transaction between the issuer or other person on whose behalf 
the offering is made and an underwriter, or among underwriters; 
(e) any transaction in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured 
by a real or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the 
sale of real estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed of trust, or 
agreement, together with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness 
secured thereby, is offered and sold as a unit; 
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(f) any transaction by an executor, administrator, sheriff, marshal, re-
ceiver, trustee in bankruptcy, guardian, or conservator; 
(g) any transaction executed by a bona fide pledgee without any pur-
pose of evading this chapter; 
(h) any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust company, 
insurance company, investment company as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, pension or profit-sharing trust, or other financial 
institution or institutional buyer, or to a broker-dealer, whether the pur-
chaser is acting for itself or in some fiduciary capacity; 
(i) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or subscription if: (i) 
no commission or other remuneration is paid or given directly or indi-
rectly for soliciting any prospective subscriber; (ii) the number of sub-
scribers acquiring any legal or beneficial interest therein does not exceed 
ten; and (iii) there is no general advertising or solicitation in connection 
with the offer or sale; 
(j) (i) any transaction pursuant to an offer by an issuer of its securities 
to its existing securities holders, if no commission or other remunera-
tion, other than a standby commission is paid or given directly or 
indirectly for soliciting any security holders in this state, if the trans-
action constitutes: (A) the conversion of convertible securities; (B) the 
exercise of nontransferrable rights or warrants; (C) the exercise of 
transferrable rights or warrants if the rights or warrants are exercis-
able not more than 90 days after their issuance; or (D) the purchase 
of securities under a preemptive right; 
(ii) the exemption created by Subsection (2)(j)(i) is not available for 
an offer or sale of securities to existing securities holders who have 
acquired their securities from the issuer in a transaction in violation 
of Section 61-1-7; 
(k) any offer, but not a sale, of a security for which registration state-
ments have been filed under both this chapter and the Securities Act of 
1933 if no stop order or refusal order is in effect and no public proceeding 
or examination looking toward such an order is pending; 
(1) a distribution of securities as a dividend if the person distributing 
the dividend is the issuer of the securities distributed; 
(m) any nonissuer transaction effected by or through a registered bro-
ker-dealer where the broker-dealer or issuer files with the division, and 
the broker-dealer maintains in his records, and makes reasonably avail-
able upon request to any person expressing an interest in a proposed 
transaction in the security with the broker-dealer information prescribed 
by the division under its rules; 
(n) any transactions not involving a public offering; 
(o) any offer or sale of "condominium units" or "time period units" as 
those terms are defined in the Utah Condominium Ownership Act, 
whether or not to be sold by installment contract, if the provisions of the 
Utah Condominium Ownership Act, or if the units are located in another 
state, the condominium act of that state, the Utah Uniform Land and 
Timeshare Sales Practices Act, and the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code are complied with; 
(p) any transaction or series of transactions involving a merger, consol-
idation, reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or sale of assets, 
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if the consideration for which, in whole or in part, is the issuance of 
securities of a person or persons, and if: 
(i) the transaction or series of transactions is incident to a vote of 
the securities holders of each person involved or by written consent or 
resolution of some or all of the securities holders of each person in-
volved; 
(ii) the vote, consent, or resolution is given under a provision in: 
(A) the applicable corporate statute or other controlling statute; (B) 
the controlling articles of incorporation, trust indenture, deed of 
trust, or partnership agreement; or (C) the controlling agreement 
among securities holders; 
(iii) (A) one person involved in the transaction is required to file 
proxy or informational materials under Section 14(a) or (c) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 20 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and has so filed; (B) one person involved in the 
transaction is an insurance company which is exempt from filing 
under Section 12(g)(2)(G) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
has filed proxy or informational materials with the appropriate regu-
latory agency or official of its domiciliary state; or (C) all persons 
involved in the transaction are exempt from filing under Section 
12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and file with the 
division such proxy or informational material as the division requires 
by rule; 
(iv) the proxy or informational material is filed with the division 
and distributed to all securities holders entitled to vote in the trans-
action or series of transactions at least ten business days prior to any 
necessary vote by the securities holders or action on any necessary 
consent or resolution; and 
(v) the division does not, by order, deny or revoke the exemption 
within ten business days after filing of the proxy or informational 
materials; 
(q) any transaction as to which the division, by rule or order, finds that 
registration is not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
(3) Upon approval by the executive director and a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the executive director may by order deny or revoke any 
exemption specified in Subsection (l)(h) or (l)(j) or in Subsection (2) with 
respect to: (a) a specific security, transaction, or series of transactions; or (b) 
any person or issuer, any affiliate or successor to a person or issuer, or any 
entity subsequently organized by or on behalf of a person or issuer generally. 
No such order may be entered without appropriate prior notice to all inter-
ested parties, opportunity for hearing, and written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, except that the division may by order summarily deny or revoke 
any of the specified exemptions pending final determination of any proceeding 
under this subsection. Upon the entry of a summary order, the division shall 
promptly notify all interested parties that it has been entered and of the 
reasons therefor and that within 15 business days of the receipt of a written 
request the matter will be set down for hearing. If no hearing is requested and 
none is ordered by the executive director or division, the order will remain in 
effect until it is modified or vacated by the executive director. If a hearing is 
requested or ordered, upon approval by the executive director and a majority 
of the Securities Advisory Board the executive director, after notice of and 
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opportunity for hearing to all interested persons, may affirm, modify, or va-
cate the order or extend it until final determination. The executive director 
may not extend any summary order for more than ten business days No order 
under this subsection may operate retroactively No person may be considered 
to have violated Section 61-1-7 or 61-1-15 by reason of any offer or sale ef-
fected after the entry of an order under this subsection if he sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the order. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-14, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, <} 5; 1983, 
ch. 284, * 17; 1987, ch. 92, * 106. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment corrected the statutory reference in Sub-
section (2)(jXn), substituted "Utah Uniform 
Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act" for 
"Utah Uniform Land Sale Practices Act" in 
Subsection (2)(o), and made minor stylistic 
changes 
Federal law. — The federal acts cited in 
this section are codified as 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 
15 U S C k 79 et seq For provisions regarding 
registration of holding companies, see 15 
U S C § 79e 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U S C 
** 80a-1 et seq For definition of investment 
ANALYSIS 
Debentures of cemetery association 
Isolated transaction 
Stock dividends or distribution out of earnings 
Debentures of cemetery association. 
Debentures of an incorporated cemetery as-
sociation were not exempt from registration 
where the articles of incorporation did not con-
tain language reasonably interpretable to cate-
gorize the corporation as one whose purpose 
was exclusively for educational, benevolent, 
fraternal, charitable, or reformatory pursuits 
State ex rel Securities Comm'n v Lake Hills, 
14 Utah 2d 14, 376 P2d 540 (1962) 
Isolated transaction. 
The exchange by the incorporators of a min-
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Elu-
sive Limited Offering Exemption of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, 1976 B Y U L Rev 
825 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 69 Am Jur 2d Securities 
Regulation — State ^ 69 to 85 
C.J.S — 79 C J S Supp Securities Regula 
tion ^ 201 to 221 
company, see 15 U S C *} 80a-3 Section 20 of 
that act, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(ui), 
appears as 15 U S C § 80a-20 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U S C ^ 77a et 
seq 
Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, referred to in Subsection (2)(p)(ni), 
appears as 15 U S C § 78/(g)(l) Section 
12(g)(2)(G) of that act appears as 15 U S C 
§ 78/(g)(2)(G) Sections 14(a) and (c) of that act 
appear as 15 U S C §S 78n(a) and (c) 
Cross-References. — Condominium Own-
ership Act, § 57-8-1 et seq 
Utah Consumer Credit Code, * 70C-M01 et 
seq 
Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, 
k 57-11-1 et seq 
ing company of shares of stock for mining 
claims, where the transaction involved the si-
multaneous issuance of shares to the plaintiff 
and a third person, did not involve a transac-
tion requiring registration because it was ex-
empt as an isolated transaction Johnson v 
Crail, 11 Utah 2d 392, 360 P 2d 485 (1961) 
Stock dividends or distribution out of 
earnings. 
To claim exemption, it had to be shown that 
corporation was distributing shares to its 
shareholders as a stock dividend out of earn-
ings or surplus, or that it was increasing its 
capital stock Harper v Tn-State Motors, Inc , 
90 Utah 212, 58 P 2d 18 (1936), rehearing de-
nied, 90 Utah 226, 63 P 2d 1056 (1937) (de-
cided under former law) 
A.L.R. — Sales as "isolated" or "successive" 
or the hke under state securities acts, 1 
A L R 3 d 614 
Dealer who is 'dealer" under state securi-
ties acts exempting sales by owners other than 
issuers not made in course of successive trans 
actions, and the like, 6 A L R 3d 1425 
Who may exercise voting power of corporate 
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61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies — 
Limitation of actions. 
(1) Any person who: 
(a) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 61-1-3(1), 61-1-7, or 
61-1-17(2) or of any rule or order under Section 61-1-15 which requires 
the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, or of any 
condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61-1-11(7); or 
(b) offers, sells, or purchases a security by means of any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not knowing of the 
untruth or omission, and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he 
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the untruth or omission, is liable to the person selling the 
security to or buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or 
in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, 
upon the tender of the security or for damages if he no longer owns the 
security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a 
tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and 
interest at 12% per year from the date of disposition. 
The court in a suit brought under Subsection (l)(b) may award an 
amount equal to three times the consideration paid for the security, to-
gether with interest, costs, and attorney's fees, less any amounts, all as 
specified in Subsection (l)(b) upon a showing that the violation was reck-
less or intentional. 
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or 
buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar func-
tions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale 
or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale 
are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller 
or purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains 
the burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the 
liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases of contract among 
the several persons so liable. 
(3) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before 
entry of judgment. 
(4) Every cause of action under this section survives the death of any per-
son who might have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(5) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this section 
unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or transaction 
constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery by 
the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, whichever expires first. No 
person may sue under this section: (a) if the buyer or seller received a written 
offer, before suit and at a time when he owned the security, to refund the 
consideration paid together with interest at 12% per year from the date of 
payment, less the amount of any income received on the security, and he 
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failed to accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt; or (b) if the buyer or 
seller received such an offer before suit and at a time when he did not own the 
security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within 30 days of its receipt. 
(6) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract 
in violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has ac-
quired any purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the 
facts by reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may base 
any suit on the contract. 
(7) Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring 
any security to waive compliance with this chapter or any rule or order here-
under is void. 
(8) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any 
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this chapter 
does not create any cause of action not specified in this section or Subsection 
61-1-4(5). 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-22, enacted by L. 
1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, § 7; 1983, 
ch. 284, § 32; 1986, ch. 107, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in Subsection (1Kb), added the last para-
graph; in Subsection (5), substituted the 
present first sentence for the former first sen-
ANALYSIS 
Assignability of cause of action. 
Attorney fees. 
Bond of dealer. 
Evidence. 
Foreign contracts. 
Laches and estoppel. 
Participating or aiding in sale. 
Proof of misconduct. 
Statute of limitations. 
Cited. 
Assignability of cause of action. 
Causes of action for return of money paid to 
securities dealer on sale of stock, claimed to 
have been fraudulent, were assignable. Mayer 
v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611, 110 
A.L.R. 837 (1936). 
Attorney fees. 
Recovery of attorney fees pursuant to a state 
securities law claim is not limited to the time 
reasonably spent prosecuting only that claim. 
City Consumer Servs. Inc. v. Home, 631 F. 
Supp. 1050 (D. Utah 1986). 
A court is not bound by agreements as to 
attorney fees between the parties, though it 
«*£ consider them. City Consumer Servs., Inc. 
v
- Home, 631 F. Supp. 1050 (D. Utah 1986). 
Bond of dealer. 
Blue Sky Law and bond therein required 
w
*re for protection of purchasers of securities 
tence which read: "No person may sue under 
this section more than two years afler the con-
tract of sale"; and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Limitation of actions 
generally, § 78-12-1 et seq. 
against fraud perpetrated in violation of act, 
and not solely for protection of state, and as-
signee of purchaser of securities could main-
tain action on bond. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 
193, 63 P.2d 611, 110 A.L.R. 837 (1936). 
In suit against securities dealer and surety 
on his bond for fraud of dealer in sale of stock, 
where complaint alleged sufficient facts to sup-
port judgment against dealer independent of 
Securities Act, surety was a proper party to the 
proceedings. Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 
P.2d 611, 110 A.L.R. 837 (1936). 
Evidence. 
In action to rescind sale of corporate stock on 
ground of fraudulent representat ions as to con-
dition of company, report of state auditor or 
audit made by state banking department was 
not admissible in evidence on theory that it 
was a public record. Wilson v. Guaranteed Sec. 
Co., 82 Utah 224, 23 P.2d 921 (1933). 
In action to recover purchase price of shares, 
in which defendant corporation defended on 
ground that stock sold was owned by secretary 
of corporation, evidence held to make prima 
facie case that shares sold belonged to corpora-
tion so that court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff, 
and fact that notes in payment for stock were 
payable to secretary held not to show conclu-
sively that shares belonged to secretary. 
Hansen v. Abraham Irrigation Co., 82 Utah 
361, 25 P.2d 76 (1933). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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1574 Securities Act—Law Text 1266 12-3087 
[H 551] EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS 
Sec. 4. The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to— 
[As amended by Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580 ] 
[H 552] [Transactions by Persons Other than Issuers, Underwriters and Dealers] 
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer. 
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective 
October 9, 1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.] 
[11 553] [Private Offerings] 
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering. 
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective 
October 9, 1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.] 
[H 554] [Dealers Transactions] 
(3) transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an underwriter 
in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except— 
(A) transactions taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date 
upon which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or through 
an underwriter, 
(B) transactions in a security as to which a registration statement has been filed 
taking place prior to the expiration of forty days after the effective date of such 
registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty days after the first date upon 
which the security was bona fide offered to the public by the issuer or by or through an 
underwriter after such effective date, whichever is later (excluding in the computation of 
such forty days any time during which a stop order issued under section 8 is in effect as 
to the security), or such shorter period as the Commission may specify by rules and 
regulations or order, and 
(C) transactions as to securities constituting the whole or a part of an unsold 
allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution of such 
securities by the issuer or by or through an underwriter. 
With respect to transactions referred to in clause (B), if securities of the issuer have not 
previously been sold pursuant to an earlier effective registration statement the applicable 
period, instead of forty days, shall be ninety days, or such shorter period as the Commission 
may specify by rules and regulations or order. 
[As amended by Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 906; Act of August 10, 1954, effective 
October 9,1954, 68 Stat. 683; Act of August 20, 1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.] 
[H 555] [Brokers' Transactions] 
(4) brokers' transactions, executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the 
over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders. 
[As amended by Act of August 20,1964, Sec. 12, 78 Stat. 580.] 
[H 556] [Securities Originated by Certain Mortgagees] 
(5) (A) Transactions involving offers or sales of one or more promissory notes directly 
secured by a first lien on a single parcel of real estate upon which is located a dwelling or 
other residential or commercial structure, and participation interests in such notes— 
(i) where such securities are originated by a savings and loan association, 
savings bank, commercial bank, or similar banking institution which is supervised 
and examined by a Federal or State authority, and are offered and sold subject to 
the following conditions: 
(a) the miminum aggregate sales price per purchaser shall not be less than 
$250,000; 
(b) the purchaser shall pay cash either at the time of the sale or within 
sixty days thereof; and 
(c) each purchaser shall buy for his own account only; or 
(ii) where such securities are originated by a mortgagee approved by the 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development pursuant to sections 203 and 211 of 
1f 5 5 1 § 4 ©1987, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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the National Housing Act and are offered or sold subject to the three conditions 
specified in subparagraph (AXO to any institution described in such subparagraph 
or to any insurance company subject to the supervision of the insurance 
commissioner, or any agency or officer performing like function, of any State or 
territory of the United States or the District of Columbia, or the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Association, or the 
Government National Mortgage Association 
(B) Transactions between any of the entities described in subparagraph (AXO or 
(AXii) hereof involving non-assignable contracts to buy or sell the foregoing securities 
which are to be completed within two years, where the seller of the foregoing securities 
pursuant to any such contract is one of the parties described in subparagraph (A)(i) or 
(AXii) who may originate such securities and the purchaser of such securities pursuant to 
any such contract in any institution described in subparagraph (A)(i) or any insurance 
company described in subparagraph (AXii), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion, Federal National Mortgage Association, or the Government National Mortgage 
Association and where the foregoing securities are subject to the three conditions for sale 
set forth in subparagraphs (AXiXa) through (c) 
(C) The exemption provided by subparagraphs (A) and (B) hereof shall not apply to 
resales of the securities acquired pursuant thereto, unless each of the conditions for sale 
contained in subparagraphs (AXi)(a) through (c) are satisfied. 
[As added by Act of June 4, 1975 (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975), Sec. 30,89 Stat. 
169.] 
[H 557] [Offers or Sales to Accredited Investors] 
(6) transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited 
investors, if the aggregate offering price of an issue of securities offered in reliance on this 
paragraph does not exceed the amount allowed under section 3(b) of this title, if there is no 
advertising or public solicitation in connection with the transaction by the issuer or anyone 
acting on the issuer's behalf, and if the issuer files such notice with the Commission as the 
Commission shall prescribe. 
[As added by Act of October 21, 1980 (Small Business Issuers* Simplification Act of 
1980), Sec. 602, Pub. Law 96477, 94 Stat. 2294.] 
[H 561] PROHIBITIONS RELATING TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE 
MAILS 
Sec. 5. (a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be 
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly— 
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any 
prospectus or otherwise; or 
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.] 
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any 
means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for 
delivery after sale. 
[D 564] [Prospectus Requirements] 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly— 
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any 
security with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this title, unless 
such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10, or 
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.] 
(2) to carry or to cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any 
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded 
by a prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10. 
[As amended by Act of August 10, 1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec. 7, 68 Stat. 684.] 
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underwriter (unless such underwriter shall have knowingly received from the issuer for acting 
as an underwriter some benefit, directly or indirectly in which all other underwriters 
similarly situated did not share in proportion to their respective interests in the underwnt 
ing) be liable in any suit or as a consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) for 
damages in excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and 
distributed to the public were offered to the public In any suit under this or any other section 
of this title the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the 
costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered 
against a party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be 
assessed in favor of such party litigant (whether or not such undertaking has been required) if 
the court believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient 
to reimburse him for the reasonable expenses incurred by him, in connection with such suit, 
such costs to be taxed in the manner usually provided for taxing of costs in the court in which 
the suit was heard 
[1668] [Joint and Several Liability] 
(f) All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) shall be jointly and 
severally liable, and every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section 
may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, 
would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable 
was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation 
[H 669] [Limitation on Amount of Damages] 
(g) In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the price at which 
the security was offered to the public 
[Sec 11 was amended generally by Act of June 6, 1934 48 Stat 907 ] 
[H 681 ] CIVIL LIABILITIES ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH PROSPECTUSES 
AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Sec 12 Any person who— 
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5 or 
[As amended by Act of August 10,1954, effective October 9, 1954, Sec 8, 68 Stat 685 ] 
[D 683] Offers or Sells by Use of Interstate Communications or Transportation 
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3, other 
than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of 
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a 
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or 
omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of 
such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, 
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall 
be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in 
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such 
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the 
tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security 
[H 691 ] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
Sec 13. No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11 
or section 12(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or 
the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 12(1), unless brought 
within one year after the violation upon which it is based In no event shall any such action 
be brought to enforce a liability created under section 11 or section 12(1) more than three 
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 12(2) more than 
three years after the sale 
[As amended by Act of June 6,1934,48 Stat 908 ] 
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[H 23,361] [Denial, Suspension, or Revocation of Registration of Security] 
I Sec. 12(j) The Commission is authorized, by order, as it deems necessary or appropriate 
I for the protection of investors to deny, to suspend the effective date of, to suspend for a 
J period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a security, if the 
ft Commission finds, on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the issuer of 
J such security has failed to comply with any provision of this title or the rules and regulations 
y thereunder No member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer shall make use of 
I the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction 
I in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security the registration of which has been and is 
I suspended or revoked pursuant to the preceding sentence 
.001 Historical comment.— 
The Act of June 4, 1975, Sec 9, 89 Stat 118, 
added Sec 120) CCH 
.10 Failure of issuer to comply with regis-
tration requirements—1975 amendments.— 
Subsection 0) would provide a more logical place-
ment of the authority the SEC already has under 
present section 19(aX2) to deny, to suspend the 
effective date of, to suspend for a period not 
exceeding twelve months, or to withdraw the 
registration of any security if it finds, on the 
record after notice and opportunity for hearing, 
that the issuer of such security has failed to com-
ply with any provision of the Exchange Act or the 
rules and regulations thereunder It would also 
make unlawful any trading in any such security 
.001 Historical comment.— 
Act of October 16, 1990 (Market Reform Act of 
1990), Sec 2, Pub Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963, 
amended Sec 12(k) which formerly read 
"If in its opinion the public interest and the 
protection of investors so require, the Commission 
is authorized summarily to suspend trading in 
any security (other than an exempted security) 
for a period not exceeding ten days, or with the 
approval of the President, summarily to suspend 
all trading on any national securities exchange or 
otherwise, in securities other than exempted 
securities, for a period not exceeding ninety days 
No member of a national securities exchange, 
broker, or dealer shall make use of the mails or 
any means or instrumentality of interstate com 
merce to effect any transaction in, or to induce 
the purchase or sale of, any security in which 
trading is so suspended " 
The Act of June 4 1975, Sec 9, 89 Stat 118, 
added Sec 12(k) CCH 
by any broker or dealer With this change, the 
Commission is expected to use this section rather 
than its ten-day suspension power in cases of 
extended duration —Senate Committee Report 
No 94-75 (1975), page 106 
20 Tacking of suspension orders.—The SEC 
may not utilize successive ten day suspension 
orders to order the suspension of trading in a 
security for more than ten days—Sloan v SEC 
(CA-2 1976), 547 F2d 152, 76-77 CCH Dec. 
f95,757 mod'g(CA-2 1975), 527 F2d 11 
Rehearing —Upon rehearing, the portion of the 
opinion dealing with the 90-day suspension provi-
sion were excised —See 7 6 - 7 7 CCH Dec 
f 95,783 
.10 Suspension of trading—1975 amend-
ments.—Subsection (k) would consolidate in one 
place the power the SEC presently has under 
sections 15(cX5) and 19(a)(4) of the Exchange 
Act to suspend summarily trading in any security 
(other than an exempted security) for a period not 
exceeding ten days The SEC's power, with the 
approval of the President, to suspend summarily 
all trading on a national securities exchange 
would be continued and extended to mtiude the 
power to prohibit trading in all securities, other 
than exempted securities, otherwise than on an 
exchange —Senate Committee Report No 94-75 
(1975), page 106 
.15 Transactions effected by broker-
dealer —A broker dealer's purchase of attached 
shares of a Canadian company, subject to a sus 
pension of all trading in the U S , at a public 
auction held to satisfy a judgment of the broker 
dealer, and the subsequent sale of the purchased 
shares in Canada would be a broker dealer within 
[H 23,371 ] [Suspension of Trading] 
Sec. I2(k) TRADING SUSPENSIONS, EMERGENCY AUTHORITY — 
(1) TRADING SUSPENSIONS—If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of 
investors so require, the Commission is authorized by order— 
(A) summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than an exempted security) 
for a period not exceeding 10 business days, and 
(B) summarily to suspend all trading on any national securities exchange or 
otherwise, in securities other than exempted securities, for a period not exceeding 90 
calendar days 
The action described in subparagraph (B) shall not take effect unless the Commission notifies 
the President of its decision and the President notifies the Commission that the President 
does not disapprove of such decision 
1123,361 Law §120) ©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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the meaning of Section 12(k) However, the SEC .20 Persons affected by trading suspen-
Staff would not recommend enforcement action if sion—Procedure adopted.—Any person 
the transaction were carried out, provided that adversely affected by a summary suspension of 
the broker-dealei acts in good faith and has no
 t r a ( j 'b h l a b o u t b t h e S £ C s u a n t 
connection with the activities surrounding the
 c , , , . ,? t ; . ~ 
suspension -Canadian Javelin, Ltd (SEC 1975), S * c t l ° " 12<k> m a y P"11 '™ l h e Commission to 
75-76 CCH Dec 1180 417 s n o * t n a t s u c n a suspe^1 0 0 »s not in the public 
_ .
 t ,. _ , , , interest or for the protection of investors—Proce-
.16 Suspermon of trading-Broker-deal-
 d f persom M ted b Sum s 
ers—Purchase of warrants.—The private
 /CT,~ ^n^^ r» « XT ~>A I - > ^ / A -« 
purchase of warrants of a suspended security *«»<SEC 1976) Release No 34-12361, Apr 23, 
through newspaper advertisements by a person 7 ^ - ' " CCH Dec ]| 80,480 
who is not a broker or dealer is not prohibited bv 
Section \2(k)~—Equity Funding Corp of America .21 Tacking of suspension orders.—See 
(SEC 1975), 75 76 CCH Dec If 80,420 f 23,361 20 
[H 23,372] [Emergency Orders] 
Sec. 12(k) 
(2) EMERGENCY ORDERS—(A) The Commission, in an emergency, may by order summa-
rily take such action to alter, supplement, suspend, or impose requirements or restrictions 
with respect to any matter or action subject to regulation by the Commission or a self-
regulatory organization under this title, as the Commission determines is necessary in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors— 
(1) to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets (other than markets in 
exempted securities), or 
(n) to ensure prompt, accurate, and safe clearance and settlement of transactions in 
securities (other than exempted securities) 
(B) An order of the Commission under this paragraph (2) shall continue in effect for the 
period specified by the Commission, and may be extended, except that in no event shall the 
Commission's action continue in effect for more than 10 business days, including extensions 
In exercising its authority under this paragraph, the Commission shall not be required to 
comply with the provisions of section 553 of title 5, United States Code, or with the provisions 
of section 19(c) of this title 
Historical comment.— 
Sec 12(kX2) was added by Act of October 16, 
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub 
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963 
[11 23,373] [Termination of Emergency Actions] 
Sec. 12(k) 
(3) TERMINATION OF EMERGENCY ACTIONS B\ PRESIDENT —The President may direct that 
action taken by the Commission under paragraph (1KB) or paragraph (2) of this subsection 
I shall not continue in effect 
Historical comment.— 
Sec 12(kX3) was added by Act of October 16, 
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub 
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963 
[1123,374] [Compliance] 
Sec. 12(k) 
(4) COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS—No member of a national se< unties exchange, broker, or 
| dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or mstrui.ientaliiy of interstate commerce to 
I effect ?ny transaction in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, any security in contravention of 
an order of the Commission under this subsection unless such order has been stayed, modified, 
or set aside as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection or ha'> ceased to be effective upon 
direction of the President as provided in paragraph (3) 
Historical comment.— Sec 12(k)(4) was added by Act of October 16, 
1990 (Market Reform Act of 1990), Sec 2, Pub 
Law 101-432, 104 Stat 963 
4 
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2014 NASD Manual—Rules of Fair Practice 303 7-90 
"Act" 
(1) The term "Act" means the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 
"Fixed Price Offering" 
(m) The term "fixed price offering" means the offering of securities at a stated 
public offering price or prices, all or part of which securities are publicly offered in the 
United States or any territory thereof, whether or not registered under the Securities 
Act of 1933, except that the term does not include offerings of "exempted securities" or 
"municipal securities" as those terms are defined in Sections 3(a)(12) and 3(a)(29), 
respectively, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or offerings of redeemable 
securities of investment companies registered pursuant to the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 which are offered at prices determined by the net asset value of the 
securities. 
H 2102 Definitions in By-Laws 
Sec. 2. Unless the context otherwise requires, or unless defined in this Article, 
terms used in the Rules and provisions hereby adopted, if defined in the By-Laws, shall 
have the meaning as defined in the By-Laws. 
ARTICLE III 
Rules of Fair Practice 
H 2151 Business Conduct of Members 
Sec. 1. A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of 
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. 
• • • Cross References 
"Filing of Misleading Information as to Membership or Registration" . . 
U1791 
"Failure to Register Personnel" K 1791 
"Fair Dealing with Customers" 1f 2152 
"NASD Mark-Up Policy" H2154 
"Manipulative and Deceptive Quotations" U 2155 
"Policy with Respect to Firmness of Quotations" If 2156 
" Third Market' Confirmations" U 2162 
"Refusal to Abide by Rulings of the Uniform Practice Committee" . . . . 
K3502 
"Failure to Act Under Provisions of Code of Arbitration Procedure" . . . . 
H3744 
"Prompt Payment by Members for Shares of Investment Companies" 
H5265 
" 'Breakpoint' Sales" 1f 5266 
Annotations of selected SEC decisions 
Execution and Delivery 
.10 Failure to Execute Customer Orders.— 
In 1977, the firm acted as managing underwriter 
of a registered public offering of 385,000 Jhirmack 
Enterprises, Inc , securities The underwriting 
syndicate distributed 398,200 shares, resulting in 
a short position of 13,200 shares when distribution 
closed on March 24, 1977 Subsequently, BEHR 
became Jhirmack's primary market maker and 
placed quotations in the NASDAQ System On 
March 25, BEHR began trading the stock in the 
OTC market The conduct of which NASD com-
plained occurred in after-market trading by 
BEHR on March 25, 28, and 29 
On March 25, BEHR had customer orders to 
buy 40,000 shares of Jhirmack However, BEHR 
1f 2102.10 Aft. l l f SeC. 2 ©1990, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
EXHIBIT " I " 
1290 6-1S-S8 Financial Responsibility—§ 15(c) 18,379 
of tht NVSL v conduct in cancelling a sale e/ MODS during niKotidlions fur the %al« and \\u 
Lquitv Funding bonds The bondholder had mailing of confirmations of v»i< —Sprt^uc <{ 
dirutcd his broker to effectuate such sale *hi<h Nammack (SEC 1973), 1973 CCH 1X< «| 79 \\A 
direction had been carried out Since trading of
 A~ 0 , , 0 , 
L ^ , r , r _ , , . , . 47 Suspension of trading—Private sa es— tquity Funding securities had been suspendul
 n , . ^7 , *i u i c : .i r »u i .u < 4 Broker-dealer involvement—Although SMII«»M prior to the opening of the market on the da\ said , -
 K v c . , , . . ui i . i « u .u TT u u « l>u>o)ut the hvehange Act urohihits a hr<»k< r 
order was given, however, the exchange had . . ' , * * j ^ j .L i J it J <lea cr from taking anv at lion in arraniiini; or deemed the sale improper and cancelled i t— . . . u , , , , , ' * i n ^ 
r . c i r~ . f \
 / t r r ionsummating a transaction invoKmg a sicuniv 
Equity Funding Coriwration of AmtruA (SIX , . . , 7 u i * i . • 
197^> 197^ CCH Dec f 79 S37 uni<n trading has been sus{>cnd(.d a hol<)< r oi 
such sccuntits ma> make a private disfxisition uf 
40 Transactions in suspended securities— his shares — McVugh (ShC 1972) 72 7~\ ( ( 11 
While it is possible for a broker dealer transacting Dec *| 79 27^ 
all its business on a national securities exchange . . 
to sell securities for which trading has been sus 
pended, the practical problems arc considerable Dou^Ls R Grahnm (SFC 197^1 7S ?'» ( ( 11 
In that resect, the prohibition against the use of Dec <1 80 2^2 (private individual could cow r hi^ 
anv instrument of interstate commerce includes short (Motion in warrants even though SUSJM nMon 
the transfer of the securities, telephone discus <>t trading in suun t ) was stilhn force) 
[H 25,139] Consummation of Securities Transactions by 
Broker-Dealers When Trading Is Suspended 
Release No 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 31 F R 10076 
JW r The release below is based on the law in effect prior to the Securities Acts Amendments 
of 1975 Sec 12(k) at tf 23,371 consolidates former Sections 15(cX5) and 19(aX*) See 1j23 371 10 
CCH 
17 CFR 241.7920. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission todav made public a policy statement ot 
its Division of Trading and Markets relating to the post-suspension consummation of 
securities transactions entered into by brokers and dealers before the Commission 
suspended trading in the security pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended 
The text of the statement, issued by Irving M Pollack, Director of the Division, 
follows 
"A number of questions have been presented recently as to whether, during the 
period when trading is suspended by order of the Commission pursuant to Section 
15(c)(5) or Section 19(aX4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a broker or dealer 
may complete (e g , by payment or delivery) an agency or principal contract entered 
into pnoi to the suspension 
"It is the position of the Division that where the broker or dealer is himself acting 
in good faith, where he is not connected with the activity announced by the Commis-
sion as a basis for suspension pursuant to Section 15(c)(5) or Section 19(a)(4) and 
where he has no reason to believe that his customer is so connected, no objection need 
be raised under such sections because the broker dealer completes his contractual 
obligations in the particular transaction (eg , by pa>ment or delivery) while the 
suspension is still in effect The Division believes that in each such case, however, he 
should inform his customer, prior to consummating the transaction, that trading in the 
security is suspended and of the reasons announced by the Commission for suspending 
trading 
"A broker-dealer, in deciding whether to consummate such a transaction, must of 
course consider not only the provisions of Sections 15(c)(5) and 19(a)(4) but also all 
other applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws " 
[Release No 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 31 F R 10076 ) 
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John C Baldwin, Director 
Patricia Louie, Director of 
Registration 
Securities Division 
Utah Department of Business Regulation 
160 East 300 South 
Post Office Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45802 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF t SUMMARY ORDER DENYING 
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION : AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS 
: FROM REGISTRATION 
t 
FILE NUMBER 8T 1619 I CASE NUMBER SD-89-030 
Pursuant to 8 61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
(Title 61, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1983) ("the 
Act"), the Utah Securities Division ("the Division") has found that 
this Summary Order is in the public interest. It appears to the 
Division mat: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state 
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979. On or about December 8, 1987, 
S.M.I., Inc. merged with USA Medical Corporation, a Utah 
Corporation. The surviving company is domiciled in the state of 
Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA"). 
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2. The anti-fraud provisions contained in § 61-1-1 of the Act 
prohibits (1) employment of any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud, (2) the making of any untrue statement of a material fact, 
or omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they are made, not misleading and (3) engaging in any act, practice 
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit upon any person* 
3. Section 61-1-7 of the Act states that it is unlawful for 
any person to offer or sell any security in Utah unless it is 
registered or exempt from registration under § 61-1-14 of the Act. 
4. Offers and sales of the securities of USA have been made 
in the state of Utah during the period June 1, 1988 through this 
date. 
A. Failure to Register Securities 
5. A search of the Division's records indicates that a 
registration statement pursuant to § 61-1-8, § 61-1-9 or § 61-1-10 
of the Act has never been filed by USA with the Division. 
B. Failure to Qualify for Exemptions from Registration 
6. Section 61-1-14(2) of the Act contains several 
transactional exemptions from registration, including the 
exemptions commonly referred to as the "manual listing" exemption 
contained in § 61-1-14(2)(b) and the "secondary trading" exemption 
contained in § 61-1-14(2)(m) of the Act. 
0000^5)1 
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7. On or about February 17, 1989, USA filed with the Division 
an application for confirmation of the availability of the manual 
listing exemption pursuant to § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 
177-14-2b of the Division. However, the listing for USA contained 
in Moodyfs OTC Industrial did not contain the minimal information 
required by § 61-1-14 (2) (b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the 
Division. Specifically, the listing did not contain a profit and 
loss statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the 
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations. By letter 
dated February 21, 1989, the Division notified USA that the filing 
was incomplete and that additional information was required. 
8. Section 61-1-14(2) (m) of the Act provides a transactional 
exemption for fl[a]ny nonissuer transaction effected by or through 
a registered broker-dealer where the broker-dealer maintains in his 
records, and makes reasonably available upon request to any person 
expressing an interest in a proposed transaction in the security 
with the broker-dealer information prescribed by the division under 
its rules and regulations." 
9. Rule 177-14-2m of the Division sets forth the exclusive 
method of claiming the transactional exemption contained in § 61-
1-14(2) (m) of the Act. In particular, the rule requires that 
specific information, i.e., a "due diligence package" be filed with 
the Division. A search of the Division's records does not reflect 
that USA has ever made a "due diligence" filing with the Division 
pursuant to Rule 177-l4-2m of the Division. 
0000292 
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C. Fraudulent Scheme to Defraud 
10. In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company. Inc. v. USA 
Medical Corporation, et alP Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court, 
Central Division) (March lr 1989), the court found, after having 
heard testimony on the matter, that: 
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Division hereby 
issues the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
11. Failure of USA Medical Corporation to register its 
securities, or claim an appropriate exemption from registration as 
provided in § 61-1-14 of the Act, is a violation of § 61-1-7 of the 
Act; 
12. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made a» part of a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act; 
13. Untrue statements of material facts and omission to state 
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the 
securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2) 
of the Act; and 
0000^)3 
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14. Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities 
of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or 
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in 
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is in the public interest to issue the following 
SUMMARY ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with the provisions set 
forth in § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, that the availability of any and 
all transactional exemptions contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act, 
be and hereby are, summarily denied. 
Pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act, notice is hereby given 
that within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a written request, 
this matter will be set down for hearing. 
DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1989. 
SECURITIES DIVISION 




BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
USA MEDICAL CORPORATION 
Respondent, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DEFAULT ORDER 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-031 
By the Presiding Officer: 
The instant proceeding was initiated via a Petition for Order 
Denying Availability of Transactional Exemptions from Registration 
dated March 1, 1989. A Notice of Agency Action was sent, certified 
mail, return receipt requested to Respondent and Respondent's 
authorized representative on March 2, 1989, The Notice of Agency 
Action and Petition was also sent, postage prepaid, regular mail, 
to the parties listed on Exhibit A, attached hereto and made a part 
hereof. A hearing has not been requested by Respondent or any 
other interested party within twenty (20) days of the date of the 
Notice of Agency Action as required pursuant to the provisions of 




Section 63-46b-ll of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
provides that failure of a party to participate in an adjudicative 
proceeding may result in an order of default against such party. 
The Presiding Officer, being fully advised in the premises, 
now enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. S.M.I., Inc. was incorporated under the laws of the state 
of Wyoming on January 12, 1979. On or about December 8, 1987, 
S.M.I., Inc. merged with USA Medical Corporation, a Utah 
corporation. The surviving company is domiciled in the state of 
Wyoming under the name USA Medical Corporation ("USA"). Offers and 
sales of the securities of USA have been made in the state of Utah. 
2. In the matter of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. v. USA 
Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. District Court, 
Central Division) (March 1, 1989), the court found, after having 
heard testimony on the matter, that: 
2. [T]he stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
3. The stock of USA Medical has been and continues 
to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and device 
to manipulate and artifically inflate the price of that 
stock in violation of the securities laws. 
Such findings of fact are adopted herein. A copy of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Motion for 
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Preliminary Injunction and Granting Motion to Stay Action and 
Compel Arbitration is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part 
hereof. 
3. The securities of USA, or its predecessor S.M.I., Inc., 
have never been registered in Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
§ 61-1-8, § 61-1-9 or § 61-1-10 of the Act. 
4. The exemption from registration contained in § 61-1-
14(2)(b) of the Act is unavailable for nonissuer transactions of 
the securities of USA inasmuch as the listing, in Moodyf s OTC 
Industrial manual for USA did not contain the information required 
by § 61-1-14(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 177-14-2b of the Division. 
Specifically, the listing did not contain a profit and loss 
statement for either the fiscal year preceding the date of the 
balance sheet, or the most recent year of operations. 
5. USA did not file an application for any other 
transactional exemption from registration contained in 61-1-14(2) 
of the Act with the Division. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made in violation of § 61-1-7 of the Act; 
7. Offers and sales of the securities of USA Medical 
Corporation have been made as part of a device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud in violation of § 61-1-1(1) of the Act; 
8. Untrue statements of material facts and omissions to state 
material facts have been made in the offer and sale of the 
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securities of USA Medical Corporation in violation of § 61-1-1(2) 
of the Act; and 
9. Persons engaged in the offer and sale of the securities 
of USA Medical Corporation have engaged in acts, practices and/or 
a course of business which has operated as a fraud or deceit in 
violation of § 61-1-1(3) of the Act, 
DEFAULT ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the availability of the 
transactional exemptions from registration contained in § 61-1-
14(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act be, and hereby are, denied 
for the securities of USA Medical Corporation, any affiliate or 
successor to USA Medical Corporation, or any entity subsequently 
organized by or on behalf of USA Medical Corporation. 
AGENCY REVIEW 
A defaulted party may seek to set aside the Default Order by 
filing a request for agency review within ten (10) days after the 
issuance of the order in accordance with the procedure set forth 
in Rule 151-4 6b-12 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act rules. 
DATED this 2 T ^ day of March, 1989. 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
/huOhMhiii. 




BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default 
Order are hereby accepted, confirmed and approved by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce. 
DATED this 27 th day of March , 1989. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
DAVID L. BUHLER 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
The foregoing Default Order is hereby accepted, confirmed and 
approved by the Utah Securities Advisory Board. 





R. Paul van cam 
Attorney General 
Mark J. Griffin 4329 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 538-1331 
KAYCEE MCGINLEY 2187 
Securities Division 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, I N C 
CRD NUMBER 7578 
A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
CASE NUMBER SD-89-46BD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF 
MARLEN JOHNSON 
CRD NUMBER 259888 
A M E N D E D P E T I T I O N 
CASE NUMBER 8D-89-47AG 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah ("the Division"), by and through its Director, John 
C. Baldwin, upon knowledge and belief, hereby complains and alleges 
as follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The cause of action was investigated by the Division upon 
complaints that Marlen Johnson and Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. 
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("Johnson Bowles") have engaged in acts and practices which 
constitute violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (Title 61
 f 
Chapter 1, et sea., Utah Code Annotated, 1953f as amended) ("the 
Act"). 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction is vested in the Executive Director and the 
Securities Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce pursuant 
to § 61-1-6(1) of the Act. 
2. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Executive 
Director, upon approval of a majority of the Securities Advisory 
Board, may by order deny, suspend, or revoke any agent or broker-
dealer registration if he finds that such order is in the public 
interest and the agent or broker-dealer: 
(g) Has engaged in dishonest or unethical 
practices in the securities business. 
3. Johnson Bowles is a securities broker dealer duly 
registered by the state of Utah under CRD registration 7578. 
4. Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson"), CRD registration 
259888, is a registered securities agent by the state of Utah and 
principal of Johnson Bowles and acted as such at all times relevant 
to this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5. On or about January 1988, Johnson, acting as an agent and 
principal for Johnson Bowles began effecting and attempting to 
effect transactions in the securities of USA Medical Corporation, 
a Wyoming corporation ("USA Medical"), whose securities were 
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offered and sold in the state of Utah. 
6. On or about February 16, 1989, Johnson Bowles, by and 
through its agent Johnson, filed suit in federal district court to 
obtain an injunction to prevent trading of in the securities of USA 
Medical. 
7. On March 1, 1989, in the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. v, USA Medical Corporation, et al. Case No. C89-157, (U.S. 
District Court, Central Division) the Court found: 
. . . that the stock of USA Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such requisite 
registration and has been and is continuing to be traded 
illegally. 
Further, that the stock of USA Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent scheme and 
device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price 
of that stock in violation of the securities laws. 
8. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary Order, 
(Case Number SD-89-030) denying the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of 
USA Medical pursuant to the authority granted to the Division in 
§ 61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary Order was hand 
delivered to Johnson Bowles on March 1, 1989. The Order is and has 
been in effect continuously since its issuance on March 1, 1989. 
The Summary Order is attached hereto and made a part of these 
proceedings (Exhibit A). 
9. On March 1, 1989, the Division commenced an administrative 
action to deny the availability of all transactional exemptions 
from registration pursuant to § 61-1-14(3) of the Act for the 
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securities of USA Medical (Case Number SD-89-031) • A copy of the 
Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to Johnson Bowles 
on March 2, 1989. 
10. Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce accepted, 
confirmed and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order on March 27, 1989. The Default Order denied the 
availability of the transactional exemptions from registration 
contained in § 61-1-14(2) of the Act for the securities of USA 
Medical, any affiliate or successor to USA Medical or any entity 
subsequently organized by or on behalf of USA Medical. A copy of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Default Order was 
mailed to Johnson Bowles on March 27, 1989. 
11. On March 31, 1989, the Division caused a letter to be 
mailed to Johnson Bowles restating the findings of the federal 
district court and the Division's Summary Order and Default Order. 
12. On or about April 3, 1989 through April 18, 1989, 
Johnson, acting in his capacity as an agent and principal for 
Johnson Bowles, attempted to effect or effected transactions in the 
securities of USA Medical as follows: 
a. On or about April 3, 1989 and April 13, 1989, Johnson 
contacted Mr. John Dawson, a shareholder of USA Medical, to 
purchase shares of USA Medical owned by Mr. Dawson. Johnson 
informed Mr. Dawson that such arrangement would be a 
handwritten agreement between Mr. Dawson and a New York firm. 
Johnson offered Mr. Dawson $.10 per share and instructed Mr. 
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Dawson to deliver his stock certificate to Johnson Bowles 
whereupon a check for the shares of USA Medical would be given 
to him. 
b. On or about April 6, 1989, Johnson purchased 12,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,200.00 from Sheldon 
and Lois Flateman in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
c. On or about April 14, 1989, Johnson purchased 18,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $1,800.00 from Richard 
Sax in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
d. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 80,000 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $8,000.00 from Paul Jones 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
e. On or about April 18, 1989, Johnson purchased 69,500 
shares of USA Medical for the sum of $6,950.00 from Nick 
Julian in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
f. On information and belief, the Division believes 
Johnson has purchased approximately 226,500 additional shares 
of USA Medical since March 1, 1989. 
COUNT l 
13. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 12 as specifically 
set out herein. 
14. Section 61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division 
may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration of a 
broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public interest 
and the broker-dealer: 
6 
tg; nas enyayeu in dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business. 
15. The above described sales of USA Medical shares were 
sales effected without registration or exemption in violation of 
Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
16. The actions of Johnson, in soliciting and/or purchasing 
the USA Medical shares during the pendency of the Division's order, 
encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 
of the Act. 
17. The above actions of Johnson, acting on behalf of 
Johnson-Bowles, in soliciting, encouraging or aiding the violation 
of the Division's Order constitute violations of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
COUNT II 
23. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference its 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 22 as specifically 
set out herein. 
24. Section 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Act provides that the 
Division may issue an order suspending or revoking the registration 
of a broker-dealer if it finds that such order is in the public 
interest and that the broker-dealer "has engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the securities business." 
25. Rule R177-6-lg(a)(3) of the Division, promulgated under 
the authority of § 61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act, establishes that the 
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following acts and practices by broker-dealers constitute grounds 
for suspension or revocation of registration: 
11
 (3) Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale 
or exchange of any security without reasonable grounds 
to believe that such transaction or recommendation is 
suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customerfs investment objectives, 
financial situation and needs, and any other relevant 
information known by the broker-dealer." 
26. Johnson and Johnson-Bowles, as described above, 
recommended, solicited or effected for customers the sales of 
securities of USA Medical which sales would necessarily involve a 
violation of Section 61-1-7 of the Act. 
27. The above actions by Johnson Bowles constitute dishonest 
and unethical practices within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1)(g) 
of the Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg in that transactions which 
involve a violation of the Act are not suitable. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. A finding that Johnson Bowles Company, Inc., engaged in 
the acts and practices alleged above; 
2. A finding that Marlen Johnson engaged in the acts and 
practices alleged above; 
3. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Johnson 
Bowles Company, Inc. be adjudged and decreed to be found in 
violation of § 61-1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and 
Rule R177-6-lg of the Division; 
4. That by engaging in the above acts and practices, Marlen 
Johnson be adjudged and decreed to be found in violation of § 61-
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1-6(1) (g) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act and Rule R177-6-lg of 
the Division; 
5* That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
6. That the registration of Johnson Bowles Company, Inc. to 
act as a securities broker-dealer be suspended or revoked 
accordingly. 
Dated this day of July, 1989. 






BEFORETHE DIVISION OP SECURITIES 
OF TOE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOTION TO CONVERT PROCEEDINGS 
In the Matter of the Registration of : AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. -: 
CRD No. 07678 : Case No. SD-89-46BD 
In the Matter of the Registration of : 
Marten Vernon Johnson : Case No. SD-89-47AG 
CRD No. 2598888 : 
Appearances: 
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
Pursuant to motion, dated May 24,1989, die division seeks to con vat the above-referenced cases 
to formal adjudicative proceedings. On May 31,1989, Respondents filed an objection to the pending 
motion. Said objection was further supplemented by a June 2,1989 letter. 
Oral argument was conducted on June 19,1989 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge for die Department of Commerce. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The division contends these proceedings should be converted because it appears that Respondents 
will vigorously contest any adverse ruling issued on die merits in this forum. Given that informal 
adjudicative proceedings are subject to judical review by trial de novo, the division urges it would then be 
necessary to conduct another evidentiary proceeding ami assem that expertise by the feet finder in the 
interpretation of securities laws and the regulation of the securities industry would be lost if the instant 
adjudicative proceedings are not conducted on a formal basis and, thereby, subject to judicial review on the 
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record The division thus contends that conversion of these proceedings is in the public interest and, since 
the pending motion has been made in the early stages of these proceedings, the division also urges that 
neither party would be unfairly prejudiced if the motion is granted. 
Section 63-46b-4(3), Utah Code Ann. (1953), provides as follows: 
Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer may convert... an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal 
adjudicative proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the 
rights of any party. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (Section 63-46b-1 et seq.) provides for three kinds of adjudicative 
proceedings: formal, informal and emergency. Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), agencies may designate, 
by rule, those categories of adjudicative proceedings which are to be conducted informally. Section 63-46b-
4(2) provides that all agency adjudicative proceedings which are not designated as informal are to be 
conducted on a formal basis. 
The division has engaged in the rulemaking process authorized by Section 63-465-4(1). 
Specifically, R177-46b-6B provides as follows: 
All adjudicative proceedings under the Act, enumerated in this Rule, are 
designated as informal adjudicative proceedings. 
R177-46b-6E sets forth when hearings will be conducted in adjudicative proceedings. Specifically, the just-
stated rule provides as follows: 
2. In the following proceedings, a hearing will be held only if timely 
requested: 
(a) 61-1-6(1) or (2) Denial, suspension, revocation of registration of 
broker-dealer, agent, investment advisor, 
Although it has designated the instant proceedings to be conducted on an informal basis, the division argues 
that all of its adjudicative proceedings were so designated on the assumption that the vast majority of such 
proceedings would be perfunctory in nature and that the proposed agency action in those matters would not 
be contested. However, the division urges that if there is a dispute as to proposed agency action and the 
party toward whom that action is directed determines to actively defend its interests, a motion to convert the 
proceeding is appropriate. 
The Utah Administrative Proce^ State agency 
rulemaking is a necessary prerequisite to effectively implement various provisions of that Act, the most 
significant of which involves the matter now under review. Given its recent origin, the Act has not yet 
been the subject of judicial review as to the issue now presented. Nevertheless, comments of the Utah 
Administrative Law Advisory Committee, pertinent to Section 63-46b-4, are instructive. Those comments 
provide as follows: 
If a party moves to convert an adjudicative proceeding from informal to 
formal.. . , the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the 
requirements of Section 63-46b-4(3) have been satisfied The intent of the 
Advisory Committee is that these requirements be narrowly construed to 
encourage agencies to decide which classes of adjudicative proceedings will be 
formal and which will be informal and to designate in advance the classes of 
adjudicative proceedings that will be informal. The propriety of conversion is 
decided by the presiding officer. 
The Committee has further stated as follows: 
There may be cases where a party moves to convert an adjudicative 
proceeding from formal to informal and the category of adjudicative proceedings 
involved has not been designated as a category for informal adjudication by the 
agency in advance through rulemaking. Conversion is possible under these 
circumstances. Each case, however, is fact sensitive. The decision of the 
presiding officer in such a case to convert the adjudicative proceeding from 
formal to informal should not be used as precedent for subsequent cases in the 
same category of adjudicative proceedings. An ad hoc approach to the 
formal/informal question is not a substitute for rulemaking. Agencies should 
regularly reassess the classes cf cases that they intend to conduct informally in 
light of their own experience. 
Many of the agency actions which could be taken by the Diviskxi, as evidenced throughout the 
rules which have been promulgated, are matters of a mundane and noncontroversial nature. However, the 
suspension or revocation of registration for a boko/dealer, agent or investment advisor would impact an 
existing right to practice in that capacity. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that any given 
registrant would actively and aggressively defend against an interruption of their livelihood Nevertheless, 
the designation as to whether any proceeding should be conducted on a formal or informal basis should not 
turn on whether individuals to whom a notice of agency action have been directed arc inclined to respond 
actively or passively. Granting a motion to convert amply because there is active resistance by the party 
to whom the notice of agency action has been issued would be capricious and not justified 
3 
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Despite the foregoing, (he pending motion has serious merit in an important respect Given the 
relative complexity of securities regulation, expertise in the application and interpretation of the statutes and 
rules which govern the securities industry could prove to be invaluable to any fact finder charged with the 
responsibility to determine whether certain conduct is violative of the governing statutes and rules in that 
regard. In fact, the existence and effectiveness of agency adjudicative proceedings is primarily predicated 
upon the exercise of such specialized skills by boards and commissions similar to the Securities Advisory 
Board. In light of the proposed agency action incident to these proceedings, it is in the public interest to 
conduct these cases on a formal basis. 
Respondent urges that greater attorney's fees and costs would be incurred in defending formal 
proceedings. Respondent further asserts that conversion of these proceedings would talw away a "significant 
right" to judicial review by trial de novo and suggests that the pending motion has been made because the 
Division desires that any evidentiary proceedings in this forum be subject to judicial review on the record. 
Respondent thus contends that the "forced and unreasonable swap of rights would be inherently unfair" and 
that the motion under review is "designed merely to 'unfairly prejudice'" its' interests in all respects. 
Respondent's concern with costs which could be incurred on appeal and the nature of judicial 
review from any order entered in this forum implies that Respondents may believe the outcome of these 
proceedings is a foregone conclusion. Although the division has undertaken proceedings which could 
prompt entry of a disciplinary sanction against Respondents, there is no basis to conclude that Respondents 
will not be fully accorded (hie process in these proceedings, whether conducted en a formal or informal 
basis. The "unfair prejudice" referenced in Section 6346b^3Xb) partknilariy relates to the requirement that 
adjudicative proceedings be conducted as to afford all parties due process. Simply put, the costs incurred by 
Respondent as a litigant in these proceedings are a matter of choice. Neither said costs nor the nature of 
judicial review and associated costs in that regard are relevant to die issue of "unfair prejudice". Given the 
early stage of these proceedings, a favorable ruling on the pending motion would not adversely affect the 
substantial rights of either party. Thus, the Division's motion is well taken and should be granted. 
Nevertheless, two further matters should be addressed Nothing herein should be construed to 
suggest that subsequent motions of this nature will be customarily granted, on an ad hex: basis, upon the 
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uigence that toe Division desires to avoid evidentiary proceedings in both the a d m i n ^ ^ 
forum and the concomitant loss of agency expertise during de novo review in the latter instance. The 
Division should re-evaluate the nature of the various agency actions it can take and assess those cases where 
expertise by the fact finder in adjudicative proceedings is necessary and/or desirable. Thereafter, the Division 
should modify its rules to accordingly differentiate the manner in which adjudicative proceedings will be 
conducted. 
Respondent has requested that any order granting the pending motion be certified as "final", so that 
any necessary review of that order can be sought Section 6346b-12, which provides that parties to any 
adjudicative proceeding may seek review "of an order by the agency", sets forth the procedure to obtain any 
such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that respect Presumably, Respondents'request is 
directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides: 
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency 
action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited 
by statute. (All emphasis herein added). 
Whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow for subsequent judicial review, is not for this Court 
to decide. However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the May 24,1989 motion to convert these proceedings is 
granted. 
Dated this r / ^ ^ day of July, 1989. 
sveftEklutfil 
illustrative Law Judge 
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EXHIBIT ,fN" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STA1E OF UTAH 
: MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
In the Matter of the Registration of : ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. : 
CRD No. 07678 : Case No. SD-89-46BD 
In the Matter of the Registration of : 
Marien Vernon Johnson : Case No. SD-89-47AG 
CRD No. 2598888 : 
Appearances: 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
By Motion, dated July 3,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative 
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by Ae Division on July 13,1989. On the 
just-stated date, Respondents also filed an affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss. 
Oral argument on the pending motion was conducted on July 14,1989, at which time Respondents 
filed a reply memorandum and copies of six (6) letters relative thereto. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. is a securities broker and Respondent Marien 
Vernon Johnson is a securities agent and principal of the just-named company. Respondents are duly 
registered by the Division of Securities of the State of Utah. 
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2. By Summary Order, dated March 1,1989, the Division denied the availability of all 
transactional exemptions relative to the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation. The Summary Order has 
been in effect on a continuous basis since the just-stated date. 
3. Prior to entry of the March 1,1989 Summary Order, Respondent Johnson, as an agent and 
principal for Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., had effected transactions in the securities of 
U.S A. Medical Corporation. Sparing detail, outstanding contracts existed between Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, Inc. and various third parties respecting the sale of the securities in question by 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. to those third parties. Specifically, said contracts existed prior 
to issuance of the March 1,1989 Summary Oder. 
4. Given the just-described contracts, and in order to effect the delivery of the securities in question 
to various third parties, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., through Respondent Marten Vernon 
Johnson, purchased approximately 364,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock from seven (7) 
individuals between April 3,1989 and April 13,1989. Respondents were aware of die March 1,1989 
Summary Order when the just-described purchases were made. 
5. On April 27,1989, the Division filed a Notice of Agency Action and Petition, wherein it was 
alleged that Respondents had willfully violated or willfully fedled to comply with the Miarch 1,1989 
Summary Order and that they had engaged in dishonest or unethk^ practices in the securities business. 
Pursuant to an Amended Petition, dated July 19,1989, the Division has withdrawn the allegation that 
Respondents had either willfully violated or willfully failed to comply with the March 1,1989 Summary 
Oder. However, based on die allegation that Respondents have engaged in dishonest oi unethical practices 
in the securities business, the Division seeks entry of an order suspending or revoking the respective 
registration of Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson. 
CX>NeLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents assert that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction to initiate the instant 
proceeding and to enter any disciplinary sanction as to their existing registration. Specifically, Respondents 
contend that rules of conduct promulgated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
2 OOO^i^O 
required thai they complete their existing contracts by either payment a deUvery (rfd^ 
question. Respondents further contend that compliance with diatdiitcrivepnm^ 
US.A. Medical Corporation securities from certain Utah residents subsequent to the issuance of the March 
1,1989 Summary Order and that said Order prohibited only the sak, but not the puidiase,^ 
securities. In essence, Respondents urge that die pertinent NASD rules of conduct promulgated pursuant to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessarily supercede the operation of the March 1,1989 Summary 
Order and, thus, the instant proceeding should be dismissed. 
During oral argument on the pending motion, counsel for Respondents extensively addressed those 
rules of conduct which govern NASD members and whether Respondents could have been subject to 
disciplinary sanction regarding their membership in that organization for any failure to comply with said 
rules. In rejoinder, counsel for the Division has urged that Respondents could have fulfilled their 
contractual obligations to third parties by means other than a purchase of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities, but that it was financially advantageous for Respondents to act as they did. The Division has 
also asserted that Respondents solicited die sale of U.S .A. Medical Corporation securities and that any such 
solicitation is relevant to whether Respondents engaged in dishonest and unethical securities practices. 
Notwithstanding the belabored arguments which were presented as to the foregoing matters, the 
operative effect of die March 1,1989 Summary Order was to prevent the sale of unregistered securities to 
Utah residents. Bodi parties concede that those securities had been the subject of market manipulation and 
securities fraud. Under such circumstances, issuance of die Summary Order was clearly intended lo preclude 
any subsequent sale of those securities within this state. 
With knowledge of the existence of the Summary Order, Respondents purchased said securities 
from certain Utah residents. In so doing. Respondents' conduct effectively frustrated die attempts of die 
Division to preclude the trading of those unregistered securities. Whether Respondents solicited die sale of 
U.S A. Medical Corporation securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it is 
obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of those securities facilitated a violation 
of the Summary Order as to potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. 
3 000 i.#I 
Respondents' assertion that NASD rules of conduct should be accorded the force and effect of federal 
law, as to thus obviate compliance with the March 1,1989 Summary Order, is not well-founded. 
Coocededly, had Respondents owned the securities prior to March 1,1989 and merely delivered those 
securities to third parties after the Summary Order had been issued, such a ministerial act may not have 
exposed Respondents to possible revocation or suspension of their registration. However, Respondents' 
purchase of the securities after March 1,1989 to effect their subsequent delivery of those securities to third 
parties was squarely at odds with the operative effect of the March 1,1989 Summary Order. Simply put, 
any necessary compliance by Respondents with NASD rules as a member of that self-regulatory 
organization does not lend support to the conclusion that the Division lacks subject matter jurisdiction in 
this case. 
Two further matters should be addressed. Both parties have noted certain aggravating and/or 
mitigating factors in this case and have urged that such factors should be considered relative to the merits of 
the pending motion. Without doubt, such circumstances are relevant as to any possible entry of a 
disciplinary sanction at some subsequent stage in these proceedings. However, those factors arc not 
germane to die matter presently before the Court 
Respondents have also requested that any order denying the pending motion be certified as "final", 
so that necessary review of that order can be sought Section 63-465-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, provides that parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek review "erf an order by the agency" 
and sets forth die procedure to obtain any such review. R151-46b-12(A) is further applicable in that 
respect Presumably, Respondents' request that any order issued on the pending motion be certified as final 
is one directed toward the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, which provides: 
(1) Any party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. (All 
emphasis herein added) 
It is not within the province of this Court to decided whether the order set forth below is "final", as to allow 
for subsequent judicial review, nor to certify any such order as being final for purposes of such review. 
However, the order herein is subject to agency review, as set forth above. 
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ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion to dismiss the July 19,1989 
Amended Petition is denied 
Dated this t*A'*^ dav of August 1989. 
tw Judge ^ ^ 
JlArteven Ekluni 
listrative La
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying 
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott 
Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to 
Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation 
Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Dated this O ? ^ day of August, 1989. 
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901 
DISHONEST OR UNETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Adopted on April 23, 1983 
[11401] 
kts ana practices, including but 
not limited to the following, are considered contrary to such standards and may 
constitute grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration or such other 
action authorized by statute. 
ft 1402] 
1. BROKER-DEALERS 
a. Engaging in a pattern of unreasonable and unjustifiable delays in the 
delivery of securities purchased by any of its customers and/or in the 
payment upon request of free credit balances reflecting completed 
transactions of any of its customers; 
b. Inducing trading in a customer's account which is excessive in size or 
frequency in view of the financial resources and character of the account; 
c. Recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security 
without reasonable grounds to believe that such transaction or 
recommendation is suitable for the customer based upon reasonable inquiry 
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and 
needs, and any other relevant information known by the broker-dealer; 
d. Executing a transaction on behalf of a customer without authorization to do 
so; 
e. Exercising any discretionary power in effecting a transaction for a 
customer's account without first obtaining written discretionary authority 
from the customer, unless the discretionary power relates solely to the time 
and/or price for the execution of orders; 
f. Executing any transaction in a margin account without securing from the 
customer a properly executed written margin agreement promptly after the 
initial transaction in the account; 
g. Failing to segregate customers' free securities or securities held in 
safekeeping; 
h. Hypothecating a customer's securities without having a lien thereon unless 
the broker-dealer secures from the customer a properly executed written 
consent promptly after the initial transaction, except as permitted by Rules 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
i. Entering into a transaction with or for a customer at a price not reasonably 
related to the current market price of the security or receiving an 
unreasonable commission or profit; 
j. Failing to furnish to a customer purchasing securities in an offering, no later 
than the date of confirmation of the transaction, either a final prospectus or 
a preliminary prospectus and an additional document, which together 
include all information set forth in the final prospectus; 
k. Charging unreasonable and inequitable fees for services performed, including 
miscellaneous services such as collection of monies due for principal, 
dividends or interest, exchange or transfer of securities, appraisals, 
NASAA Reports % 1402 
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902 Statements of Policy 
safekeeping, or custody of securities and other services related to its 
securities business; 
1. Offering to buy from or sell to any person any security at a stated price 
unless such broker-dealer is prepared to purchase or sell, as the ease may be, 
at such price and under such conditions as are stated at the time of such 
offer to buy or sell; 
m. Representing that a security is being offered to a customer "at the market" 
or a price relevant to the market price unless such broker-dealer knows or 
has reasonable grounds to believe that a market for such security exists other 
than that made, created or controlled by such broker-dealer, or by any 
person for whom he is acting or with whom he is associated in such 
distribution, or any person controlled by, controlling or under common 
control with such broker-dealer; 
n. Effecting any transaction in, or inducing the purchase or sale of, any 
security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or fraudulent device, 
practice, plan, program, design or contrivance, which may include but not be 
limited to: 
(1) Effecting any transaction in a security which involves no change in the 
beneficial ownership thereof; 
(2) Entering an order or orders for the purchase or sale of any security with 
the knowledge that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at 
substantially th€ same time and substantially the same price, for the 
sale of any such security, has been or will be entered by or for the same 
or different parties for the purpose of creating a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in the security or a false or misleading 
appearance with respect to the market for the security; provided, 
however, nothing in this subsection shall prohibit a broker-dealer from 
entering bona fide agency cross trans-actions for its customers; 
(3) Effecting, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of 
transactions in any security creating actual or apparent active trading 
in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for 
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others; 
o. Guaranteeing a customer against loss in any securities account of such 
customer carried by the broker-dealer or in any securities transaction 
effected by the broker-dealer with or for such customer; 
p. Publishing or circulating, or causing to be published or circulated, any 
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment service, or 
communication of any kind which purports to report any transaction as a 
purchase or sale of any security unless such broker-dealer believes that such 
transaction was a bona fide purchase or sale of such security; or which 
purports to quote the bid price or asked price for any security, unless such 
broker-dealer believes that such quotation represents a bona fide bid for, or 
offer of, such security, 
q. Using any advertising or sales presentation in such a fashion as to be 
deceptive or misleading. An example of such practice would be a distribution 
of any nonfactual data, material or presentation based on conjecture, 
unfounded or unrealistic claims or assertions in any brochure, flyer, or 
display by words, pictures, graphs or otherwise designed to supplement, 
U 1 4 0 2 ©1986, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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detract from, supersede or defeat the purpose or effect of any prospectus or 
disclosure; or 
r. Failing to disclose that the broker-dealer is controlled by, controlling, 
affiliated with or under common control with the issuer of any security 
before entering into any contract with or for a customer for the purchase or 
sale of such security, the existence of such control to such customer, and if 
such disclosure is not made in writing, it shall be supplemented by the giving 
or sending of written disclosure at or before the completion of the 
transaction; 
s. Failing to make a bona fide public offering of all of the securities allotted to 
a broker-dealer for distribution, whether acquired as an underwriter, a 
selling group member, or from a member participating in the distribution as 
an underwriter or selling group member; or 
t. Failure or refusal to furnish a customer, upon reasonable request, 




a. Engaging in the practice of lending or borrowing money or securities from a 
customer, or acting as a custodian for money, securities or an executed stock 
power of a customer; 
b. Effecting securities transactions not recorded on the regular books or records 
of the broker-dealer which the agent represents, unless the transactions are 
authorized in writing by the broker-dealer prior to execution of the 
transaction; 
c. Establishing or maintaining an account containing fictitious information in 
order to execute transactions which would otherwise be prohibited; 
d. Sharing directly or indirectly in profits or losses in the account of any 
customer without the written authorization of the customer and the broker-
dealer which the agent represents; 
e. Dividing or otherwise splitting the agent's commissions, profits or other 
compensation from the purchase or sale of securities with any person not also 
registered as an agent for the same broker-dealer, or for a broker-dealer 
under direct or indirect common control; or 
f. Engaging in conduct specified in Subsection l.b, c, d, e, ft i, j, n, o, p, or q. 
(11404] 
[CONDUCT NOT INCLUSIVE.] The conduct set forth above is not inclusive. 
Engaging in other conduct such as forgery, embezzlement, non-disclosure, incomplete 
disclosure or missutement of material facts, or manipulative or deceptive practices 
shall also be grounds for denial, suspension or revocation of registration. 
[The next page is 1001.] 
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EXHIBIT "P" 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Before the 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
March 6, 1989 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
File No. 500-1 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
OF TRADING 
It appears to the Securities and Exchange Commission that 
there is a lack of adequate and accurate current information 
concerning the securities of USA Medical Inc., and that questions 
have been raised about recent market activity in USA Medical, and 
about the adequacy and accuracy of publicly disseminated 
information concerning, among other things, the financial 
condition of the company, the identities of its shareholders, and 
the beneficial ownership and control of the company's shares. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the public interest and the 
protection of investors require a suspension of trading in the 
securities of the above-listed company. 
Therefore, it is ordered, pursuant to Section 12 (X) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that trading in the above-listed 
company, over-the-counter or otherwise, is suspended for the 
period from 9 : 30 a.nu EST, March € $ 1989 through 13: 59 p.m. 
EST, on March is 1989. 
By the Commission. 
Jonathan G. Katz 
Secretary 
'JlK<^io9 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
Washington D.C. 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission announced pursuant to 
Section 12 (k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange 
Act") the temporary suspension of over-the-counter trading of the 
securities of USA Medical Corp. for a ten day period commencing 
at 9: 30 a.m. (EST) , March 6r 1989 and terminating at n: 59 p.m. 
(EST) on March 15, 1989, 
The Commission temporarily suspended trading in the securities of 
USA Medical in view of questions that have been raised about recent 
market activity in the securities of USA Medical, and about the 
adequacy and accuracy of publicly disseminated information 
concerning, among other things, the financial condition of the 
company, the identities of its shareholders, and the beneficial 
ownership and control of the company's shares. 
The Commission cautions broker-dealers, shareholders, and 
prospective purchasers that they should carefully consider the 
foregoing information along with all other current available 
information and any information subseouentlv issued by the company. 
Further, brokers and dealers should be alert to the fact that, 
pursuant to Rule 15c2~ll under the Exchange Act, at the termination 
of the trading suspensions, no quotation may be entered unless and 
until they have strictly complied with all of the provisions of 
said rule. If any broker or dealer has any questions as to whether 
^r no*- Vu» H*R nowpl i«d with said rule, he should not enter any 
quotation but immediately contact the staff of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in Salt'Lake City, Utah. If any broker or 
dealer is uncertain as to what is required by Rule 15c2-ll, he 
should refrain from entering quotations relating to the securities 
in question until such time as he has familiarized himself with 
said rule and is certain that all of its provisions have been met. 
If any broker or dealer enters any quotation which is in violation 
of said rule, the Commission will consider the need for prompt 
enforcement action. 
If any broker-dealer or other person has any information which may 
relate to this matter, the Salt Lake Branch Office of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission should be telephoned at (801) 
524-5796. 
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EXHIBIT "Q" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
CRD No. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD No. 259888 
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW 
Case No. SD-89-46B 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
On September 11, 1989, Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson, pursuant to §63-46b-12 Utah Code 
Ann. and R151-46-b-12A of the Rules of Procedure for Adjudicative 
Proceedings before the Department of Business Regulation, requested 
agency review of an August 29, 1989 Order, and asked for an oral 
hearing thereon. The August 29, 1989 Order denied Respondents 
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Petition of the Division of 
Securities (the Division). 
Respondents have also requested certification of the August 
29, 1989 Order as a "final agency action,11 or, in the alternative, 
asked for an order declaring that Respondents had exhausted their 
administrative remedies regarding the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Respondents also requested that any order issued on review 
also be certified as a "final agency" action. 
Finally, Respondents requested that the Division disclose 
whether the Securities Advisory Board constitutes the Appellate 
Body performing this review, in order to determine the existence 
of any conflicts of interest by David Eccles Hardy, a member of 
that Board. 
On September 11, 1989, Respondents filed a brief in support 
of their request for agency review and oral hearing thereon. On 
September 26, 1989, the Securities Division filed a brief in reply 
to Respondents' request for agency review and hearing. On October 
6, 1989 Respondents filed a reply brief in support of their request 
for agency review. 
THE DIRECTOR, AS PRESIDING OFFICER, now enters the following: 
Section 63-46b-12 Utah Code Ann. sets forth the procedure 
which governs administrative review of agency orders. That statute 
vests agencies with the discretion to provide, by rule, whether 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding may seek "review of an order 
by the agency or by a superior agency". R151-46b-12A of the Rules 
of Procedure for Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of 
Business Regulation allows such requests to be made as follows: 
A request for agency review may be filed...after the issuance 
of findings of fact, conclusions of law and the order entered 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding... . 
Section 63-46b-13 provides that if agency review of "an order" is 
not available pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 "and if the order would 
otherwise constitute final agency action", a party may request 
agency reconsideration of "the order"• Section 63-46b-14 also 
provides that an aggrieved party "may obtain judicial review of 
final agency action...". 
Section 63-46b-12 and R151~46b-12 do not expressly limit 
agency review to orders which constitute final agency action. 
Thus, a party aggrieved by orders of an interim nature (i.e., an 
order denying a request for a continuance or an order denying a 
motion to dismiss) could arguably request agency review of such 
matters. However, in Sloan v. Board of Review, 118 Utah Adv. Rep 
68 (October 2, 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals distinguishes 
orders, which are not reviewable because they are not "final", from 
orders which do constitute "final agency action", by stating that 
"an order of the agency is not final so long as it reserves 
something to the agency for further decision". Id. at 68. In the 
Sloan case, the Court dismissed an appeal due to the lack of a 
final agency order. 
Given the nature of the August 29, 1989 Order, Respondents' 
request represents an interlocutory appeal and, following Sloan, 
would not be considered a final agency action. Review of 
interlocutory matters would necessarily deprive agency adjudicative 
proceedings of the simplicity and speed contemplated by the 
Administrative Procedures Act and the rules governing adjudicative 
proceedings in this Department, and would inappropriately interpose 
an interlocutory appeal process within the Department. 
< •: .. ,:>s 
In essence, absent a rule permitting agency review pursuant 
to Section 63-46b-12, agency reconsideration pursuant to Section 
63-46b-13 is only available as to an order which constitutes final 
agency action. The availability of judicial review is also limited 
to such orders. In light of the provisions which govern agency 
reconsideration and judicial review, and mindful of the rationale 
expressed in Sloan v. Board of Review, it is ill-advised to conduct 
agency review of orders which do not constitute final agency 
action. Although Section 63-46b-12 and R151-46b-12 do not so limit 
the availability of agency review, the efficient administration of 
agency adjudicative proceedings compels the conclusion that such 
interpretation be given. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING ARE HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondents1 Request for Agency Review and oral argument 
thereon are denied. 
2. Respondents' Requests that both the August 29, 1989 order 
and this Order on Review, be certified as "final agency action", 
are denied because it is not considered to be within the province 
of the Presiding Officer to so certify or declare. 
3. Respondents' concerns regarding the involvement of 
Securities Advisory Board member David Eccles Hardy in the 
consideration of these requests are inapplicable, since the 
Director has acted as the Presiding Officer, and accordingly, 
Respondents' request for an order to disclose any conflicts of 
interest is also denied. 
( C. .A/J 
Dated this 
*0» 
J* da: day of October, 1989. 
rohn C. Baldwin 
Director, Division of Securities 
Presiding Officer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing 
Order on Agency Review properly addressed, postage prepaid, to John 
Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111; to Craig F. McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th 
Floor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents; and to Mark J. 
Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the Division of Securities 
at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114. 
Dated this O ^ day of October, 1989, 
Te/ri Farn^worth ±L 
( '. , .1-0 
EXHIBIT "R" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 





BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents herewith respond to the amended petitions in the above matters, 
affirmatively allege, and counterclaim against the Division as follows. 
ANSWER 
1. Respondents deny 51 of the amended petitions in that the Division does not 
have any Jurisdiction over these proceedings. 
2. Respondents admit 12 as a blanket statement of the law taken out of 
context but allege that §61-1 -6(1 )(g). Utah Code Ann., and the rules promulgated 
0'U> /US 
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thereunder based on NASD rules and NASAA Guidelines, are inapplicable to these 
proceedings and the conduct of Respondents. 
3. Respondents admit 13 of the amended petitions. Respondents deny 14 to 
the extent that Respondent Marlen V. Johnson was acting at all times relevant to this action 
as an individual and not as either a securities principal or agent. 
4. Respondents deny 15 in that Respondent Johnson-Bowles was effecting 
transactions in the securities of U.S.A. Medical in January, 1989, not 1988. 
5. Respondents deny 16 of the amended petitions to the extent that such was 
the sole purpose of Respondents' filing of a federal lawsuit ultimately assigned to Judge J. 
Thomas Greene. On the contrary, the primary reason Respondent Johnson-Bowles filed the 
federal action was to have a U.S. District Court declare Respondents' outstanding Exchange 
Act contracts void for illegality — something the Court ultimately declined to do on 
February 28, 1989. 
6. Respondents admit 17 of the amended petitions but allege that such is not 
the full extent of Judge Greene's ruling in Case No. C-89-157-G and 17 is thus misleading 
to the extent that it is taken out of context. What Judge Greene essentially ruled relative to 
these proceedings was that Respondents' outstanding Exchange Act contracts were neither 
"void" nor "voidable" and therefore, Respondents would be required by law to purchase 
enough U.S.A. Medical stock, as they ultimately did, to complete such interstate contracts 
previously entered into in the course of their Exchange Act business. 
7. Respondents admit 18 of the amended petitions to the extent that the 
Division's Order of March 1, 1989, revoked the availability of exemptions in Utah only for the 
offer and sale of U.S.A. Medical stock. The Order, however, either legally, or by its own 
terms, is irrelevant to and otherwise has no effect whatsoever on purchases of U.S.A. 
Medical stock by anyone as a matter of law. Respondents do not recall whether the Order 
was "hand-delivered" to them or not on March 1. and whether it was or not, such Order, by 
its own unambiguous terms, does not and did not put Respondents on either actual or 
constructive notice that their subsequent purchase of U.S.A. Medical stock to fulfill 
Exchange Act obligations would, or could, result in the instant proceedings. As to whether 
the March 1, Order has been in effect continuously since its issuance, this is debatable and 
therefore denied. 
8. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in 19 of the 
amended petitions and therefore, they deny the same. They also have no recollection of 
whether a Notice of Agency Action and Petition was mailed to them by the Division on either 
March 2, 1989, or at all. 
9. Respondents have no personal knowledge of that contained in Ts 10 and 11 
and therefore, on that ground, deny the same. 
10. Relative to 112a, Respondent Johnson admits that he called John Dawson 
but such only occurred after he was informed by one Karl Smith that Dawson was anxious to 
sell his "worthless" U.S.A. Medical stock to anyone who wanted to buy it. The remainder of 
112a is inaccurate and irrelevant to these proceedings as a matter of law and therefore, the 
same is denied. 
11. Respondents deny Ts 12b-12f of the amended petitions insofar as they 
are inconsistent with various Representation Letters furnished Respondents by each of their 
sellers, true and correct copies of which were similarly furnished the Division and the 
Administrative Law Judge at the hearing on Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss. 
- 3 -
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Such Representation Letters and their respective contents are incorporated herein by 
reference. In particular, however, Respondents deny the applicability and relevance of all of 
512 to these proceedings. 
12. Paragraphs 13 and 23 of the amended petitions do not call for a response. 
13. Respondents admit 514 of the amended petitions to the extent such an 
order would be "in the public interest" but deny that any part or portion of these 
proceedings are either "in the public interest" or in the interests of public policy. 
Respondents thus deny this allegation and allege that these entire proceedings are against 
both "the public interest" and public policy. 
14. Respondents deny 515 of the amended petitions in that it is an inaccurate 
and misleading statement of the law relative to the facts of this case. Whether the "sales" 
to Respondents were unlawful or not in and of themselves is irrelevant to whether or not 
Respondents, as purchasers, have any legal liability or otherwise did anything wrong or 
remotely improper in their capacities as broker-dealers and agents. 
15. Respondents deny 5's 16 and 17 of the amended petitions. 
16. There are no 5's 18-22, inclusive, in the amended petitions calling for an 
answer or response. 
17. Respondents admit I s 24 and 25 of the amended petitions as blanket 
statements of the law taken out of context, but deny their applicability in any respect to the 
instant proceedings. 
18. Respondents deny 5's 26 and 27 of the amended petitions. 
WHEREFORE, Respondents pray for an "adversary adjudication" as 
contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act and an order of no cause in their favor on 
- 4 -
both Counts I and II of the amended petitions. Respondents further pray for an award of all 
costs, expenses, and attorney's fees in accordance with Rule 11. §78-27-56, Utah Code 
Ann., as amended, and as otherwise fully contemplated in the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. The Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these proceedings and 
as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The amended petitions fail to state any claim on which relief may be granted 
and as otherwise contemplated in Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred for 
each and every reason conceivably contemplated in and by any and all pleadings heretofore 
filed by Respondents in these proceedings, the contents of which are each and all 
incorporated herein by reference. 
4. The amended petitions are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 
5. The amended petitions are barred by their own unlawfullness and illegality. 
6. The amended petitions are barred by the illegal conduct, bad faith, and 
overall malicious and improper motives of employees of the Division. 
7. The amended petitions are barred in that they have unlawfully damaged 
Respondents in their business and reputations. Such amended petitions have further 
deprived Respondents of liberty and property by individuals acting under color and power of 
state law based upon powers granted to them as a result of their employment by the state. 
8. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred by 
virtue of a No-Action Letter of the Division relative to U.S.A. Medical addressed to Utah 
securities agent Susan Slattery and Utah broker-dealer P.B. Jameson dated August 9,1989, 
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a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as 
Exhibit "A". Such Letter completely undermines the Division's March 1939, Orders in that it 
creates an "unsolicited order" or trading exemption in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for a 
Utah broker-dealer and agent. Such Letter is further inconsistent as a matter of law with 
the instant amended petitions in that such Letter authorizes the very same conduct that is 
proscribed and attributed to Respondents in the amended petitions. Such Letter — a policy 
statement of the Division directed solely to certain privileged individuals — is thus further 
evidence that the amended petitions violate various constitutional rights guaranteed 
Respondents and as otherwise set forth in their Memorandum in Support of their Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on file herein. 
In addition, the foregoing No-Action Letter, Exhibit "A" hereto, ironically puts 
the Division in the untenable and precarious position of aiding and abetting the so-called 
"U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators" identified in the Judge Greene litigation. This is because 
Susan Slattery has been named as a co-defendant in the class action securities fraud, 
racketeering, and insider trading case identified as Arena Land & Investment Co., Inc., et al. 
v. Petty, Strand, Global Oil, Slattery, et al., U.S. District Court Case No. 89-C-144-S, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B". 
In such case, Susan Slattery is an alleged co-conspirator in the U.S.A. Medical stock fraud 
and market manipulation. See 148, page 23 and 1280, page 85 of Exhibit "B" hereto. 
Reference is also made to Respondents' Memorandum of Law in Support of their Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion dated September 27,1989, pages 16 and 17 thereof, which makes reference 
to P.B. Jameson and its alleged participation in the U.S.A. Medical fraud, even after March 
1. Thanks to the Division's secret No-Action Letter (which Respondents only discovered on 
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September 29. by accident). Slattery. P.B. Jameson, convicted felon Michael William Strand, 
and any and all other U.S.A. Medical Co-Conspirators have been given a state license to 
engage in "dishonest and unethical practices'* by distributing its "unsuitable" stock 
out-of-state in obvious furtherance of the U.S.A. Medical fraudulent scheme. The 
foregoing is significant in that it demonstrates not only that the Division does not know 
what "in the public interest" means but that it is otherwise discriminating against 
Respondents in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and otherwise. 
9. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in that 
Respondents have now completed their Exchange Act contracts and there is no showing 
that the conduct complained of will or may occur in the future or. that it is otherwise 
capable of being repeated by Respondents. Therefore, the entire case is moot. This 
defense is consistent with the weight of authority which holds that the SEC cannot obtain 
an injunction or issue a cease and desist order without an adequate showing of not only 
irreparable harm but a substantial showing that the conduct complained of is highly likely to 
occur in the future. Since revocation is on the nature of an injunction, the same principles 
apply in these proceedings. 
10. The amended petitions fail to state a claim and are otherwise barred in 
that Respondents did not need the protection of the securities laws in purchasing U.S.A. 
Medical stock from certain individuals who arguably lacked exemptions. SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co.. 346 U.S. 119 (1953)(holding that securities laws are inapplicable to a person who 
does not need the protection afforded by them). 
11. The amended petitions are violative of or otherwise invoke Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Section §78-27-56. Utah Code Ann., and the Equal Access to 
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Justice Act ("EAJA"). 5 U.S.C. §504, "Costs and Fees of Parties", Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 5. 
*60.104, as amended, effective August 5,1985, Sec. 1, Public Law 99-80, 99 Stat. 183. 
Based on the violation or applicability of the authority referred to in this paragraph, 
Respondents are entitled to reimbursement of all costs, expenses, and attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with these unlawful proceedings. 
12. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted because the Division has no power or authority to summarily suspend all 
exemptions from registration under §61-1-14(2). Utah Code Ann., particularly when not 
even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has such power or authority to suspend 
al] exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933. In the alternative, it is an abuse of agency 
discretion under the circumstances for the Division to have suspended all §14(2) 
exemptions, even if the Division had such power or authority, which it does not. Further, the 
Division's findings of fact relative to their March, 1989 Orders do not support the wholesale 
and ruthless suspension of all §14(2) exemptions from registration under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
13. The Division's amended petitions fail to state a claim because 
Respondents' sellers had "exemptions" regardless of the Division's March, 1989, Orders. 
This is because such sellers were "bona fide purchasers" who acquired their U.S.A. Medical 
stock in good faith, without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code and otherwise, they paid value. The Division thus cannot 
prohibit the sale of such stock to Respondents and this exemplifies the Division's regulatory 
overreaching with respect to its March 1989 Orders. The burden is also on the Division in 
these proceedings to prove that Respondents' sellers were not "bona fide purchasers" of 
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the U.S.A. Medical stock in issue or that Respondents themselves were not "bona fide 
purchasers". 
COUNTERCLAIM 
1. Respondents incorporate each and every allegation hereinabove as if each 
were set forth more fully hereafter verbatim. 
2. The original and amended petitions have been brought and filed in violation 
of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann. 
3. These proceedings have been brought for an improper purpose and are 
based on personal, malicious, vindictive, and retaliatory motives on the part of Division 
employees and personnel. 
4. Respondents have been deprived of liberty and property as a result of the 
instant proceedings. 
5. Respondents have been substantially damaged in their business and 
reputations by the initiation of the instant proceedings. 
6. Respondents have incurred substantial unwarranted and unnecessary 
attorney's fees, expenses, and costs in being required to defend the instant proceedings. 
7. As a direct and proximate result of these proceedings. Respondents have 
been substantially damaged as aforesaid. 
8. Neither the Division nor any of its personnel, including the Utah Attorney 
General, has statutory immunity or any lawful exemption from the operation of either Rule 
11, §78-27-56, Utah Code Ann., or the spirit of the Equal Access to Justice Act. 
9. The equity and other powers and authorities of this court enable it to make 
the type of award to Respondents, if warranted, as specifically contemplated in the Equal 
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Access to Justice Act. regardless of whether said Act directly applies to these particular 
proceedings. The spirit of such Act therefore does and should apply to these proceedings 
regardless. 
10. The amended petitions have not been brought with a reasonable 
investigation of the facts or the law. nor have they been brought after a reasonable inquiry 
into whether the allegations contained therein are well grounded in fact or whether they are 
otherwise warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification or 
reversal of existing law. 
11. These proceedings have been brought by the Division and its personnel In 
bad faith. 
WHEREFORE, Respondents pray for an award of all costs, expenses, and 
attorney's fees incurred by them in any respect in connection with the existing proceedings. 
DATED this 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the^ /day of November, 1989. (s)he 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
with attendant Exhibits by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin. Director and 
Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division. Utah 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge and Presiding Officer J. Stephen Eklund, Esq.. 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0802; Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General. 115 South State Capitol. Salt 
Lake City. Utah 84114; and to Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. & Nebeker, 
Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, Kennecott Bjdg ,^ 10jE^st South T^prjple Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84133. 
J:ANSWER.1-3 
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EXHIBIT " S " 
State 01 Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 Easl 300 South 
P O Box 4£>aa? 
SattLafceGty Utah B4145-OB0? 
l)»r«U»r t <801) 'AKMIWX) 
August 9, 1989 
Ms. Susan Slattery 
P.B. Jameson, Inc. 
175 South Main Street 
Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
Dear Ms. Slattery: 
John Baldwin asked me to respond to your letter regarding 
trading in U.S.A. Medical. The division's position is that if a 
Utah agent, also licensed in other states, causes the firm to 
execute unsolicited orders on an agency basis with customers from 
any of those other states, and the transaction is executed outside 
the state of Utah, then the division probably has no jurisdiction 
over the trades. 
Please be aware, however'; of several caveats: First, if any 
transaction is conducted with a customer in any state in which the 
agent is not licensed, that state may have grounds to take action 
against the agent and firm. That other state's order, as well as 
the fact of unlicensed activity in another state, may be the basis 
of an action by this division against the agent and firm. Second, 
virtually every state (and federal) law applicable requires that 
there be no active trading in a stock until there is full 
disclosure of all material facts. We believe that adequate 
disclosure would at a minimum include discussion of the federal 
temporary restraining order in the U.S.A. Medical case and the 
reasons therefor. Before executing many transactions you may want 
to ensure that an amended Form 15c-2(ll) is on file. 
This letter is not an official opinion of the division and is 
based on the facts as presented in your letter. Should any facts 
change, or should the transaction occur differently than described 
in your letter and this response, then this letter will not be 
binding upon the division. 
If you have any questions, please contact the division. 
Sincerely, % 
Constance B. White 
Assistant Director <*,, 
EXHIBIT 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L Buhler 
Exccuttw Director 
John C. Baldwin 
EXHIBIT "T" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
: MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
In the Matter of the Registration of : ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. : 
CRD No. 07678 : Case No. SD-89-46BD 
In the Matter of the Registration of : 
Marlen Vernon Johnson : Case No. SD-89-47AG 
CRD No. 2598888 : 
Appearances: 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
Mark J. Griffin and Kathleen C. McGinley for the Division of Securities 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
By Motion, dated September 27,1989, Respondents seek a dismissal of the instant adjudicative 
proceedings. A memorandum in opposition thereto was filed by the Division on October 13,1989. 
Respondents filed a reply to that memorandum on October 25,1989. On October 27,1989, the Court 
advised respective counsel that the pending motion would be addressed on the basis of the filed memoranda 
and that no oral argument was deemed necessary. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters die following 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend that the July 19,1989 Amended Petition fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted Sparing detail, Respondents urge that the amended petition should be d i smiss 
because: (1) it violates numerous constitutional provisions; (2) Respondents' conduct was not a dishonest 
or unethical practice as a matter of law; (3) the Division has no authority to prohibit purchases of stock for 
any reason; (4) the Division has no statutory authority to revoke a license based on Respondents' 
0'/Ujb65 
participation in a securities transaction occurring in interstate commerce and undertaken to complete 
obligations imposed by federal law; (5) issuance of the amended petition serves no public interest and, thus, 
is not within the Division's polios power, (6) a person cannot aid and abet or solicit a sale of securities to 
himself, as alleged in Count I; (7) Respondents' purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities was 
suitable and the concept of suitability, as alleged in Count n, is irrelevant because that concept is only 
applicable to a purchase of securities from a broker; (8) this proceeding is barred by reason of an August 9, 
1989 no-action letter issued by the Division; (9) there is no evidence that Respondents are capable of 
repeating the alleged improper conduct and, thus, this case is moot; (10) Respondents did not need the 
protection afforded by the securities law relative to their purchase of the above-stated securities. 
The July 19,1989 Amended Petition sets forth various factual allegations. For the purpose of 
addressing the pending motion, all of the factual allegations contained in the amended petition are 
incorporated herein by reference. To generalize, the amended petition contains allegations that (1) 
Respondents purchased USA Medical Corporation securities during such time that all transactional 
exemptions from registration of those securities were unavailable; (2) the unavailability of transactional 
exemptions from registration as to the securities in question was based on a Summary Order, issued March 
1,1989, and a Default Order, issued March 27,1989; (3) Respondents' purchase of the securities occurred 
within the S tate of Utah; and (4) Respondents contacted an existing shareholder of USA Medical 
Corporation securities in an attempt to purchase said securities, actually purchased USA Medical 
Corporation securities from five other named individuals and may have also purchased USA Medical 
Corporation securities from other unnamed sources after the March 1,1989 Order. Based on the factual 
allegations set forth in the amended petition, the Division asserts that a disciplinary sanction should enter as 
to Respondents' registration because such an order is in die public interest and Respondents have engaged in 
dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business, violative of Section 61-1-6(1) and R177-6-l(g). 
Prior to a review of the pending motion, a preliminary matter should be noted. Nobeneficial 
purpose would be served by addressing this motion in any manner similar to either of the extremes reflected 
in the memoranda which has been submitted by the parties in this case. Simply put, am attempt will be 
2 OOOjbbG 
made to rule on the pending motion without recourse to either legal puffery and/or baldfaced conclusions. 
The filing of any subsequent matters for consideration during these proceedings by counsel for either party 
should adhere to the same standard. 
Section 63-46b-l(4), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides as follows: 
This chapter does not preclude... the presiding officer during an 
adjudicative proceeding from: 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss . . . if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b).. . of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party 
Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the drafting and interpretation of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act further provide as follows: 
A presiding officer i s . . . authorized to grant a timely motion either to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, if die requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the UAPA are met The well-developed caselaw 
concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist presiding officers in deciding [such] 
motions . . . . 
In Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Service Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165,467 P.2d 605 (1970), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted the standard which governs the consideration of a motion to dismiss made 
pursuant to Rule 12(b), to wit: 
A complaint does not fail to stale a claim unless it appears to a certainty that 
the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of the claim. Id at 168. (Emphasis added.) 
With one exception, Respondents' assertions that issuance of the amended petition violates various 
constitutional provisions are wholly lacking in any merit The March 27,1989 Default Order was issued to 
prohibit any subsequent trading of USA Medical Corporation securities within this state. The regulation of 
securities transactions conducted within the confines of this state, as well as the regulation of conduct 
undertaken by registered agents and broker-dealers in thai respect, is a proper exercise of die police power 
authorized by the provisions of Section 61-1*1 et seq. As generally stated in 79 C J.S. Securities 
Regulation, Section 188: 
A state has the power to regulate and control the traffic in securities which is 
conducted within the borders of the state, the regulation and control of such traffic 
being regarded as a proper exercise of the police power of the state.... 
Therein, it is further stated as follows: 
3 
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The Federal Securities Act of 1933 specifically provides that the Act shall not 
affect the jurisdiction of the states where the regulation is not in conflict with the 
Act This indicates the clear intention of Congress to leave the states free to exercise 
such regulatory control over the sale of securities as does not conflict with the 
provisions of the federal Act, and, in the absence of such a conflict, it is 
contemplated that the states and the federal government shall exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction in this field. 
In Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), the United States Supreme Court held that a state 
statute regulating the disposition of securities within the borders of a state which only incidentally affects 
interstate commerce is not violative of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Therein, the Court 
stated as follows: 
The provisions of the law, it will be observed, apply to dispositions of 
securities within the state... this certainly is only an indirect burden upon them as 
objects of interstate commerce, if they may be regarded as such. It is a police 
regulation strictly, not affecting them until there is an attempt to make disposition of 
them within the state. To give them more immunity than this is to give them more 
immunity than more tangible articles are given, they having no exemption from 
regulations the purpose of which is prevent fraud or deception. Such regulations 
affect interstate commerce in them only incidentally. Id. at 557-558. (Emphasis in 
original.) 
A considered review of the amended petition clearly reflects two matters which must be recognized. 
First, the factual allegation of critical relevance in the amended petition is that Respondents purchased USA 
Medical Corporation securities. It is that conduct which potentially subjects Respondents to disciplinary 
sanction in these proceedings. Respondents' subsequent disposition of those securities and the satisfaction 
of Respondents' outstanding contractual obligations to third parties, while matters potentially affecting 
Respondents' NASD membership, are not relevant to whether the amended petition states a cause of action. 
Simply put, there is no rationally discernible conflict between the initiation of these proceedings and 
existing federal securities law or most of the various constitutional provisions referenced in Respondents' 
memorandum in support of the pending motion. 
Further, if die facts alleged in the amended petition were proved, it could be concluded that 
Respondents participation as a purchaser of the securities facilitated the violation of art March 27,1989 
Order issued by the division to suspend the trading (both buying and selling) of securities which had been 
the subject of market manipulation and securities fraud. limiting the operative effect of that order to one 
which precludes only the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities, as Respondents have repeatedly 
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urged, would be patently unreasonable. Thus, the amended petition properly raises the issue whether 
Respondents' purchase of the securities in question constituted dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business. 
For the record, the Court notes Respondent's contention that the division has not sought to 
discipline others who may have engaged in conduct violative of the March 27,1989 Order. The Court also 
notes the division's response in that regard. Whether the division has engaged in arbitrary and capricious 
enforcement of that order and whether entry of a disciplinary sanction as to Respondents could thus violate 
their right to equal protection are matters which cannot be adequately addressed at this time upon review of 
the pending motion. On its' face, the amended petition states a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Nevertheless, any relevant and substantial evidence of arbitrary or capricious enforcement of the March 27, 
1989 Order, if offered as a defense during the hearing on the merits of this case, could be properly addressed 
at that time. 
Respondents assert that the amended petition serves no public benefit because there is no evidence 
that any Utah resident "has been or can be in the least damaged or injured by the conduct of Respondents". 
The simple rejoinder to that contention is as follows: 
There are numerous grounds for denying, suspending or revoking the 
registration of persons engaged in the securities business. Under the Uniform 
Securities Act, and most blue sky laws, an order depriving a person of die 
registration can only be entered if it is in die "public interest" to do so. This 
requirement is intended to insure that minor or technical violations will not be the 
subject of disciplinary actions by administrators. When a denial, suspension or 
revocation is in the public interest, it has been said to mean that it is necessary to 
protect the investing public. However, this does not mean that just because no 
member of the public has been injured that the loss of privilege is not warranted. 
The distinction seems to be whether the violation was insubstantially technical and 
inadvertent or whether it was willful. 1 lC-Part 2, Business Organizations, Section 
8.09, Sowards & Hirsch Blue Sky Regulation. (Emphasis added.) 
If no damage was occasioned by Respondents' conduct, such would be a relevant mitigating factor with 
respect to any disciplinary sanction which may be imposed. However, whether entry of such a sanction "is 
in the public interest" is not dependent upon proof of injury to the public and it is not necessary to allege 
damage in order to state a cause of action in these proceedings. 
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Paragraph 12(a) of the amended petition contains allegations as to Respondents' actions regarding 
the possible purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities from a John Dawson. Paragraphs 16 and 17 
contain allegations that: (1) Respondent Johnson solicited and/or purchased USA Medical Corporation 
securities; (2) Respondent Johnson thus encouraged or otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7; 
and (3) Respondents solicited, encouraged or aided the violation of the March 27,1989 Order. 
Notwithstanding Respondents' assertions, Count I is not based on an allegation that Respondents aided and 
abetted or solicited a sale of the securities to themselves. Rather, the essence of Count I is that 
Respondents' purchase of the securities resulted in the violation of the March 27,1989 IDefault Order and, as 
a corollary, Section 61-1-7. Whether Respondents urged USA Medical Corporation shareholders to sell 
their securities is a matter adequately and properly pled in the amended petition and relevant as an 
aggravating factor with respect to whatever disciplinary sanction should enter if it is found that Respondents 
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
R177-6-l(gXB) provides as follows: 
The following acts and practices, when performed by a broker-dealer... are 
considered contrary to Section 6(lXg) of the Act and may constitute grounds f or 
denial, suspension or revocation of registration. 
(3) Recommending to a customer the . . . sa le . . . of any 
security without reasonable grounds to believe that such 
transaction or recommendation is suitable for the customer 
based upon seasonable inquiry concerning the customer's 
investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any 
other relevant information known by the broker-dealer. 
With reference to Count II, the allegations of the amended petition are not sufficient to state a cause of 
action. Concededly, Paragraph 26 contains a general allegation that a broker-dealer and customer 
relationship existed between Respondents and those individuals who sold USA Medical Corporation 
securities to Respondents. However, there is no allegation that Respondents recommended to any 
individuals that they sell the securities in question. Paragraph 12(a) only alleges that Respondent Johnson 
contacted a shareholder with the intent to purchase USA Medical Corporation securities owned by that 
individual and then informed that shareholder as to the amount offered for the securities; and the manner in 
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which a sale could be finalized. Paragraphs 12(b) through 12(f) only allege Respondents' purchase of USA 
Medical Corporation securities from other various shareholders. 
Of greater concern is the assertion in the Division's memorandum that recommending "to a 
customer that he engage in conduct violative of law is unsuitable per se". Taken at face value, it may be 
true that such a recommendation would not be a "suitable" or a "proper" practice in a generic sense. 
However, a fair reading of R177-6-l(g)(B)(3) suggests that the rule in question is one directed to whether a 
securities transaction is advisable, given particular reference to a customer's financial circumstances, 
investment objectives and the likelihood that either a purchase or sale of the security would be beneficial to 
the customer under those circumstances. As used in the rule, the word "suitable" has a more specialized and 
technical meaning than that implied by the Division in its' memorandum. An unlawful securities 
transaction is not, ipso facto, unsuitable within the meaning of R177-6-l(g)(B)(3). Given the foregoing, 
there is a proper basis to dismiss Count II of the amended petition. 
Respondents' final three assertions can be summarily addressed. The August 9,1989 no-action 
letter was issued with respect to an inquiry concerning securities transactions "executed outside the state of 
Utah". Under such circumstances, the letter correctly notes that "the division probably has no jurisdiction 
over the trades". In the instant case, Respondents' purchase of USA Medical Corporation securities was a 
matter wholly executed within this state. Thus, the August 9,1989 no-action letter is not relevant to 
whether the amended petition states a cause of action. 
The possible entry of a disciplinary sanction in these proceedings is based on allegations of prior 
misconduct and the amended petition adequately states a claim in that respect Allegations of continuing 
misconduct could have been necessary if injunctive relief were being sought However, entry of a 
disciplinary sanction is a matter completely distinct from such relief and Respondents' assertion that this 
case is moot because the conduct in question is not likely to recur is without merit 
Finally, whether Respondents required the protection afforded by securities laws relative to their 
role as a purchaser of USA Medical Corporation securities is not at issue in these proceedings. Rather, it is 
OOU~o/i 
7 
whether Respondents' alleged conduct properly subjects them to potential disciplinary sanction by reason of 
the statute and rules which govern their status as registrants of the division. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the July 19,1989 Amended Petition fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted with regard to Count II set forth therein and, thus, that count is hereby 
dismissed. In all other respects, Respondents' motion is denied. 
Dated this day of December, 1989. 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Accompanying 
Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid to: Mark J. Griffin, assistant attorney genend for the Division of 
Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; to 
John Michael Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and to Craig F. 
McCullough, Callister Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Boor, Kennecott Building, 10 East South Temple Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for Respondents. A copy of the Motion to Dismiss and 
Accompanying Order was also hand delivered to Kathleen C. McGinley, Director, Broker/Dealer Section, 
Division of Securities, Department of Commerce. 
Dated this . day of December, 1989 
000 .</7^ 
EXHIBIT "U" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
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DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Marlen Vernon Johnson, being first put on his oath, deposes and says the 
following on behalf of himself and Respondent Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc., in support of 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on file herein: 
1. That your affiant is a respondent in the above-matters and he has personal 
knowledge of that which is contained herein. He is also a principal of Johnson-Bowles 
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Company, Inc., also a respondent in these matters, and he has personal knowledge, power 
and authority to make this affidavit on its behalf as well as on his own behalf. 
2. That in order to consummate various out-of-state Exchange Act contracts 
entered into by Respondent Johnson-Bowles in interstate commerce prior to March 1, 
1989, your affiant purchased U.S.A. Medical stock from certain individuals. [Emphasis 
added.] 
3. That based on the lawsuit Respondent Johnson-Bowles filed in federal 
court in February 1989, it became well known in the local brokerage community that 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" securities of U.S.A. Medical. As a result of this 
litigation and the fact that a market for the stock of U.S.A. Medical ceased to exist, your 
affiant was contacted by several individuals in March and April 1989, each expressing a 
desire to sell U.S.A. Medical stock that they owned and held. 
4. Because Respondent Johnson-Bowles believed that it had no choice but to 
honor its outstanding Exchange Act contracts entered into prior to March 1,1989, your 
affiant agreed to purchase U.S.A. Medical stock for the exclusive purpose of consummating 
such contracts previously entered into in interstate commerce. 
5. Prior to effecting any purchases of such stock, however, your affiant made 
certain that each such seller was well aware of the Division's March 1989 Orders and that 
the Division could contend that such prospective sellers lacked Utah exemptions from 
registration, and further, your affiant made certain that each was aware of Judge J. 
Thomas Greene's ruling on February 28, 1989. At such time, each prospective seller 
conveyed his personal knowledge of the immediately foregoing as further confirmed in the 
additional supporting affidavits filed contemporaneously herewith. 
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6. At no time did either Respondent, or any one of their agents or employees, 
ever -solicit-, "aid", "counsel", "command", "induce", "recommend", or otherwise "encourage", 
in any respect, any of such sellers to sell or otherwise part with any portion of their U.S.A. 
Medical stock to or for the benefit of either Respondent. In fact, to the very best of your 
affiant's recollection, each such seller contacted your affiant first and offered to sell or 
otherwise, each "solicited" him to purchase stock of U.S.A. Medical. At one point, your 
affiant did initiate a call to one John Dawson but such was only after your affiant was 
informed independently from one Karl Smith that Mr. Dawson was anxious to sell his U.S.A. 
Medical stock. However, such conversation with Mr. Dawson did not result in the purchase 
or sale of any U.S.A. Medical stock and your affiant believes that under the First Amendment 
to the Constitution he certainly has the right to talk to anyone he desires, including John 
Dawson. Your affiant can further attest that everyone from whom he ultimately purchased 
U.S.A. Medical stock contacted him first, either directly or indirectly, offering to sell him 
such person's U.S.A. Medical stock as each knew that Johnson-Bowles had a federal 
requirement for it. In addition, those from whom your affiant ultimately purchased U.S.A. 
Medical stock after March 1,1989, were not only anxious to sell their U.S.A. Medical stock, 
but each (with the exception of Sheldon Flateman, a New York resident) personally and 
voluntarily ventured into the office of Respondent Johnson-Bowles for the express purpose 
of selling their U.S.A. Medical stock. Further, at the time of the purchases, each such 
person, with the exception of Paul Jones and Sheldon Flateman (both licensed securities 
brokers registered with the NASD), executed Representation Letters, true and correct 
copies of which are on file herein and which are further attached to the supporting 
affidavits of Richard Sax, Leo Pavich, Philip Tanzini, Nick Julian, and Jim Coleman. 
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7. That two of those individuals from whom your affiant purchased U.S.A. 
Medical stock, namely Paul Jones and Sheldon Flateman, were and are licensed securities 
brokers with the States of Utah and New York, respectively, and each are NASD registered 
representatives and therefore, your affiant did not think it necessary to obtain 
Representation Letters from them. This is because your affiant understands that as a 
matter of law, including Utah law, and, on advice of counsel, a broker cannot "solicit" 
another broker to do anything. Moreover, both Messrs. Jones and Flateman informed your 
affiant that they were well aware of the Division's March 1989 Orders, including Judge 
Greene's ruling, and, because both are licensed and knowledgeable securities brokers, each 
was naturally aware of the effect of such. 
8. That of those from whom your affiant purchased U.S.A. Medical stock after 
March 1, 1989, each seller informed your affiant that he was fully aware of what had gone 
on and what was going on with respect to U.S.A. Medical and its stock and each 
represented that the prospective sales to your affiant were "suitable" to each one's 
financial or investment needs or objectives, particularly when each knew and acknowledged 
to your affiant that the stock of U.S.A. Medical was virtually worthless, there being no 
market for it. That each such seller also informed your affiant that he was a "bona fide 
purchaser" of the stock and that he was and had been unaffiliated in any respect with 
U.S.A. Medical or the so-called "U.S.A. Medical Conspirators". Thus, your affiant believed 
and was informed that he was purchasing stock from "bona fide purchasers'* for mere 
transfer or delivery as fully contemplated in Article 8, U.U.C.C. — stock which was in no 
way "tainted" by the U.S.A. Medical fraud. 
0->b ; :3 
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9. That none of the purchases that occurred after March 1, 1989. for the 
exclusive purpose of consummating outstanding Exchange Act contracts, involved a 
,,commissionM or a stock purchase confirmation from Respondent Johnson-Bowles. Your 
affiant thus believes that such transactions were entirely private and between consenting 
adults and such did not involve any such sellers as "customers'1 of either Respondent. 
Based on the foregoing and the fact that anyone could have undertaken such purchases, 
your affiant, in making such purchases, does not believe that he was acting in either his 
capacity as a securities agent or otherwise as a principal of Johnson-Bowles. 
10. That because your affiant purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock in issue from 
"bona fide purchasers", he believes that he was also a "bona fide purchaser" in that such 
transactions were undertaken in good faith, without notice of any "adverse claims" as 
contemplated in Article 8 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, and your affiant paid 
valuable consideration. Lastly, the purchases in issue were merely to effect "delivery" or 
"transfer" as contemplated in Article 8 of the federal Uniform Commercial Code — 
ministerial acts — and your affiant does not believe, in his professional experience, that the 
Division's March 1989, Orders impaired or otherwise had an effect (or were designed to 
have an effect) on Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
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In re: Johnson-Bowies Company. Inc.. and Marien V. Johnson 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this^day of November. 1989. 
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EXHIBIT "V" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. St©. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
^ NOV 29 TO 
DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
AFFIDAVIT OF KARL SMITH 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Karl Smith, on his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That your affiant has personal knowledge of that which is contained herein. 
2. That sometime on or after April 1,1989. your affiant learned that 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" the securities of U.S.A. Medical. 
- 1 - OOOJUS'I 
3. That as a result of the foregoing, your affiant, who knew Marlen V. Johnson, 
gave Mr. Johnson, a Mr. John Dawson's telephone number because your affiant was 
informed or under the impression that Mr. Dawson owned stock of U.S.A. Medical and might 
be interested in selling the same. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this ^ f ^ a y of November, 1989. 
-HCar^ S 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this^? 
at Salt Lake City, UT 






^ DEC 2 1 RFC 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ., Np. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
 1RE D 
DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCE 
EATCHEL IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Bruce Eatchel, being first put on his oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That I have personal knowledge of and experience as to that which is 
contained herein. I have also taken several federal and state courses and examinations with 
respect to securities and based on this education and my six (6) year employment in the 
brokerage industry, I consider myself to be as much of an expert as anyone with similar 
- 1 -
experience and training. That I am also a registered representative with the NASD and 
licensed as an agent with the Utah Securities Division though I am no longer employed in the 
securities business. 
2. That during the beginning of 1989, up to and until, June thereof, I was 
employed as a securities trader with Respondent Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc. That I was 
terminated by Johnson-Bowles in June, 1989, and I am now employed with a company that 
distributes art posters on a national basis. 
3. That as a securities trader, I had discussions with traders from other 
brokerage firms all day long and, during the time that I was employed by Johnson-Bowles, I 
often conversed several times a day with Mr. Paul Jones, a trader with broker-dealer 
Wasatch Stock Trading. 
4. That I have read Exhibit "A" to the Division's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Respondent's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Petitioner's Cross 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and I can attest, of my own personal knowledge, that 
its contents are wrong, misleading, and incorrect in several respects. 
5. First, after March 1, 1989,1 had several discussions with Mr. Paul Jones 
about the stock of U.S.A. Medical and I can attest that he knew of the Division's Order and 
Judge Greene's ruling and their effect and was perhaps more aware of such than I was. 
That Mr. Jones also knew that Johnson-Bowles was "short" stock of U.S.A. Medical and 
during typical trading-related conversations we discussed his selling stock at 120 per 
share. I can honestly say that I did not ever intentionally, deliberately, or continually "offer" 
to buy such stock and to the extent we did discuss it, we only discussed prices at which he 
might have been interested in selling it. These kinds of discussions are typical of traders in 
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the securities industry. In other words, I certainly did not call Mr. Jones "hundreds" of times 
to "solicit" him to sell his U.S.A. Medical stock as set forth in Exhibit "A". This is because as 
a trader, I conversed with Mr. Jones regularly about lots and lots of stocks, including what 
was happening with various issuers. I might add that any conversations I engaged in with 
Mr. Jones after March 1, 1989, wherein the subject of U.S.A. Medical came up, I can attest 
that I was not acting under the direction of Marlen V. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles when I 
engaged in such conversations with Mr. Jones or anyone else about U.S.A. Medical; such 
were just ordinary, every day conversations which included "small talk". Mr. Jones and I had 
both been trading the stock of U.S.A. Medical prior to March 1, and so it was quite natural 
to discuss it after that date as it was a highly unusual situation — one that had not 
occurred in my several years of experience in the brokerage industry. 
6. That sometime during April, 1989,1 received a call from Paul Jones who 
asked me if I thought Johnson-Bowles was interested in buying U.S.A. Medical stock or 
whether it had in fact covered all of its "short" positions. I informed Mr. Jones that I 
thought Mr. Johnson had purchased some stock at 50 per share and that Johnson-Bowles 
may have already completed its outstanding pre-March 1, Exchange Act contracts. Hearing 
this, Mr. Jones became anxious and expressed a great interest in selling his U.S.A. Medical 
stock. This is because I gathered that he then realized that he would not be able to sell his 
stock at 120 or at any other price once Marlen Johnson was able to consummate 
Johnson-Bowles' open and outstanding, out-of-state Exchange Act contracts. Mr. Jones 
then offered to sell his U.S.A. Medical stock for 80 per share at which point either he asked 
me or I simply put him in contact with Mr. Marlen V. Johnson as I had nothing to do with the 
situation and "covering" Johnson-Bowles' "short" positions was not my responsibility. 
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7. Lastly, having been a securities trader, I can attest that in the industry, a 
broker cannot "solicit" another broker or trader to buy or sell anything. This is because in 
my experience — and because of my previous employment and experience I believe I may be 
deemed an expert — the "unsolicited order exemption", by its own language, applies only to 
a broker's "customers" (i.e., to the general public); it does not apply to another broker, 
trader, or dealer, including Mr. Jones. Furthermore. I am aware of the allegations in the 
Division's amended petitions and I do not see how either "solicitation", "encouragement", or 
"aiding", the crux of Count I to the amended petitions, applies to Respondents' conduct in 
even the most remote of senses. For what it's worth. I also do not believe that what 
Respondents did in order to honor their Exchange Act contracts is "dishonest or unethical" 
from a broker's standpoint as I do not see who such conduct is "dishonest or unethical" 
towards and it would seem to me that there must be an object or recipient of such 
adjectives. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this 20th day of December, 1989 
.-— — — — — — — -
Notary Public I 
CATHY C.ARNOT • 
11171 Buddtoa Drive | Sandy, Utah 84070 
VCommitiic --•-«-
November! 
Ity mtafcton Expires • 
* S L ° ™ „ I ^ R U C E EATCHEL 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
J:AFDVT.17-18 
Notary Pufcflic\ 
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DRAFT 
PRESS REISASE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
September l, 1289 
The Utah Securities Division .And tJSA Medical Company have 
reached an agreement pursuant to which shares of the company may 
resume trading at some future date, provided the Company files a 
registration statement with the Division. USA Medical stock was 
the subject of an Order of the. bivision on March 1, 1989, denying 
the availability of all exemptions from registration and, in 
effect, shutting down trading c£ th« stock on the Utah market. 
The Division1* Order remains in effect and shares bf USA Ma<Jical 
cannot be traded in Utah until the. Division approves an as yet to 
be filed registration statement for USA Medical and the Utah 
Securities Advisory Board has rescinds the. Order• 
In February, 1989, USA Medical stock was the subject of a 
civil action filed in U. S; District Court for the Central Division 
of Utah by Johnson-Bowles Coxwaanv- Ino., a local broker-dealer* 
In that action,. Johnson-Bowles* made a Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction against further trading of USA Medical stock on the 
basis that it had been illegally traded. Although Judge J. Thomas 
Greene. denied the Motion, he found that the stock 
w
 * • ,was unlawfully issued, lias never been registered with 
any proper regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and. has been and is continuing to be 
traded illegally.1* 
As the basis for denying /Tnhnson-Bowlefi Motion, the Court 
noted that 
M
 Johnson-Bowles - kriew. or should have. known 
about*.. irregularities as, to non-registration, non-exempt 
.OttO -714
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*tatus and illegal trading of USA Medical stock, and that 
Johnson-Bowles participated in trading in the stock after it 
became a market maker, and is charge with knowledge of these 
irregularities.n 
Based upon the court's findinas. th^ Utah Securities Division 
issued its Karch lr 1989 Order and initiated an investigation, 
which Continues, into the irrecfularitie* with respect to trading 
of USA Kedical stock • The Division1 s investigation of USA Medical 
focuses on the use of nominees to make a public distribution of the 
shares without registration, excessive markups by brokers trading 
the shares, illegal price manipulation and possible fraudulent 
statements and non-disclosures of material facts to some previous 
purchasers of USA Medical stock. 
I*> addition, in April, the Division of Securities filed, an 
administrative proceeding against MArlen v, Johnson and. his firm, 
Johnsor\~Bowles and Paul Jones,, a sales Representative of another 
firm, seeking to revoke the securities licenses of each for 
engaging in securities transactions involving USA Medical stock 
while t&e Division's order is ** af****. 
Before the Division will rescind i^a Order, allowing shares 
to tra<**r USA Medical must file a registration statement with the 
Divisionf including filing audited financial statements and other 
disclosures concerning USA Medicaids history. In addition, certain 
requirements will be imposed. on broker* with respect to future 
sales of USA Medical stock. Such requirements will include 
disclosures to and obtaining representations from purchasers 
concerning their status as purchasers. PQllowina completion of the 
registration process, the matter will be presented to the 
0900 715 
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Securities Advisory Board with . the r«ou««t that : the Division's 
Order be rescinded* The Division, cautioned brokers and the 
investing public that until the registration statement is effective 
and the Advisory Board has approved the action, tne Marcn l Order 
is still in effect prohibiting transactions involving USA Medical 
stock in Utah* 
OO'JWIG 
EXHIBIT "Y" 
MEMORANDUM TO FILE 
FROM: Dorothy Akins 
DATE: May 8, 1989 @ 2:30 P.M. 
RE: USA MEDICAL CORPORATION 
FILE #: 89-02-15-01 
TELEPHONE (^OFFICE ^ O^FERENCE WITH WHOM: Paul Jones 272-2700 
Jones a registered rep with Wasatch Stock Trading. He has been a 
broker for approximately 3 years. He passed the Series 63 & 7. 
Took the Series 24, however did not pass it. 
Myself and Scott Frost talked with Paul Jones at his 
attorney's office, Mark Van Wagoner 215 South State Street Salt 
Lake City, Utah on May 8, 1989, at 2:30 p.m. Jones stated the 
following: 
1. He was a broker at Wasatch Stock Trading. 
2. That Wasatch had a meeting with the agents, which he 
attended, stating that the State Securities had suspended the 
trading on USA Medical Corp. Jones could not remember the date 
of the meeting, however it was soon after the Order was served on 
the firm. 
3. That sometime prior to the suspension order issued by 
the State, he had purchased 100,000 shares of USA Medical 
Corporation at 30 cents a share for his own account* 
4. That he was good friends with Bruce Eatchel, a trader at 
Johnson-Bowles. He had worked with Bruce numerous times with 
good results. 
0'»0 t83 
5. That Bruce Eatchel contacted Jones numerous times and 
wanted him to sell his USA Medical Corporation stock. 
6. That on April 18, 1989, Bruce Eatchel again contacted 
Jones and stated that other people had sold their USA Medical 
Stock and that Johnson-Bowles shorts were being covered and 
didn't he want to sell his shares? Jones stated that he was 
tired of Eatchel contacting him, that he had contacted him 
hundreds of times to sell his shares, so finally he agreed to 
sell for 8 cents a share. 
7. On April 18, 1989, Jones went to Johnson-Bowles, handed 
Marlen Johnson his four or five certificates, which were in 
street names, and Marlen handed him an $8000.00 check, written on 
a Johnson-Bowles1 firm account. 
8. Jones stated that he knew of the suspension on USA 
Medical, however he didnft think there was anything wrong with 
doing a private transaction. 
Jones stated he would provide a copy of the check and would 
also get the certificate numbers. 
000* bSl 
BEFORE THE 
D E P A R T M E N T OP C O M M E R C E 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE 
STATE OP UTAH 




DOROTHY A. AKINS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Having been duly sworn, Dorothy A. Akins, hereby deposes and 
states the following: 
1. That I am an investigator for the Securities Division 
of the Utah Department of Commerce, 
2. That I am investigating alleged violations of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. 
3. The investigation involves USA Medical Corporation, 
Johnson-Bowles and others. 
4. That on or about July 12, 1989, I contacted by telephone 
John Dawson. Mr. Dawson stated that at the time Marlen Johnson had 
contacted him to purchase his stock, he did not have a customer 
account at Johnson-Bowles, however, he did have one several years 
ago. 
5. That on or about July 12, 1989, I contacted by telephone 
00U.tS3 
Nick Julian. Mr. Julian stated that he has and had an account at 
Johnson-Bowles. 
6. That the above statements, to the best of my knowledge, 
information and belief are true. 
DATED this /T day of /LIU^U^AJ . 1989. 
DOROTHY A. AKINS appeared before me this. 
1989, and attested that the foregoing information is true to the 
best of her knowledge and belief, ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC: y^L ^ ^ ^ € ^ 
My commission expires: C / ^ y ^ /??/ 
'.^£j>C Residing in: /o-c-t' 
My commission e x p i r e s : 
Res id ing i n : 
OOLKt^O 
EXHIBIT "Z" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
•mfB 
^ DEC 21RECD 
DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
OBJECTION AND MOTION 
TO STRIKE AND MEMORANDUM 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents, by and through their counsel, hereby lodge their objection to and 
otherwise move the Court for an order striking Exhibits "A" and "C" to the Division's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Support of Petitioner's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, together dated 
December 14,1989. 
The basis for this formal objection and motion to strike is that Exhibits "A" and 
"C" to such memorandums are gross hearsay and are otherwise not legally acceptable. 
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proper, or in valid format under the express provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Such exhibits are further totally irrelevant to the simple legal issues before 
this tribunal and should be further striken based on their attempted prejudicial value. 
Respondents thus pray for an order striking such exhibits In their entirety in that they 
should not become part of the record in this case and should otherwise not be considered 
in any respect by the Court in ruling on Respondents' Rule 56 motion. D & L Supply 
v. Saurini 775 P.2d 420, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, (Sup. Ct. 06/08/89); Bruno v. Plateau Mining 
Company, 747 P.2d 1055, 73 Utah Adv. Rep 89, (Ct. App. 12/22/87); Guardian State Bank 
v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Sup. Ct. 09/28/88); Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, (Ct. App. 01/12/89); 
Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, (Ct. App. 03/28/89); 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170. (12/13/83); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224. (10/07/83); 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, (08/23/83); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100. 
(04/27/83). 
Since this objection and motion are merely procedural in nature, no opposing 
or reply memorandum will be necessary or expected to further perfect or address that 
which is set forth herein. Oral argument is further waived, however. Respondents do 
respectfully ask for a decision in this regard. 
DATED this ^//tlayof December, 198 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the Q\_ day of December, 1989, (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION AND MOTION TO 
STRIKE to John C. Baldwin, Director and Kathleen C. McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer 
Section, Securities Division, Utah Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 
45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Eklund, Esq., 
Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0802; and mailed the same to Craig F. McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan, & 
Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, Kennecott Bldg., 10 East South Temple 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 and Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant Attorney General, 115 





BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Registration of 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
CRD No. 07678 
In the Matter of the Registration of 
Marlen Vernon Johnson 
CRD No. 2598888 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, OTHER RELATED MOTIONS 
AND ACCOMPANYING ORDER 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Appearances: 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
Mark J. Griffin for the Division of Securities 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
By Motion, dated November 28, 1989, Respondents seek entry of summary judgment 
in the instant adjudicative proceedings. On December 14, 1989, the Division filed a cross-
motion for partial summary judgment. Respondents' reply memorandum was filed on 
December 21, 1989, as was Respondents' objection and motion to strike with a supporting 
memorandum. On December 22, 1989, Respondents filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit in opposition 
to the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 
On January 5, 1990, the Division filed replies to Respondents' objection and motion 
to strike and memorandum, and also to Respondents' opposition to the Division's cross-
motion for partial summary judgment. The Division also requested a hearing a Respondents' 
motion for summary judgment. On January 9, 1990, Respondents filed a reply regarding the 
December 21, 1989 objection and motion to strike and also filed an objection and motion to 
strike with respect to the Division's January 5, 1990 pleadings and supporting memorandum. 
A conference call was conducted with respective counsel on January 11, 1990. At 
that time, Respondents' January 9, 1990 motion to strike matters which had already been 
filed by the Division on January 5, 1990 was denied. Further, the Court advised respective 
(Jiu . , . ; , ; 
counsel that oral argument would not be necessary as to either of the pending motions and the 
parties agreed that no oral argument would be warranted in that regard. The Court further 
advised respective counsel that Respondents' December 21, 1989 petition for permission to 
take depositions would be taken under advisement and thus subsequently addressed during a 
discovery conference to be conducted, if necessary, after issuance of a ruling on the pending 
motions. 
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether they 
"solicited", "encouraged" or "aided" the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities by third 
parties to Respondent Johnson. Respondents thus contend that Count I of the July 19, 1989 
Amended Petition should be dismissed. Respondent further asserts that the Division does not 
have the authority, pursuant to Section 61-1-14(3) Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, to 
summarily suspend all exemptions from registration. Respondents thus urge that: (1) the 
March 1, 1989 Summary Order did not, as a matter of law, prohibit Respondents from 
purchasing the above-named securities; and (2) such conduct does not constitute a "dishonest 
or unethical practice" as to subject Respondents to possible disciplinary sanction in these 
proceedings. 
In response, the Division initially asserts that there is a disputed issue of fact as to 
whether Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities. The Division 
also contends that it has the authority to suspend all possible exemptions from registration in 
this case. In support of its' cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the Division urges 
that: (1) Respondents' mere participation in the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities, 
during the pendency of the March 1, 1989 Order, was a dishonest or unethical practice; (2) 
Respondents' admission of having purchased the securities after entry of the just-stated order 
provides an undisputed basis upon which to conclude that Respondents thus engaged in 
dishonest and unethical conduct; and (3) a determination as to the disciplinary sanction to be 
entered is the only remaining issue to be addressed. 
Section 63-46b-l(4) provides that, during an adjudicative proceeding, a presiding 
officer may grant "a timely motion . . . for summary judgment if the requirements of . . . 
2 o n * * . . :i8 
Rule 56 • . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party". 
Comments of the Utah Administrative Law Advisory Committee on the drafting and 
interpretation of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act further provide as follows: 
A presiding officer is . . . authorized to grant a timely 
motion either to dismiss or for summary judgment, if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the UAPA are met. The well-developed caselaw 
concerning Rules 12(b) and 56 should assist presiding officers 
in deciding [such] motions . . . . 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
The standards which govern the disposition of a motion for summary judgment are 
well-established. In Bowen v. Riverton City, 565 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated as follows: 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, 
the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, 
the court must evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Id. at 436. 
It has also been stated that a motion for summary judgment: 
. . .should be granted only when it clearly appears that there is 
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail. 
Frisbee v.K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). Further, the Court has 
recognized that a genuine issue of material fact exists if "reasonable minds could differ on 
whether . . . conduct measures up to the required standard". Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 
613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
The July 19, 1989 Amended Petition sets forth various factual allegations. For the 
purpose of addressing the pending motion, all of the factual allegations contained in the 
amended petition are incorporated herein by reference. To generalize, the amended petition 
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contains allegations that: (1) Respondents purchased USA Medical Corporation securities 
during such time that all transactional exemptions from registration of those securities were 
unavailable; (2) the unavailability of transactional exemptions from registration as to the 
securities in question was based on a March 1, 1989 Summary Order and a March 27, 1989 
Default Order; (3) Respondents' purchase of the securities occurred within the State of Utah; 
and (4) Respondents contacted an existing shareholder of USA Medical Corporation securities 
in an attempt to purchase said securities, actually purchased USA Medical Corporation 
securities from five other named individuals and may have also purchased USA Medical 
Corporation securities from other unnamed sources after the March 27, 1989 Order. 
Based on the factual allegations set forth in the amended petition, Paragraphs 16 and 
17 of that petition reflect the Division's assertions that Respondent Johnson, "in soliciting 
and/or purchasing" the securities during the pendency of the Division's Order, encouraged or 
otherwise aided in the violation of Section 61-1-7 and that Respondent Johnson, acting on 
behalf of Respondent Johnson-Bowles, "in soliciting, encouraging, or aiding the violation of 
the Division's Order" engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business, 
violative of Section 61-l-6(l)(g). 
In an Amended Answer, dated November 21, 1989, Respondents admit that the 
March 1, 1989 Order revoked the availability of exemptions in Utah for the offer and sale of 
USA Medical Corporation securities, but deny the just-stated order had any effect whatsoever 
on purchases of those securities by anyone as a matter of law. Relative to Paragraph 12(a) of 
the amended petition, Respondent Johnson has admitted that he called a John Dawson, but 
that such only occurred after he was informed by one Karl Smith that Mr. Dawson was 
anxious to sell his "worthless" USA Medical Corporation stock to anyone who wanted to buy 
it. Respondents have otherwise denied any remaining allegations as set forth in Paragraph 
12(a). Respondents have also denied the applicability and relevance of all allegations 
otherwise set forth in Paragraph 12 of the amended petition. Respondents further denied 
allegations set forth in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the amended petition. 
Respondents have submitted seven (7) affidavits in support of their pending motion. 
Five of those affidavits are from the individuals who sold USA Medical Corporation 
securities to Respondent Johnson. In each affidavit, the affiant states that he was not 
"encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or "solicited" by either Respondent 
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Johnson or anyone else to sell the securities in question. In his affidavit, Respondent Johnson 
has stated that he was contacted by several individuals in March and April 1989, who each 
expressed a desire to sell the USA Medical Corporation stock which they held. Respondent 
Johnson has also averred that none of his agents or employees ever engaged in any conduct to 
"solicit", "aidH, "counsel", "command", "induce", "recommend", or otherwise "encourage" 
any of the owners of USA Medical Corporation securities to sell those securities to, or for the 
benefit of, either Respondent. 
The Division has filed a May 8, 1989 memorandum from a Dorothy Akins and Ms 
Akins* December 14, 1989 affidavit with its' cross-motion for partial summary judgment. 
Ms. Akins1 memorandum references a May 8, 1989 conversation she and a Scott Frost had 
with a Mr. Paul Jones, wherein the latter stated he was contacted by a Bruce Eatchel on April 
18, 1989, Mr. Eatchel inquired if he (Mr. Jones) wanted to sell his USA Medical 
Corporation securities and Mr. Jones met with Respondent Johnson later that day and sold 
such securities at that time. In her affidavit, Ms. Akins has stated that she was told by Mr. 
Dawson that Respondent Johnson "had contacted him to purchase his stock." In support of 
its' motion, the Division urges that Respondent Johnson has admitted that he purchased USA 
Medical Corporation securities from seven (7) individuals in April 1989. 
Respondents have also filed two additional affidavits with respect to the Division's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Respondents have filed an affidavit from 
Mr. Eatchel, who has stated that any conversation he had with Mr. Jones after March 1, 
1989 were not undertaken pursuant to the direction of Respondent Johnson or Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles, that Mr. Jones contacted the affiant in April 1989 and expressed an interest 
in selling his USA Medical Corporation securities and that Mr. Jones either asked the affiant 
to put him in contact with Respondent Johnson as to the possible sale of said securities or that 
the affiant simply did so. Mr. Eatchel also stated that he was not acting under Respondents' 
directions when he discussed the above-stated matters with Mr. Jones. 
Counsel for Respondent has also filed an affidavit, where he has stated that discovery 
is not complete as to potential defenses which Respondents may have in the instant 
proceeding and, thus, any favorable ruling on the Division's cross-motion for summary 
judgment would effectively preclude Respondents from continuing in discovery as to present 
whatever defenses may be applicable in this proceeding. 
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Prior to addressing the respective motions filed by the parties, various preliminary 
issues must be resolved. In tiieir December 19, 1989 motion to strike, Respondents urge that 
the May 8, 1989 memorandum from Ms. Akins and her December 14, 1989 affidavit are 
gross hearsay, not otherwise proper or legally acceptable and do not conform to the 
provisions of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The just-stated rule provides 
as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein . . . . 
In Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
An affidavit, supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment 
is an evidentiary affidavit, whose form and content is governed by Rule 
56(e), U.R.C.P. Such an affidavit must be made on personal 
knowledge of the affiant, set forth facts that would be admissible in 
evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify 
to the matters stated therein. 
Affidavits containing statements made merely "on information and 
belief1 will be disregarded. Hearsay testimony and opinion testimony 
that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly 
be set forth in an affidavit. Id. at 506. 
See also Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
Concededly, the statements contained in the May 8, 1989 memorandum have not been 
presented by a document identified as an affidavit and there is no indication that Ms. Akins 
was duly sworn as to those matters. With respect to a motion for summary judgment, the 
proper practice in administrative adjudicative proceedings would be to present evidentiary 
affidavits in typical format. More importantly, the Court notes that the truth of the 
statements attributed by Ms. Akins to Mr. Jones in the May 8, 1989 memorandum is not 
based on Ms. Akins* personal knowledge and her December 14, 1989 affidavit contains a 
recital that the statements therein are true "to the best of my knowledge, information and 
belief." 
However, Section 63-46b-8(l)(c) provides that the presiding officer in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding "may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay". Further, 
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while Section 63-46b-10(3) provides that no finding of fact that was contested may be based 
solely on hearsay evidence unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, hearsay testimony is admissible in formal adjudicative proceedings. Thus, such 
testimony may be considered with respect to the pending motions and Respondents' assertion 
to the contrary is not persuasive. While such testimony is cognizable for the just-stated 
purpose, the Court acknowledges that a question remains whether proper and sufficient 
evidence will be presented during any subsequent hearing on the merits to sustain the 
Division's burden of proof at that time. 
In support of their pending motions, both parties have referenced language set forth 
by this Court as to other motions previously addressed during the course of these 
proceedings. Respondents contend that it cannot be established that they participated in the 
sales of USA Medical Corporation securities unless they have "solicited", "encouraged", 
"aided" or, as the Court purportedly indicated in its' December 18, 1989 Conclusions of 
Law, "urged" existing shareholders to sell their securities. The pertinent language from the 
just-referenced order is as follows: 
Notwithstanding Respondents* assertions, Count I is not based on an 
allegation that Respondents aided and abetted or solicited a sale of the 
securities to themselves. Rather, the essence of Count I is that Respondents9 
purchase of the securities resulted in the violation of the March 27, 1989 
Default Order and, as a corollary, Section 61-1-7. Whether Respondents 
urged USA Medical shareholders to sell their securities is a matter adequately 
and properly pled in the amended petition and relevant as an aggravating 
factor with respect to whatever disciplinary sanction should enter if it is found 
that Respondents engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities 
business. 
The amended petition sets forth a number of factual questions, to wit: 
(1) Did Respondent Johnson solicit the sale of USA Medical Corporation 
securities during the pendency of the Division's March 1, 1989 and 
March 27, 1989 orders; 
(2) Did Respondent Johnson purchase USA Medical Corporation securities 
during the pendency of the just-referenced orders; 
(3) If Respondent Johnson solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation 
securities, did that conduct encourage or otherwise aid in the 
violation of Section 61-1-7; 
(4) If Respondent Johnson purchased the securities in question, did such 
conduct encourage or otherwise aid in the violation of Section 61-1-7; and 
(5) If Respondent Johnson, acting on behalf of Respondent Johnson-Bowles, 
either solicited a possible sale of USA Medical Corporation securities or 
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purchased such securities and such conduct encouraged or otherwise 
aided in the violation of the above-referenced orders, does such conduct 
constitute a dishonest or unethical practice within the meaning of 
Section 61-l-6(l)(g). 
The Division correctly asserts that a disciplinary sanction could enter in these proceedings, 
absent any finding that Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation securities. 
As indicated in the December 18, 19989 Conclusions of Law, whether Respondents urged 
existing shareholders to sell their securities would be relevant as an aggravating factor with 
respect to whatever disciplinary action may be warranted, should it be found that Respondents 
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business. 
In support of its' cross-motion for summary judgment, the Division references 
language of this Court in its' August 29, 1989 Conclusions of Law: 
Whether Respondents solicited the sale of USA Medical Corporation 
securities (and Respondents have strenuously urged that they did not), it 
is obvious that their participation in those transactions as a purchaser of 
those securities facilitated a violation of the Summary Order as to 
potentially subject them to disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. 
In its' December 18, 1989 Order, this Court stated as follows: 
A considered review of the amended petition clearly reflects two 
matters which must be recognized. First, the factual allegation of 
critical relevance in the amended petition is that Respondents purchased 
USA Medical Corporation securities. It is that conduct which 
potentially subjects Respondents to disciplinary sanction in these 
proceedings. 
Further, if the facts alleged in the amended petition were proved, it 
could be concluded that Respondents' participation as a purchaser of the 
securities facilitated the violation of a March 27, 1989 Order issued by 
the Division to suspend the trading (both buying and selling) of 
securities which had been the subject of market manipulation and 
securities fraud. 
As further reflected in the December 18, 1989 Conclusions of Law, the amended petition 
properly raises the issue "whether Respondents' purchase of the securities in question 
constituted dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business". 
At various times during these proceedings, the Court has attempted to articulate the 
factual and legal basis underlying the amended petition. However, nothing contained in 
either the August 29, 1989 or December 18, 1989 Conclusions of Law should be construed to 
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suggest that this Court has concluded, as a matter of law, that Respondents have engaged in 
conduct constituting a dishonest or unethical practice which necessarily subjects them to the 
entry of a disciplinary sanction in these proceedings. Simply put, there has been no 
determination of facts, or of the law applicable thereto, which would warrant such a 
conclusion at this point in these proceedings. 
A review of the pleadings, admissions and affidavits on file reveals a dispute as to 
whether Respondents solicited the sale of the securities in question, whether any such alleged 
conduct thus encouraged or aided a violation of Section 61-1-7, whether any such alleged 
conduct encouraged or aided a violation of the March 1, 1989 and March 27, 1989 Orders 
and whether any such alleged conduct constitutes a dishonest and unethical practice, within 
the meaning of Section 61-l-6(l)(g). Given the case law set forth below, the Court 
concludes that the foregoing matters reflect mixed questions of law and fact to be addressed 
by the Securities Advisory Board and there is no proper basis to grant Respondents' motion. 
Consistent with the foregoing, and upon further review of the pleadings, admissions, 
affidavits and the May 8, 1989 memorandum on file, there is no genuine issue as to the 
material fact that Respondent Johnson purchased USA Medical Corporation securities during 
the pendency of the Division's March 1, 989 and March 27, 1989 Orders. However, it is 
inappropriate for this Court to conclude, as a matter of law, that the purchase of those 
securities constituted a dishonest or unethical practice and, thus, that the Division is entitled 
to summary relief. In Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed whether an osteopath could be held to a general statutory standard of 
"unprofessional conduct," as to invoke a disciplinary sanction regarding treatment he had 
rendered to various patients. The Court stated as follows: 
Once a professional is certified, however, the public's interest in his 
or her professional performance in the treatment of patients (or in 
services to clients) is paramount. It is therefore appropriate for the 
public to place great reliance on the self-governing functions and 
standards of the profession As applied to the treatment of patients (or 
services to clients), a general statutory standard like "unprofessional 
conduct" is acceptable for three reasons: (1) The subject of professional 
performance is too comprehensive to codified in detail. (2) Members of 
a profession can properly be held to understand its' standards of 
performance. (3) Standards of performance will be interpreted by 
members of the same profession in the process of administrative 
adjudication. Id. at 129. 
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The Court further stated that whether a licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct is a 
determination to be made by the members of the licensing committee "on a case-by-case basis 
by drawing on the statutory standards . . . and on its own knowledge of (the patient-care 
standards of the profession." Id. 
In a subsequent case, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed whether a real estate 
broker could be held to a general statutory standard of being "unworthy or incompetent" as to 
justify entry of a disciplinary sanction. In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah App. 1988). The 
Court stated as follows: 
We find that the general standard found in section 61-2-11(8), "being 
unworthy or incompetent," meets the three justifications required by 
Vance and is not vague and indefinite so long as the Commission 
carefully considers the A.LJ. 's recommendation and reviews the 
evidence and filings prior to rendering its final decision. Of course, as 
in this case, the final decision maker's review is enhanced by detailed 
factual findings. The findings in this case described each fact situation 
with such particularity that the Commission could readily understand 
the circumstances of each alleged violation in evaluating whether the 
conduct was consistent with the general professionalism standard. Id at 
36. 
Importantly, the Court then stated as follows: 
The Commission's application of section 61-2-11 to a particular fact 
situation, including the meaning of "unworthy or incompetent,H is a 
mixed question of law and fact. On appeal, an appellate court must 
inquire whether the Commission's determination was within the limits of 
reasonableness and rationality . . . . So long as there is evidence of 
substance to support the Commission's factual findings, we defer to the 
Commission's factual findings. Id. (Citations omitted) 
Consistent with the rationale set forth in the above-cited cases, this Court concludes 
that whether Respondents' conduct constitutes "dishonest and unethical practices in the 
securities business" is a mixed question of law and fact which should be properly addressed 
to, and resolved by, the Securities Advisory Board. Without the application of the Board's 
expertise (i.e., its' understanding of the securities industry) to the questions which must be 
addressed in this adjudicative proceeding, this Court cannot rule, as a matter of law, that 
Respondents' purchase of the securities in question properly justifies entry of the summary 
relief now sought by the Division. 
Respondents also assert that the Division has no authority to summarily suspend all 
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exemptions from registration. However, in Capitol General Corp. v. Utah Dept of Business 
Regulation, Til P.2d 494 (Utah App.1989), the Court reviewed an order suspending "all 
possible secondary trading exemptions" for certain stock. The Court characterized the nature 
of such an order as follows: 
The primary effect of such an order is to force each party holding the 
affected shares to register with the division prior to any further trading. 
Absent such an order, holders of shares may avoid registration and trade their 
shares freely if a secondary exemption can be claimed. See Utah Code Ann. 
Section 61-1-14 (1986). Id. at 496. 
Importantly, the Court further stated: 
The [Utah Securities Advisory] Board has the power to remedy a violation 
of Section 61-1-7 under Section 61-1-20, which includes the power to issue an 
order of similar legal effect to the order involved here. Id. at 498. (All 
emphasis herein added.) 
Concededly, the instant proceedings were not initiated on the basis that Respondents sold or 
offered to sell an unregistered or non-exempt security. Further, the relief sought by the 
Division in these proceedings concerns the possible entry of a disciplinary sanction regarding 
Respondents' registration, not the issuance of an order to prevent the sale of unregistered 
securities. Thus, Capitol General Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Business Regulation, supra, is not 
directly on point. 
Nevertheless, the Division clearly had the authority to enter the March 1, 1989 and 
March 27, 1989 Orders in this case and the remaining pivotal issue is whether Respondents 
engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices in the securities business" by reason of either 
admitted purchases of USA Medical Corporation securities or, upon sufficient proof, that 
Respondents solicited a sale of those securities. 
One further matter should be addressed. The Court notes the Rule 56(f) affidavit 
filed by counsel for Respondents, wherein it is stated that Respondents' discovery is not 
complete and further discovery may disclose the applicability of various defenses set forth in 
Respondents' amended answer. In Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah 
App. 1987), the Court generally stated that summary judgment should not be granted if 
discovery is incomplete, " since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of 
material fact sufficient to defeat the motion/ Id. at 278. In the instant proceeding, this 
Court notes that little, if any, discovery, has been completed. Under such circumstances, it 
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would be premature to grant the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment and 
the Court thus declines to enter any such relief at this time. See Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 
311, 315 (Utah 1984), quoting Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1977). 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Respondents' motion for summary judgment, 
dated November 28, 1989, is hereby denied. 
It is further ordered that the Division's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, 
dated December 14, 1989, is also denied. 
It is further ordered that Respondents' December 21, 1989 motion to strike is also 
denied. 
It is further ordered that Respondents' December 21, 1989 petition for permission to 
take depositions is taken under advisement. Within five (5) days from the date of this Order, 
the Court will contact respective counsel to schedule a discovery conference. Said conference 
shall be conducted as soon as practicable thereafter as the means to address the appropriate 
scope of allowable discovery and to prompt the subsequent disposition of this case in an 
expeditious manner. 
Dated this of March, 1990. 
J.rSteven 
Aaministrative Law Judge 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed the foregoing Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, other related motions and 
Accompanying Order, properly addressed, postage prepaid to: John Michael 
Coombs, 72 East 400 South, Suite 220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Craig F. 
McCullough, Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 8th Floor, Kennecott Building, 10 
East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84113, co-counsel for 
Respondents; and to Mark J. Griffin, Assistant Attorney General for the 
Division of Securities at Tax & Business Regulation Division, 130 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. A copy of the foregoing was also hand 
delivered to Kathleen C. McGinley, Director, Broker/Dealer Section, Division 
of Securities, Department of Commerce* 
Dated this Q^3 day of March, 1990 
T 
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EXHIBIT "BB" 
BEF< 1)1 V I! SI ON Ml' SKCIIKITIKS 
i DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
0 F THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION 
JOHNSON-BOWLES 
CRD N o . 0 7 6 7 8 
ill THM M, VI VVh .""I1' THI'" 
REGISTRATION 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD No. 259888 
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW 
Case No. SD-89-46B 
C i V t P N l , .j) -in i ,| i'A i 
Respondents', Request for Agency Review dated April 5. 19 9 0 is 
hereby denied because the Order dated March -1" l, 199H does not 
constitute f i na ] agency acti oi i ace or ::I:I n g t :: i HI )s, i t m 1 1 s \»i e v J o u s J y 
, 11 .i1 e 11 11 i) i 11«»r f; dated October 3 0, 19 8 9 and November 2 2 , 19 H 9 i n 
the above-captioned matter. 
Dated tr: 
)hn C. Baldwin 
Director, Division of Securities 
Presiding Officer 
EXHIBIT "CC" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
/.;p3 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
HE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
IN 1 HE MA I ITU 01 I HI REGISTRATION 
OF 
JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR 
PURPOSES OF HEARING 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
The petitioner and respondents, by and through their respective and mutual 
counsel, hereby stipulate to the followiinj lm I . Im i < i > • i I I M " ' ^ " " ) 'I'1, respective 
hearing in the above-matter before the Securities Advisory Board. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
1. I ison-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson are 




2. As of January 22. 1989, respondent Johnson-Bowles was "short" exactly 
53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation 
("U.S.A. Medical" or "Company"). 
3. Effective January 23. 1989, U.S.A. Medical effected a 10 for 1 forward split 
which automatically increased Johnson-Bowles' "short" position tenfold. For example, 
instead of being "short" only 53,500 shares, Johnson-Bowles suddenly was "short" 535,000 
shares. 
4. Following the January 23, forward split, the price of U.S.A. Medical stock 
rapidly increased to approximately $1 per share. 
5. On February 16, 1989, Johnson-Bowles brought a 10b-5 securities fraud 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Utah seeking a preliminary 
injunction and declaration that Johnson-Bowies' outstanding contracts and obligations to 
certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations to whom Johnson-Bowles owed U.S.A. 
Medical stock were void for illegality. In such action, Johnson-Bowles, alleged improprieties 
and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A. Medical's securities. 
6. The U.S. District Court granted Johnson-Bowies' Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order on February 17. 1989 as against Midwest Clearing, thereby preventing 
Midwest Clearing from effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Johnson-Bowles. 
7. Following a hearing for Preliminary Injunction held on February 27 and 28, 
1989. the Court denied Johnson-Bowles' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. However, U.S. 
District Judge J. Thomas Greene did rule that the securities of U.S.A. Medical were and had 
been the subject of market manipulation and securities fraud. 
8. During February. 1989, Marlen Johnson furnished information to the Division 
relative to the problems associated with U.S.A. Medical and its securities. 
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9. On March 1,1989, the Division issued a Summary Order si ispending all 
§14(2) registration under the Utah Uniform Securities Act relative to U.S.A. 
Medical's securities. On March 29.1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Order was made 
permanent by default. I i i ie ai ic I correct ::: spies of tl ie petitioner's March, 1989, Orders are 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibits HA" and "B" respectively. 
On March 6, 1989, the U.S. fiei unties
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suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical for ten (10) days. A true and correct 
copy of such Order is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit MC". 
received copies of the Division's March 1 and 29, 1989 
Orders (Exhibits "A" and MBM hereto) on or about the date of their respective issuance. 
- As of March 1# 1989 litiiiM<ii H. IAIIJ» A- I suv nal hundred thousand 
shares ol .A. Medical stock to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. During 
March, 1989, respondents purchased a total of 397,900 shares i ^ u Mies 
f i if ts and one (1) New York resident. 
Of the seven (7) individuals from whom respondents purchased U.S.A. 
Medical have submitted affidavits that they were not 
"solicited" by respondents or any of their agents and such individuals have further attested 
that they were aware of not only Judge Greene's Febi I.II ' I'H 1989 nln ij I n, i I IM i liny 
1989 orders. True and correct copies of such 
affidavits, including their respective exhibits, are attached hereto as Exhibits "D", "E". "F 
"G". and "I f\ 
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 ""he remaining two (2) individuals from whom respondents purchased 
U.S.A. Medical stock after March i Flateman and Utah 
_ 3 _ 
resident Paul Jones. Such individuals were also aware of Judge Greene's ruling and the 
Division's March 1989 Orders. Further, both individuals are registered representatives with 
the National Association of Securities Dealers. Inc.. ("NASD") and prior to the Division's 
March 1.1989, order. Paul Jones, a licensed securities agent with Wasatch Stock Trading, 
was involved in the trading of the securities of U.S.A. Medical. Because Flateman is a New 
York resident, and. in an effort to expedite these proceedings, whether respondents 
"solicited" him or not will not be an issue in these proceedings. 
15. During April. 1989. respondent Marlen V. Johnson was informed by one 
Karl Smith that a Mr. John Dawson had stock of U.S.A. Medical that Smith thought Dawson 
was desirous of selling. Based on Mr. Johnson's conversation with Mr. Smith. Mr. Johnson 
contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was interested in selling his U.S.A. Medical stock. 
Such conversation never resulted in either a sale of U.S.A. Medical stock or a violation of 
the Division's March 1989 orders. 
16. The purchases undertaken by the respondents in U.S.A. Medical stock 
during the pendency of the Division's order from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York 
resident are as follows in the amounts indicated: 
SELLER AMOUNT OF SHARES 
Paul Jones 180.900 
Richard Sax 18,000 
Philip Tanzini 20.000 
Jim Coleman 30.000 
Nick Julian 69.500 
Leo Pavich 67,500 
Sheldon Flateman, 12,000 




DATED this 0 th day of July. 1990. 
In re: 
Codmbs 
\ttomey for Respondent* 
Johnson-Bowles Compai i, 111L ' ' 
Case No. SD-89-45BD 
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF HEARING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of July, 1990, (s)he 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR PURPOSES OF 
HEARING by regular mail, postage prepaid to John C. Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. 
McGinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities Division, Utah Department of 
Commerce, 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802; 
Administrative Law Judge J. Steven Ekiund. Esq., Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 
South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. McCullough, Esq., 
Callister, Duncan, & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor. Kennecott Bldg., 10 
East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133: and Mark J. Griffin. Esq.. Assistant 
Attorney General, 115 State Capitol Building, Salt I ake City. Utah 84114. 
J.M1P.J-4 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)369-0833 
Attorney tor Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Jim Coleman on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson when I sold 




2, That 1 i ii l "inn < in HIJIHT, "H! 1 nl", "i-ommanded". "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That I 
in fact sold such stock on my own initiative withoul any IJIUSWIHI horn rinyniui 1 also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transactir 
IM11ii oh' |nil' 11II Hit1 i* 11*10 because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
i I hit I pnrrhTw1 thn 11 l i\ hi i I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of to the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the tin i n • "ii | mini 1 i r ii >i ii t "i i 11 us 
i j consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted and to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behatt 
of anyone else i "" "' chased or when I sold such stock. ! am 
also not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in t\nn .imn i • • "' ' ;>n »n> ' '" < »»at lion 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
I) I have not received any additional compensation froni Mi Johnson oi 
anyone nh n Inr my CM i uln I 11 ir» affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this /<£ day of Novm 1989. 
r f \ r 
Jiff] Coleman 
* ' ) , * * rJ'> 
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. Case 
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM COLEMAN 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 




Ma< 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
hi HI Ul MI "JI.JI i", I!, » -I H e d i r a l 1,01 p/ - i,»U00.00 
I, James Coleman, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp shares to Marl en Johr s<-n, 
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning 
U.S..A. Medical dated February 29, 1989 as well as being aware of 
State of Utah's action dated March 1? IMWi, 
'Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and 
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical 
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers. 
IHUUiV-l 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)369-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
<& 
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BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Phillip Tanzini on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
"'Ki±l J5 
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in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer" of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims'* as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this ^  day of November, 1989. 
'-.I^K 
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In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson, 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF PHILLIP TANZINI 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
• \ ^ 
J:AFCV*T.l l 
esiding at Salt Lake City, UT 
' M ^ i / 7 
- 3 -
7 June 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE: 20,000 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp. .30c per share 
I, Phillip Tanzini, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen 
Johnson. I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene1s court ruling 
concerning USA Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being 
aware of the State of Utahfs action dated March 1, 1989. 
Marlen Johnson did not solicit me for shares. I contacted him and 
asked him if there was interest to buy shares of U.S.A. Medical 
stock to close open contracts with other broker-dealers. 
Sincerely yours, 
Phillip Tanzini ^ 
*
U)\)±±J$ 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ., No. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
f 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Nick Julian on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
' > ' > ' j ^ l AS 
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in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a McustomerH of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason. I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this//jJay of November. 1989. 
- 2 -
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK JULIAN 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this {j^day of November. 1989. 
Notary Public I 
My Commission Expires: 
J:AFDVT.9 
asking at Salt Lake City. UT 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JUSTEENE BLANKENSHIP 
7655 So 2700 East 
Sa't Lake City, UT 84121 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JUNE 4,1993 
STATE OF UTAH 
°<U)^i81 
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May 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Nick Julian, called Marlen Johnson to ask him if he would be 
interested in buying ray USA Medical stock. I told him I wanted 
to sell 69,500 shares at .10c per share or $6,950.00. I also told 





6^<^y\a\A*s^ 5/3 s /gq 
Dated 
Subscribed and srorn to before me 





JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS, ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Richard Sax on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That 
- 1 -
in fact sold such stock on my own Initiative without any pressure from anyone, i also do not 
consider myself to have been a McustomerH of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even If I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve the payment of 
a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
up-





In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson 
Case Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD SAX 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before hi t 
N^ftry Public 
^siding at Salt Lake City, UT 
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May 16, 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Richard Sax, offered to sell my U.S.A. Medical stock to Marlen 
Johnson. At no time, did Marlen Johnson solicit me to sell him 
my stock. 







Subscribed and sworn before me th i s <rS5 dav of / /M*y 1989. 
i *V^ste v»\ 
*<Htnnm»«x*S 
C/ if I ?? 
y*ao 5///q^5 fi- i><f hoc °» 
/%vAWG ftCsT'J^S ACfi/rJiy /^/i{L^CrJ J~oH*/S°rJ ^ Jo^/Jfo^ 
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JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ., NO. 3639 
72 East 400 South, Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
Leo Pavich on his oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. That the representation letter or letters I furnished Mr. Marlen V. Johnson 
when I sold him stock of U.S.A. Medical is true and correct and it bears my signature. 
2. That I was not "encouraged", "aided", "commanded", "counseled", or 
"solicited" by Mr. Johnson or anyone else to sell the stock which I did in fact sell him. That I 
0 'k / j . i b s 
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in fact sold such stock on my own initiative without any pressure from anyone. I also do not 
consider myself to have been a "customer11 of Mr. Johnson or Johnson-Bowles, even if I 
previously had an account with Johnson-Bowles, as I consider the transaction to have been 
entirely private. This is also because the isolated transaction did not involve involve the 
payment of a commission to anyone. 
3. That I purchased the U.S.A. Medical stock which I sold to Mr. Johnson 
without notice of any "adverse claims" as contemplated in Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and I paid valuable consideration at the time I purchased it. For this 
reason, I consider myself to have been a bona fide purchaser of such stock (giving me the 
right to sell it when I wanted to whomever I wanted) and I was not acting by or on behalf of 
anyone else other than myself when I either purchased or when I sold such stock. I am also 
not affiliated nor have I ever been affiliated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
4. At the time I sold the stock in question to Mr. Johnson, such transaction 
was "suitable" to my investment or financial needs and objectives. 
5. I have not received any additional compensation from Mr. Johnson or 
anyone else for my execution of this affidavit. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 
DATED this _/£ day of November. 1989. 
Leo Pavitch 
- 2 -
In re: In the matter of Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson. Case 
Nos. SD-89-46BD and SD-89-47AG 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEO PAVICH 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before 
My Commission Expires: 
'Residing at Salt Lake City. UT 
J:AFDVT.I.O 
' M r j i i a o 
- 3 -
20 June 1989 
To Whom It May Concern: 
RE: 67,500 shares U.S.A. Medical Corp., .145$ per share, $9,787.50 
I, flH^m^l, sold U.S.A. Medical Corp. shares to Marlen Johnson. 
I was aware of Judge J. Thomas Greene's court ruling concerning 
U.S.A. Medical dated February 28, 1989; as well as being aware of 
the State of Utah,rs pending actions against Marlen Johnson and 








(KING - Direct by Coombs) 
GRIFFIN* Your witness. Thank you. 
COOMBS: 
COURT: 




















We have nothing further. 
Any questions by the board of this 







Tou're excused, Mr. Sorensen. 
Respondants call David King. 
DAVID KING 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Respondants, 
having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified 
as follows: 
THE COURTt Mr. Coombs? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COOMBS: 
Q. Mr. King, would you state your full name and 
address for the record? 
A. My name is David King. My home address is 
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(KING - Direct by Coombs) 
3388 East Enchanted View Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
My business address is SO West Broadway; that's the 
Valley Tower. And the firm that I work for, Kruse, 
Landa and Maycock is on the eighth floor of that 
building. 
Q. So I take it you're in private practice as an 
attorney? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Do you have a specialty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that specialty please? 
A. I specialize — 
Q. First of all, let's do this: Are you a member 
of the bar? 
h. Yes, I am. I'm a member of the Utah bar, and 
I'm an associate member of the Washington D.C. bar and 
the Idaho bar. 
Q. Let's start from the beginning. What was your 
first employment out of law school? 
A. I left law school in 1970 — graduated from 
law school in 1970 with a juris doctorate degree and 
went to work for the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in Washington D.C. as a trial attorney. I was in 
Washington D.C. for five years, transferred to the Salt 
Lake branch office of the commission as a trial attorney 
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(KING - Direct by Coombs) 
and spent seven years there. I left the Salt Lake 
branch office in February of 1983. 
Q. Okay, so how many years total did you work for 
the Securities and Exchange Commission? 
A. A little over -fewe- years. 
Q. What did you do then when you you left the 
S.E.C? 
A. I went directly to Kruse, Landa and Maycock, 
the firm that I'm with now. Our firm does a 
considerable amount of securities work. I am more on 
the litigation side of that. Our firm represents 
broker/dealers in litigation, principally defensive 
litigation; defense of arbitration proceedings in which 
broker/dealers are named as respondants; defense of 
S.E.C. enforcement actions; and defense of state and 
NASD enforcement actions. 
Q. Are you familiar with the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice? 
A. I'm familiar with both the NASD Rules of Fair 
Practice, which is the basis for most of the NASD 
disciplinary actions, and also the corresponding state 
provision, Unethical and Dishonest Business Practices, 
which is often the basis of a state enforcement action. 
Q. Are you also familiar with the Uniform 
Practice Code? 
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1 A* I have some familiarity with the Uniform 
2 Practice Code, inasmuch as from time to time our 
3 broker/dealer clients will call me and ask me questions, 
4 particularly related to buy-in procedures, which is a 
5 subject that is covered by the Uniform Practice Code* 
6 Q. And I assume you're also familiar with Article 
7 3, Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice 
8 requiring brokers to observe high standards of 
9 commercial honor? 
10 A. High standards of commercial honesty, and fair 
11 and equitable pgAaorpals of trade. 
12 I Q. Now, have you sat through this hearing today? 
13 A* Yes I have, beginning to this point. 
14 Q. So you are familiar with the facts of this 
15 case? 
16 A. Yes, I am. 
17 Q. And you're familiar with what the respondants 
18 are charged with? 
19 A* Yes, I am. It's my understanding that the 
20 basis for this action by the state — or the factual 
21 basis is a purchase by Marlen Johnson and Johnson-Bowles 
22 of securities from a Utah resident. The securities were 
23 of a company with respect to which all exemptions from 
24 registrations have been suspended by the State of 
25 Utah. 
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1 The State of Utah contends in this proceeding that 
2 that set of circumstances constitutes dishonest and 
3 unethical business practices on the part of 
4 Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson. 
5 1 Q. And you understand that they are contending 
6 that, even though the purchases were made to fulfill 
7 NASD contracts? 
8 A. Yes, I understand that to be the case. 
9 Q. So knowing that that's the fact of this case, 
10 and knowing that — or at least understanding the 
11 division's theory of liability, do you have an opinion 
12 I as to whether or not Johnson-Bowles and Marlen Johnson 
13 engaged in dishonest or unethical practice under section 
1 4
 6(9) °£ the Uniform Securities Act? 
15 A. I do have an opinion* 
16 Q. Would you tell us that opinion, and tell us 
17 the basis of that opinion? 
18 A. My opinion is that they did not engage in 
19 I unethical or dishonest business practices as a result of 
20 those circumstances. The basis for my opinion starts 
21 with an analysis of the provisions that we're dealing 
22 with and their origins. 
23 The Utah Uniform Securities Act, section 6(g) has 
e 
24 been flashed out by the Utah Securities Division in rule 
25 6-l(g), which is a rule that prohibits particular 
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conduct that is considered to be dishonest and 
unethical. That provision states unequivocally that it 
doesn't cover the field, that other things can in fact 
be considered to be dishonest and unethical business 
practices as well. 
The Utah rule setting forth dishonest and unethical 
business practices states that it is drawn from similar 
provisions of the NASD, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the organization called NASA; that's the 
North American Securities Administrators Association. 
If you look at the 1983 NASA policy statement that 
is entitled Dishonest and Unethical Business Practices, 
you will see that they state at the outset that the 
purpose is to prescribe certain conduct the 
broker/dealer should not engage in. 
And when saying that, they use the exact language 
of Article 3 section 1 of the NASD's Rules of Fair 
Practice. So it's clear that the NASD's Rules of Fair 
Practice, the state rules, the NASA policy guidelines, 
and also as a result of reading those provisions, the 
S.B.C. rules series under section 15(c) all give a 
person an idea of what is dishonest and unethical 
business practices. 
If you line those up side by side, you come out 
with about four — if I'm allowed to generalise, and I 
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don't know that all persons with my experience would 
generalize in the same way. But if I can generalize the 
categories of conduct that are generally provided by 
these sets of regulations, they fall into approximately 
four areas. 
One is a prescription against activities that 
impeach the integrity, if I can say that, of the 
broker/dealer in a registration process. Another is 
harm to the integrity of the securities market or the 
securities industry itself. Another area is harm to 
customers. And the fourth area is any time someone 
violates a particular statutory provision, rule 
provision, or the like, then that too will constitute 
unethical and dishonest business practices. 
In analyzing the facts of this case in the terms of 
these four generally prescribed areas, I first looked at 
and I eliminated the harm to the broker/dealer and agent 
registration process, because that's really not what 
we're dealing with here. 
I secondly looked at the area of harm to the 
securities industry and the securities market in 
general. And in that category, you have to look at both 
sides of the picture. Tou can't concentrate on one 
aspect of a transaction or a set of circumstances, you 
have to look at the whole impact. 
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When you look at the whole impact here, you have on 
one side of the spectrum that the seller of the 
securities in the transaction is a person who can be 
considered to be violating state lav. On the other 
side, you have the specter of a SIPC liquidation, which 
is generally understood in the industry to be avoided at 
all cost because of the length of time and the black eye 
that it gives the securities industry. 
In addition, you also have the integrity of the 
contractual process at stake. And there are cases under 
the NASD Rules of Fair Practice where a broker can be 
held to be in violation of Article 3 section 1 by 
failing to honor his contractual obligations. 
I arrive at the conclusion, and in my opinion there 
has not been harm given these facts and circumstances to 
the securities industry and the integrity of the 
securities market in general. Next, you look at harm to 
customers. 
Here I have looked at the stipulations entered into 
between the state and Johnson-Bowles and Marlen 
Johnson. And that stipulation indicates that the 
customers were fully knowledgeable of all the facts and 
circumstances. They knew that there was a court 
proceeding; many of them attended that court 
proceeding. 
197 
Kelly Hollenbeck - CSR, RPR 
(KING - Direct by Coombs) 
They knew that the state had entered orders; they 
knew what those orders were all about. And if we 
believe Ms. McGinley's statement of facts, Marlen 
Johnson even possibly advised participants in the 
transaction that they might be violating state law in 
connection with the trades• 
So you have customers that are walking into the 
transaction with their eyes wide open, arms length 
negotiations, and it doesn't appear that there is any 
possibility for Johnson-Bowles to take advantage of 
them. So I don't see any harm to customers. 
The last area: Where there is a violation of a 
law, or a statute, or regulation, or even an order 
entered by a securities division. There's been some 
talk about violating the state order in this 
proceeding. In my judgment, you don't have a violation 
of the state order, because the state's order suspended 
exemptions• 
If the state's order had prevented trading, then of 
course a trade would have been in violation of the 
order. But the order simply says there are no 
exemptions available to you who are a seller and engaged 
in this traction, and therefore you have to find an 
exemption — or «*e have .ywi register the stock in order 
to sell it. 
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I don't see a violation of a statutory provision or 
a rule. And I draw principally upon a Utah Supreme 
Court case decided in 1959. It's called Schvanavelt vs. 
Hoy-Burn. In that particular case the court was asked 
to decide whether or not a purchaser of stock was able 
to successfully contest the contract that he had entered 
into. 
Here is a purchaser who bought stock of a 
corporation, knowing that the transaction had not been 
registered by the seller, and was also a participant in 
similar transactions himself as a seller. He's trying 
to set aside his contract, and the court is asked to 
decide whether he is in pari delicto with the seller, 
who has violated the law. 
In other words, is he a co-participant in the 
illegality and therefore unable to take advantage of the 
law to set aside that contract? The court held that the 
Utah Securities Registration Provision was designed to 
protect purchasers, and it was designed to require 
performance on the part of sellers. 
And they indicated in the decision that a purchaser 
who has knowledge of the illegality of the transaction 
is still not in pari delicto with the seller. This is 
very much — well, they cite Fletcher's Encyclopedia of 
Corporations, which indicates that there are 
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1 { circumstances where the buyer will be considered to be a 
2 culpable party in the transaction; in other words, in 
3 pari delicto. And that is in instances where the buyer 
4 actively participated in some aspect of the transaction, 
5 causing it to be illegal. 
6 For instance, if a buyer signs a document that is 
7 committed by the seller to a state securities division 
8 for the purpose of qualifying for an exemption from 
9 registration, then that is active participation in 
10 making the transaction illegal. But the cases are very 
11 I clear that mere knowledge that the seller is violating 
12 the law does not make a buyer a co-participant. 
13 I This is very akin to your concept developed in 
14 particularly in abortion cases in Utah, where you have 
15 State vs. Fetiq and State vs. Craig; State vs. Fetio, 
16 1951, and State vs. Craig in 1934. They say that the 
17 woman seeking an abortion cannot be considered to be an 
18 aider and abettor or a principal violator in the act, 
19 as much as — 
20 MR. GRIFFIN: Objection. At this point we're 
21 I off on a narration and we're into abortion and 
22 everything else, and I simply don't think it's 
23 relevant. And I think Mr. King is going into some 
24 criminal actions here and we're far afield from 
25 administrative action. 
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THE COURT: He's expressing his opinion and 
the basis for it, and I think if he has anything else he 
may proceed. 
Q. (BY MR, COOMBS) Well? 
A, The Fifth Circuit in 1981 decided the G.A. 
Thompson and Company vs. Partridge case. And in dicta 
that case indicated that if a purchaser was a victim of 
a 33 act or 34 act violation, that he could not be 
considered to have violated section 7(c) — I'm sorry, 
section 5(c) of the 33 act registration provision, by 
virtue of an offer to purchase. And section 5(c) of the 
33 act proscribes not only offers to sell when a 
registration statement is not in effect or is subject of 
a 8top order, but also orders to buy. 
And the court said in dicta again that if the 
purchaser is a victim of a 33 act or a 34 act violation 
in that context, he cannot be considered to be in 
violation of the 5(c) provision. On that basis I have 
reached the conclusion that, and in my opinion, there 
have been no dishonest or unethical business practices 
as a result of the facts and circumstances that gave 
rise to this action. 
Q. Let me ask you two more questions. I assume 
you heard Ms. McGinley testify that the thrust of the 
division's action was that the respondants were aiding 
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and abetting the sellers; do you recall her saying 
that? 
A. I heard her saying that. 
Q. So then is it your opinion that as a matter of 
law the respondants could not aid and abet their 
sellers? 
A. It's my opinion that the case law supports the 
position that there is no aiding and abetting violation 
by a purchaser, as much as he is in a protected 
category. 
Q. Now, drawing your attention to Article 3 
section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice; are you 
familiar with any cases whereby an NASD member was 
disciplined as a result of not honoring trades? 
A. Yes. In the matter of Shaskan and Company, 
1976 case, it's reported in Securities and Exchange. 
Q. So it's possible if Johnson-Bowles and Marlen 
Johnson had been bought in and didn't honor those 
contracts, that they could have faced disciplinary 
action by the NASD? 
A. The case law under section ~ Article 3 
section 1 indicates that under certain circumstances a 
buyer or a seller — broker/dealer who is either a buyer 
or seller — who doesn't honor his contracts can be 
considered to be in violation of that provision. 
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1 I Q. So one last question, and this goes to 
2 inconsistent regulation. Do you see in this case a 
3 conflict between the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and how 
4 the division is attempting to enforce its own 
5 interpretation of what is dishonest and ethical? 
6 A. I don't know if I can render an expert opinion 
7 on that. But there certainly is clear to have been a 
8 conflict where on one side it is considered to be 
9 unethical or dishonest to make a purchase and you are 
10 subject to a disciplinary action, and on the other side 
11 there was not only the possibility of going out of 
12 business, but also the possibility of failing to honor 
13 those contracts being the subject a disciplinary 
14 proceeding. 
15 I MR. COOMBS: I have nothing further. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Griffin, cross? 
17 CROSS EXAMINATION 
18 BY MR. GRIFFIN: 
19 Q. Mr. King, good afternoon. 
20 I X. Afternoon. 
21 Q. is the MASO a sovereign entity? 
22 A. Mo. 
23 Q. Is the State of Utah a sovereign entity? 
24 A. There are legal concepts that give state 
25 action immunity that are based upon sovereign immunity 
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EXHIBIT "EE" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Registration of 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc, 
CRD No. 7678 
In the Matter of the 
Registration of 
Marlen Vernon Johnson 
CRD No. 259888 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Appearances: 
Mark J. Griffin and Kathleen C. McGinley for the Division of 
Securities 
John Michael Coombs and Craig F. McCullough for Respondents 
BY THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD: 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
July 16, 1990 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Department of Commerce, and the Securities Advisory Board. 
Four (4) members of the Board were present for the hearing, to wit: 
Keith Cannon, Kent Burgon, Margaret Wickens and Truman Bowler. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
The Board, being fully advised on the premises, now submits 
the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order to 
John C. Baldwin, Director of the Division of Securities, for his 
review: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondents Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. and Marlen 
Vernon Johnson are, and all times relevant to these proceedings 
have been, registered with the Division of Securities as a broker-
dealer and agent, respectively. Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
is the President of Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
2. As of January 22, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles 
Company, Inc. was short 53,500 shares of the securities of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation, a Wyoming corporation. On January 23, 1989, 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation effected a 10 for 1 forward split, which 
increased Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s short position 
to 535,000 shares. Following the just-described forward split, the 
price of U.S.A. Medical Corporation stock rapidly increased to 
approximately $1 per share. 
3. During February 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
had furnished information to the Division as to the problems 
associated with U.S.A. Medical Corporation and its securities. On 
February 6, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. received 
notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the latters' buy-in of 150,000 
shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities at $.10 per share 
and that Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. had until February 
15, 1989 to make delivery of those securities. As of February 14, 
1989, the price of those securities had risen to approximately $10 
per share. 
4. By letter, dated February 15, 1989, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson informed Otra Clearing, Inc. that Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. would not honor the buy-in notice 
because it (Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.) considered 
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U.S.A. Medical Corporation common stock to be unregistered 
securities and it declined to "engage or participate in an unlawful 
distribution of unregistered securities". 
5. On February 16, 1989 Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. filed a 10b-5 securities fraud action in Federal District 
Court seeking a preliminary injunction and declaration that 
Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 's outstanding contracts and 
obligations to certain brokerage firms and clearing corporations, 
to whom Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. owed U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities, were void for illegality. In the just-
described action, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. alleged 
improprieties and fraud in the issuance and trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities. 
6. On February 17, 1989, the Court in the just-referenced 
litigation granted Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. ' s motion 
for a temporary restraining order as to Midwest Clearing 
Corporation, thus preventing Midwest Clearing Corporation from 
effecting any "buy-ins" for ten (10) days as against Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. A hearing on the pending motion for 
a preliminary injunction was conducted on February 27-28, 1989. 
The Court denied that motion, but found as follows: 
"...the stock of U.S.A. Medical was unlawfully 
issued, has never been registered with any proper 
regulatory authority, is not exempt from such 
requisite registration and has been and is 
continuing to be traded illegally. 
The stock of U.S.A. Medical has been and 
continues to be traded as part of a fraudulent 
scheme and device to manipulate and artificially 
- 3 -
inflate the price of that stock in violation of the 
securities laws." 
7. On March 1, 1989, the Division issued a summary order 
suspending all Section 14(2) exemptions under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act relative to U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. 
Also on March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. 
received notice from Otra Clearing, Inc. of the latters1 buy-in of 
150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. 
8. On March 6, 1989, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission suspended trading in the securities of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation for ten (10) days. By letter, dated March 21, 1989, 
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson advised the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD), Inc. of the March 1, 1989 notice from 
Otra Clearing and stated as follows: 
"On March 1, 1989 at 2:00 p.m. (MST) , Otra 
Clearing called, buying-in 150,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical Corp. The buy-in price was $.70 based on 
guaranteed delivery of 148,000 (P.B. Jameson, 
seller) and the buy-in price of $.50, 2,000 shares 
(R.A. Johnson, seller). See attached confirmation 
of Execution of Buy-ins: 
It is Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.'s position 
that these buy-ins were illegal. First, shares of 
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. were unlawfully 
issued, were never lawfully registered and do not 
qualify for any valid exemption under federal or 
state law. As such, any trading of or transaction 
involving U.S.A. Medical stock has been, would have 
been and is unlawful under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e, and Section 
10 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §78j(b). 
Second, all open trades or outstanding 
contracts for the purchase or sale of shares of 
stock in U.S.A. Medical Corp. are illegal contracts 
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and therefore unenforceable. The enforcement or 
performance of any and all such open trades or 
contracts would constitute and serve to complete 
illegal trades and unenforceable contracts. This 
would violate securities laws." 
Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson sent the just-stated letter to 
prompt the initiation of an NASD arbitration proceeding with 
respect to the dispute concerning the buy-in of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. 
9. On March 29, 1989, the Division's March 1, 1989 Summary 
Order was made permanent by default. Respondents received copies 
of the Division's March 1, 1989 and March 29, 1989 Orders on or 
about the date of their respective issuance. 
10. As of March 1, 1989, Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. owed several hundred thousand shares of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities to several broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations. Sometime after the just-stated date, Respondents 
purchased a total of 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities from six (6) Utah residents and one (1) New York 
resident. The Utah residents and the amount of shares so purchased 
were: Paul Jones (180,900), Nick Julian (69,500), Leo Pavich 
(67,500), Jim Coleman (30,000), Philip Tanzani (20,000) and Richard 
Sax (18,000). The New York resident was Sheldon Flateman (12,000). 
Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities as the 
means to satisfy outstanding contracts for the delivery of those 
securities to several broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
11. Prior to Respondents' purchase of U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities from the above-named seven individuals, 
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Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson informed Mr. Julian, Mr. Pavich, 
Mr. Coleman, Mr. Tanzani and Mr. Sax of the February 28, 1989 
ruling which had been entered by the Court in the previously-
referenced security fraud action and the March 1, 1989 and March 
29, 1989 Orders entered by the Division. Mr. Flateman and Mr. 
Jones, who were both registered NASD representatives, were also 
aware of the Federal Court ruling and the Division's Orders. Prior 
to March 1, 1989, Mr. Jones, a licensed securities agent with 
Wasatch Stock Trading, was involved with the trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities. 
12. During April 1989, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson was 
informed by a Karl Smith that a John Dawson had U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities which Mr. Smith believed Mr. Dawson was 
desirous of selling. Based on that information, Respondent Marlen 
Vernon Johnson contacted Mr. Dawson to determine if he was 
interested in selling those securities. No sale resulted and the 
conversation between Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson and Mr. 
Dawson did not constitute a violation of the Division's March 1989 
Order. Further, there is no sufficient evidence to find that 
Respondents or their agents solicited any of the above-named seven 
(7) individuals to sell their U.S.A. Mediceil Corporation 
securities. 
13. Given the price which Respondents sold U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation securities prior to entry of the March 1, 1989 Order 
and the subsequent price which Respondents paid the above-named 
seven (7) individuals to purchase said securities after March 1, 
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1989, Respondents realized a profit totalling $6,538 in that regard 
to thus deliver those securities to satisfy existing contracts with 
various broker-dealers and clearing corporations. 
14. On March 20, 1990, Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson 
purchased 54,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities 
from Mr. Sax. During the instant proceeding, Respondent testified 
that he purchased those securities for an entity known as the 
January Corporation as the means to possibly satisfy a pending NASD 
arbitration proceeding between Respondent Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc. and Otra Clearing, Inc. regarding the March 1, 1989 buy-in of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities by Otra Clearing, Inc. On 
March 29, 1990 Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson - through the 
January Corporation - sold the 54,000 shares to a firm known as 
Sorenson, Chiddo & May. 
15. Sometime within the last two (2) months, Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. filed a Form BDW with the Division to 
request that its1 broker-dealer registration be withdrawn. Said 
request was denied, given the pending disciplinary proceeding as to 
that registration. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondents contend they did not engage in any dishonest or 
unethical conduct and that no disciplinary sanction should enter 
with regard to their registration as a securities broker-dealer and 
agent, respectively. Specifically, Respondents assert that: (1) 
the Division's March 1, 1989 Order prevented only the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities; (2) Respondents purchased 
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those securities to satisfy existing contracts to thus deliver the 
securities to various broker-dealers and clearing corporations; and 
(3) Section 61-1-6(1)(g), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended), quoted 
below, may not be applied to interfere with Respondents' attempts 
to honor their contractual obligations to such third parties. 
Respondents urge that the Division has taken no action against 
other individuals who may have participated in the purchase or sale 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. Respondents also contend that the imposition of any 
sanction in this proceeding would be inconsistent with their duty 
to have complied with NASD requirements which prompted their 
purchase of the securities in order to avoid entry of a possible 
sanction with regard to their NASD affiliation. 
Section 61-1-6(1) provides as follows: 
"Upon approval by a majority of the Securities 
Advisory Board, the director...may issue an 
order... suspending, or revoking any 
registration,...if the director finds that it is in 
the public interest and if he finds...with respect 
to the.. .registrant or, in the case of a broker-
dealer..., any partner, officer, or director or any 
person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, or any person directly or 
indirectly controlling the broker-dealer..., that 
such person: 
(g) engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the 
securities business...ff 
To be further noted is Section 61-1-7, which provides: 
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or 
sell any security in this state unless it is 
registered under this chapter or the security or 
transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." 
The proper scope and operative effect of the March 1, 1989 Order 
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entered by the Division was to prohibit any trading of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation securities within this state. Since those 
securities were neither registered nor exempt from registration and 
had been traded in a fraudulent scheme designed to manipulate the 
price of those securities, the just-stated order was duly entered 
to protect the public interest. It is specious to argue, as 
Respondents assert, that the order only prohibited the sale of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities. Given the unlawful issuance 
of those securities and that the subsequent trading of those 
securities was tainted by fraudulent and manipulative practices, 
the proper scope of the March 1, 1989 Order must be broadly 
interpreted and in a manner consistent with the purpose for the 
issuance of that order. 
Concededly, Respondents had an existing contractual obligation 
to deliver U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities to various broker-
dealers and clearing corporations prior to the entry of the March 
1, 1989 Order. It is obvious that Respondents elected to trade in 
the securities at issue in an effort to mitigate their "short" 
position, avoid potentially severe economic consequences and escape 
the entry of a possible sanction on their NASD membership. Under 
the circumstances, no other alternative existed to thus foster 
Respondents1 economic interests and the motivation for their 
conduct is clearly understandable. 
Nevertheless, Respondents purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities after March 1, 1989 with knowledge that a sale of those 
securities would constitute a violation of the March 1, 1989 Order. 
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Such conduct clearly constitutes a "dishonest or unethical 
practice11 within the meaning of Section 61-1-6(1) (g) and provides 
a sufficient basis upon which to enter a disciplinary sanction as 
to Respondents1 registration. 
Regardless of the factors which prompted Respondents purchase 
of U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities, that conduct frustrated 
the Division's appropriate efforts to preclude trading in those 
securities and thus partially emasculated the effect of the March 
1, 1989 Order. While the record does not identify when Respondents 
purchased U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities after March 1, 
1989, any delay between entry of the March 1, 1989 Order and 
Respondents' subsequent purchase of the securities appears to be 
more reflective of the common knowledge that the price of those 
securities would decrease after entry of the March 1, 1989 Order 
rather than any intended compliance by Respondents with that order. 
Respondents1 contention that the Division has engaged in 
selective enforcement of the March 1, 1989 Order lacks serious 
merit. The Board notes that a disciplinary proceeding has been 
initiated as to Mr. Jones. It is unknown whether any disciplinary 
proceeding may be subsequently initiated as to Otra Clearing, Inc., 
P.B. Jameson, R.A. Johnson or any of their agents with regard to 
the buy-in notice issued to Respondents by Otra Clearing, Inc. In 
any event, the fact remains that Respondents engaged in misconduct 
which subjects them to entry of a disciplinary sanction regardless 
of whether other proceedings are initiated by the Division as to 
other entities or individuals. 
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Given the circumstances of this case, it may well have been 
impossible for Respondents to have either satisfied their existing 
contractual obligations to various broker-dealers and clearing 
corporations and avoid the subsequent entry of a disciplinary 
sanction in the proceeding or to have scrupulously avoided trading 
in U.S.A. Medical Corporation securities and escape possible action 
on their NASD membership. However, the existence of that dilemma 
does not support Respondents1 assertions that their duty to comply 
with the March 1, 1989 Order was inferior and subordinate to their 
satisfaction of any NASD requirements and that no disciplinary 
sanction can enter in this forum because they could have been 
potentially subject to adverse NASD action if they did not satisfy 
their contractual obligations to third parties. 
Concededly, there is no evidence that Respondents' violation 
of the March 1, 1989 Order resulted in any harm to the investing 
public. Nevertheless, entry of a disciplinary sanction in this 
proceeding is in the public interest and clearly warranted due to 
Respondents' non-compliance with the March 1, 1989 Order which was 
duly entered to regulate the trading of U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
securities. The record reflects that Respondents' dishonest and 
unethical conduct was driven by a desire to realize monetary gain 
and/or avoid financial loss and that Respondents' willingness to 
engage in trading the securities shifted over time, depending upon 
whatever would promote Respondents' economic interests. Adherence 
to orders duly entered by the Division which govern the practices 
of broker-dealers and agents engaged in the securities business 
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should not be a matter dictated by the potential for monetary gain. 
By reason of the serious nature of Respondents' misconduct, an 
appropriately severe sanction should be entered. 
ORDER 
WHEREFOREf IT IS ORDERED that the registration of Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. as a broker-dealer in the State of 
Utah and the registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson as an 
agent in this state shall be suspended for one (1) year. 
It is further ordered that said suspensions shall be deemed 
retroactively effective from the date that Respondent Johnson-
Bowles Company, inc. filed its' Form BDW with the Division of 
Securities. 
It is further ordered that, upon expiration of the period of 
suspension set forth above, Respondents' registration shall be 
placed on probation for two (2) years. Should Respondents fail to 
comply with the statutes and rules which govern their registration 
during that time, further proceedings shall be conducted and a 
determination made whether a sanction of greater severity than that 
set forth herein i£ warranted. 
Dated this iDfadav of August, 1990. 
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BY THE DIRECTOR: 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
are hereby approved. Said Order shall become effective thirty (30) 
days from the date set forth below. 
Dated this day of August, 1990. 
hn C. Baldwin 
Director 
Administrative Review of this Order may be obtained by filing 
a Request for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any request for a review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Sections 61-1-23, 63-46b-12(l) and the 
departmental rules which govern agency review. 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-16. 
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EXHIBIT "FF" 
JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
OBJECTION TO FORM AND 
CONTENT OF AUGUST 13.1990 
FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW. AND ORDER 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby lodge their strenuous objection 
to the unconstitutional and prejudicial means or manner by which the August 13.1990. 
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order (hereinafter "Order") was unilaterally 
prepared without their knowledge, input, or participation — a prejudicial ruling that 
Respondents will no doubt be saddled with on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Respondents further object to the form and content of such Order. In support of this 
objection. Respondents file an affidavit of their counsel. The basis for this objection is as 
follows. 
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Respondents believe, after having studied the August 13.1990. Findings of 
Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order, that it was not prepared solely by the Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALT) and the Securities Advisory Board as Respondents and their counsel were 
repeatedly told in these proceedings. For instance, the document embraces the Division's 
closing argument at the July 16.1990. hearing, virtually verbatim (even as if Its counsel. Mr. 
Griffin, drafted it) and wholly ignores not only Respondents' best arguments put forth at the 
hearing, but even goes further to dismiss Mr. David R. King's entire expert testimony as 
"specious". [See page 9. second full sentence.] This is ironic in that Mr. King is undoubtedly 
the foremost authority In Utah in this area of the law. This is even more peculiar when one 
considers that Ms. McGinley testified that the Division's entire case rested on the theory of 
"aiding and abetting*— a legal theory never even alluded to in passing in the August 13, 
1990. Order. The Order thus miserably fails to address the core legal issues present in this 
case. 
Furthermore, in a conference call that the ALJ. Respondents' counsel, and 
Mr. Griffin engaged in on or about July 17.1990. concerning the March 1990. purchase 
from Richard Sax. the ALJ informed counsel that the Board neyw even discussed such 
purchase. Since the Board admittedly never took such into consideration in determining 
that there was indeed a violation, Respondents find it peculiar that such is not just referred 
to in the Findings of Fact but that the "Board" went further and determined that such 
ultimately resulted In an unlawful "sale" to Sorensen. Chido & May — an argument never 
presented at trial by the Division to even, in turn, legitimately support such a finding. To be 
sure, no one of sane mind would purchase something for $4,000, only to sell it for $30, and 
Respondents submit that Mr. Johnson's pension and profit sharing plan, January 
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Corporation, neither needed nor was quite that desperate for a $3,970. out-of-pocket, tax 
-write-off" for 1990. This is also not to ignore that Respondents fail to see the relevance of 
quoting, among other things. Mr. Johnson's letter to the NASD concerning the OTRA 
"buy-in", especially when it and numerous other "findings" were never, in the least, tied in to 
the Conclusions of Law. Respondents thus find It difficult to believe that either the ALJ 
and/or the "Board" would find it necessary to "pad" the findings with such gratuitous and 
admittedly irrelevant "facts." This is also not to further ignore that Respondents and their 
counsel have become familiar with the ALJ's own personal style of drafting the same kinds 
of orders, a style or practice that is far more thorough, impartial, logical, and Judicious — 
adjectives which Respondents are unable to sincerely ascribe to the August 13. Order. 
The purpose of this formal Objection IS that Respondents believe the August 
13.1990. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order, is grossly one-sided and 
because they were unable to participate in it to the same degree that they believe Messrs. 
Baldwin. Qriff in and Ms. McQinley did. they are. without question, enormously and 
intentionally prejudiced on appeal. For instance, the way the Order is plugged with 
irrelevant "findings" and otherwise skirts the real legal issues Involved. Respondents9 
prospects of prevailing on appeal are strictly predicated on the luck of drawings 
intelligent and thorough enough appellate judge who will read the transcript and discover 
that the August 13.1990. document is far afield from reflecting what either the law Is as 
applied to this case or what actually transpired at the trial. By way of example and to put it 
another way. Respondents are horrified at the prospect of a judge, jury and prosecutor 
secretly meeting behind closed doors after a district court trial and scheming on how to 
front-end load or doctor the findings and conclusions — behind the defendant's back — so 
OOOIiJS 
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that the prosecution can prevail on appeal. In this context, Withrow v. Larkln, 421 U.S. 35, 
43 LEd.2d 712.95 S.Ct. 1456 (1975), is entirely on point. In Withrow, a unanimous U.S. 
Supreme Court held that in the administrative adjudicative arena, It is unconstitutional for 
any person (i.e., Baldwin, McQinley, and /or Griffin) to act as investigator, prosecutor and 
judge in the same proceeding. The short point is that if the Division cannot allow itself to 
prevail fairly, it should not be entitled to prevail at all. 
In sum, Humpty Dumpty said that words are what he said they meant, and by 
the same token, the Division has been no more eloquent in the August 13, Order, than 
stating that the law is similarly nothing more than what they say it is. In fact, It is clear that 
the Division was hell bent on getting to the August 13, Order, no matter what. Knowing that 
there was never a prospect of prevailing on anything, and looking back objectively on the 
last 1% years, what Respondents should have done on April 27,1989. is stipulate to the 
August 13.1990. Order, and simply have appealed it to the Court of Appeals at that time. 
Unfortunately for Respondents, this approach would be too honest for a government 
agency. 
Based on the loregoing. Respondents request that the Order be set aside, that 
the Division fully disclose who participated, directly or indirectly, fan the drafting of such 
Order — and to what extent — and that the Division declare that the proceedings have 
continued against Respondents in an unconstitutional manner, thereby meriting either 
dismissal, arrest of judgment, or a new trial. 
DATED this 20th day of August. 1 
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In re: Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.. and Marlen V. Johnson, Case Nos. 
SD-89-45BD and SD-89-47AG 
Objection to Form and Content of August 13.1990 Findings of Fact. 
Conclusions of Law, and Order 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day of August. 1990, (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO ORDER to John C. 
Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McQiniey. Director of Broker-Dealer Section, Securities 
Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake 
City. Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen Ekiund, Esq.. Department of 
Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. 
McCullough. Esq.. Callister. Duncan. & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. 
Kennecott Btdg.. 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah 84133. and Mark J. 




JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE 
OF HOW AND BY WHOM THE 
AUGUST 13.1990. FINDINGS 
OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW. AND ORDER. WAS PREPARED 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AG 
Respondents, by and through counsel, hereby demand immediate disclosure of 
how and by whom the Division's August 13.1990. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law, and 
Order ("Order"), was prepared and the extent of participation by each. In support of this 
demand. Respondents incorporate by reference their contemporaneous Objection and a 
Supporting Affidavit of their counsel. Respondents further request that this demand be 
ruled upon regardless of whether Respondents will be shortly filing a Request for Agency 
Review, in other words, under Department of Commerce Rules, Respondents are required 
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to file a Request for Agency Review no later than August 23.1990, and in so doing. 
Respondents have no intention of making this Demand moot. 
Respondents were informed in no uncertain terms that only the Securities 
Advisory Board would be ruling at the July 16,1990. trial of this matter. They were 
subsequently told by the ALJ on the afternoon of July 16, that the ALJ had been asked by 
the Board to assist it in the preparation of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order. The ALJ further indicated in a conversation with respective counsel on July 17, 
1990, that if counsel were consulted on the form of the Order, it would be counsel to both 
parties. However, Respondents and their counsel were never consulted relative to such 
Order. On Monday, August 13,1990, Respondents received a copy of the Order in issue. 
Such was the first time they had seen such Order. In addition, the Order has not been 
prepared on the same word processor that the ALJ has previously used and the tone and 
content of such Order is not consistent, by any means, with the ALJ's logical, thorough, and 
judicial style to which Respondents are, by now, well familiar. (In this regard, reference is 
made to Respondents' Objection filed contemporaneously herewith.) 
On August 16,1990, Respondents' counsel had a telephone conversation with 
Mark J. Qrif fin, counsel to the Division. When asked, point blank, whether he prepared the 
Order, Mr. Qrif fin dodged the question and Joked about the fact that Respondents wouldn't 
be able to discover whether he did or didn't unless his deposition was taken — which he 
said tt could not. The only thing that Mr. Qrif fin stated of significance Is that he claimed he 
had no advance knowledge of what the sanction Imposed on Respondents was until the 
Order was ultimately issued last Monday. This obviously does not mean that Mr. Qrlff In did 
not participate and have a direct or indirect hand In drafting pages 1-11 of the Order. In 
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fact, Respondents believe and assert that Mr. Griffin, In conjunction with Ms. McQInley. who 
in turn may have consulted directly with Mr. Baldwin, actually drafted and determined what 
would be in the Order and that It was then shoved before the Board members for their 
respective signatures. Respondents believe this is unfair and unconstitutional as the Order, 
in its present inaccurate state, will significantly prejudice them on appeal. The Order has 
further been prepared contrary to the spirit of Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, a rule which has every reason to apply in administrative adjudicative 
proceedings. Respondents further assert that this behind-the-back, surreptitious conduct, 
designed solely to insulate and guarantee the Division against losing on appeal. Is repugnant 
to all notions of fair play and substantial Justice. It is also violative of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct governing attorneys, aside from being unconstitutional, all as set 
forth in Respondents' Objection. The foregoing Is not to ignore that the Board may have 
shirked its duties in allowing Division personnel to put words in their mouths and simply 
present an Order to them for their signatures that Respondents believe they were 
"railroaded" into signing. 
In light of the above, Respondents respectfully demand disclosure of how the 
August 13,1990, document was prepared, by whom, and what input was given, directly or 
indirectly, by anyone other than the ALJ and the Board. Respondents think it is absolutely 
necessary that this itself become an issue on appeal because if not, the Identified abuse in 
issue wffi surely prejudice Respondents and similarly prejudice others in the future — others 
who will, no doubt, be unwitting victims of the same underhanded, covert abuse and 
prejudice. This Information is also necessary for the Respondents to determine whether a 
Request for Agency Review, while procedurally necessary, would be a meaningless exercise. 
0001134 
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There should also be no objection to making this disclosure unless the Division does Indeed 
have something to hide in this respect and unless the Order was in fact crammed down the 
Board's throat. 
Based on the foregoing, unless tha requisite disciosure ia made and further 
made part of the record, Respondents should be given the opportunity to immediately take 
the depositions of Mr. Qrlffln, Mr. Baldwin. Ms. McQinley. the ALJ. and each of the 
Securities Advisory Board members. 
DATED thlsj 20th day of August. 19S 
licTtael Coombs 
Jralg F. McCullough 
^Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day of August. 1990. (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO ORDER to John C. 
Baldwin. Director and Kathleen C. McQinley, Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities 
Division. Utah Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake 
City. Utah 84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen EHund. Esq.. Department of 
Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. 
McCullough. Esq.. Calllater. Duncan. & Nebeker. Co-Counsel to Respondents. 8th Floor. 
Kennecott Bldg.. 10 East South Temple Street. Salt Lake City. Utah £14133. and Mark J. 





JOHN MICHAEL COOMBS. ESQ.. No. 3639 
72 East 400 South. Ste. 220 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-0833 
Attorney for Respondents te^i-vc 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY. INC. 
CRD NO. 07678 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REGISTRATION 
OF: 
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
CRD NO. 2598888 
AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS' 
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF 
DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE 
Case No. SD-89-46BD 
Case No. SD-89-47AQ 
STATE OF UTAH ) )ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
John Michael Coombs, on his oath, deposes and says the following on behalf of 
Respondents in the above-entitled matters and in support of their demand for disclosure of 
how and by whom the August 13,1990. Order was prepared and otherwise came about. 
The following is also submitted in support of Respondents' formal Objection to the same: 
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1. That your affiant is Respondents' counsel in the above-matters and he has 
personal knowledge and experience as to the matters contained herein and he is otherwise 
competent to make this affidavit on their behalf in these proceedings. 
2. That Respondents were informed in no uncertain terms that only the 
Securities Advisory Board would be ruling on the matters tried before them on July 16, 
1990. That the only exception to this was that Respondents were informed that Division 
Director Baldwin would probably be required to "sign of f on their exclusive decision. That 
Mr. Baldwin would only be required to "sign off" on the Order is understandable in that he 
was not present at the hearing and for this reason, he would obviously be incompetent to 
participate any further. 
3. That after the hearing on July 16.1990, the ALJ informed respective 
counsel that the Board had requested that he prepare the formal form of the Order. 
4. On or about July 17,1990. your affiant, the ALJ and Mr. Qriffin had a phone 
conversation in which the ALJ stated that the Board had not taken the March 1990, 
purchase from Richard Sax into consideration in determining whether or not there was 
violation. It thus comes as a surprise that the Findings of Fact do not stop short at such a 
finding but that they go several steps further to "find" that Respondents subsequently "sold' 
the same stock to Sorensen, Chido & May. This Is not to ignore other incongruities in the 
Order that Respondents have articulated in their formal Objection filed herewith. 
5. That in the same conversation that Mr. Qriffin and your affiant engaged in 
with the ALJ, your affiant recalls the ALJ saying that if any counsel participated In drafting 
the Order, both counsel would have that opportunity. 
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6. That Respondents received the "BoarcT's alleged Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order on August 13,1990, and your affiant can attest that it is not 
prepared on the same word processor as previously used by the ALJ in drafting each and 
every one of his previous orders and rulings In this case. He can also attest than neither he 
nor Respondents ever saw such Order, or a draft thereof, until August 13.1990. 
7. That, in addition, based on your affiant having read and reviewed numerous 
other orders of the ALJ during the last 1% years of this case, your affiant Is of the opinion 
that the ALJ did not prepare the Order in issue and he may well not have participated in it at 
all. (See Respondents' Objection filed herewith.) 
8. That on August 16.1990, your affiant had a telephone conversation with 
Mark J. Griffin, the co-prosecutor with Ms. McQinley. in this case. Your affiant asked him 
point blank whether he participated in drafting the Order in Issue. Mr, Griffin was unable 
and unwilling to give a straight answer. In fact. Mr. Griffin Joked about Respondents not 
being able to find out whether he did or not and after asking why your affiant wanted to 
know, he informed your affiant that Respondents would have to take his deposition — 
something which, under the circumstances, they would not be able to do. After having a 
moment to collect himself from a question that took him by surprise. Mr. Griffin did state 
that he was unaware of what the sanction was that was to be imposed on Respondents. 
However, this certainly does not mean that Ms. McQinley and/or Mr. Baldwin did not seek 
and utilize his assistance, directly or indirectly, hi drafting pages 1-11 of the Order — the 
pages which exclude any reference to a sanction. 
9. That your affiant believes that if Messrs. Baldwin, Griffin and/or Ms. 
McQinley unilaterally drafted the Order and submitted It to the Board for their signatures, 
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Respondents are tremendously prejudiced on appeal. This is because your affiant believes 
that the Order does not reflect what actually transpired at the July 16.1990. hearing. Your 
affiant can further attest that in his opinion — if it is indeed true that the Division and its 
counsel unilateraffy drafted the Order — these entire proceedings have been 
unconstitutional and unfair and Respondents should have been told at the outset that the 
Division was hell bent on obtaining the August 13. Order, no matter what. Your affiant also 
believes that Respondents have been damaged as a result of such Constitutional 
deprivations. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT. 






SOtaT' Jfchn Michael Coombs 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to befor^ne this 20th d 
Notary Pudnc 
Residing at Salt Lake City. UT 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 20th day olf August, 1990. (s)he 
hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RESPONDENTS' 
COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEMAND FOR DISCLOSURE to John C. Baldwin. Director and 
Kathleen C. McQinley. Director of Broker-Dealer Section. Securities Division, Utah 
Department of Commerce. 160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802, Salt Lake City. Utah 
84145-0802; Administrative Law Judge J. Stephen Eklund. Esq.. Department of Commerce, 
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160 East 300 South. P.O. Box 45802. Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802; Craig F. 
McCullough. Esq.. Cailister. Duncan. & Nebeker, Co-Counsel to Respondents, 8th Floor, 
Kennecott BIdg.. 10 East South Temple Street, Salt Lake City. Utah 84133; and Mark J. 




EXHIBIT " I I " 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION OF: 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC. 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE REGISTRATION 
OF: MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
CASE NO. SD-89-46BD 
CASE NO. SD-89-47AG 
SNTROPPCTION 
1. Orders for Which this Review is Sought 
a. Final Order 
By order of the Securities Advisory Board dated August 10, 
1990, and approved by the Director of the Securities Division (the 
"Division") on August 13, 1990, the registration of Respondent 
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc. ("Johnson Bowles") and the 
registration of Respondent Marlen Vernon Johnson ("Johnson") were 
suspended for one year. (This order is hereinafter referred to as 
the "Final Order".) Both Respondents also were ordered placed on 
probation for two years following the suspension, with certain 
conditions. 
In summary, Respondents were sanctioned for violating the 
terms of a Division order, dated March 1, 1989, and made permanent 
on March 29, 1989 (the "March 1 Order"). This March 1 Order 
suspended all exemptions available under Section 14(2) of the Utah 
- 1 -
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Uniform Securities Act relative to trading in the stock of a 
company known as U.S.A. Medical Corporation, 
b. Other Orders 
The following interim orders were entered during the pendency 
of this matter: 
i. Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert; 
ii. Order Denying Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) 
Motion (lack of jurisdiction); 
iii. Order Denying Respondents' 12(b)(6) Motion 
(failure to state a claim); 
iv. Order Granting the Division's Motion to 
Dismiss Respondents' Counterclaim; and 
v. Order Denying Respondents' Motion for Summary 
Judgement. 
2. Request for Agency Review 
Respondents filed a "Request for Agency Review of Entire 
Record and Supporting Brief" (hereinafter, the "Request for 
Review") on August 23, 1990. This Request for Review requests 
agency review (or, in this case, review by a superior agency) of 
the Final Order and the interim orders described above. 
Counsel for Respondents submitted a letter dated September 10, 
1990, to the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, who 
is issuing this Order on Review. This letter has been treated as 
a memo supplementing the Request for Review. The Division did not 
file a written response to the letter. 
In support of its request that each of the above-named orders 
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be reversed and that the proceedings be dismissed and vacated, 
Respondents have referenced the various motions, memoranda, and 
affidavits which support each particular order. The Request for 
Review requests in general fashion that the reviewing officer 
review all of these pleadings, as well as the audio tapes of oral 
argument and the hearing transcript, to determine grounds for 
reversal. The reviewing officer also is requested to address all 
issues presented in all of the documents. 
Counsel for Respondents was invited by letter dated October 9, 
1990, to supplement the Request for Review with a statement more 
particularly stating the grounds for review. Counsel requested 
and received permission to file such a statement within thirty 
days; he thereafter declined the invitation and filed no more 
memoranda. The attachments to the Request for Review and the 
documents incorporated by reference were reviewed in connection 
with this Order on Review for purposes of clarification and 
explanation but were not extensively mined to supply arguments or 
issues or grounds which Respondents declined to specify in the 
Request for Review. 
3. Statutes or Rules Permitting or Requiring Review 
The review of this matter is being conducted by the Executive 
Director of the Department of Commerce pursuant to Section 61-1-23 
of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act") . Rule 151-46b-12 of 
the Department also allows for filing a request for agency review. 
By letter dated August 29, 1990, counsel was advised that no oral 
argument would be heard. The Division did not file any written 
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response to Respondent's Request for Review. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES REVIEWED 
As previously noted, Respondents1 Request for Review did not 
clearly enumerate each separate issue on appeal, but appeared to be 
an attempt re-argue all motions previously made. Where particular 
grounds for review were alleged in the Request for Review, they are 
set forth below. The relief requested is assumed to be a reversal 
of each contested order. 
1. The Final Order: 
a. Whether the Order is supported by the evidence, the 
record, and the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of 
Law; 
b. Whether the Conclusions of Law follow from the 
Findings of Fact; 
c. Whether there should be no findings of fact nor 
conclusions of law, simply a verdict and sanction; 
2 . Qrfler granting Pivisipn's Motion to convert: 
a. Whether the Division waived any right or ability to 
convert the proceeding from an informal proceeding to a 
formal one; 
b. Whether the order granting the Division's motion to 
convert to formal proceedings is erroneous; 
3. Qrfler Denying Resppntentg' R\il3 13(b) (11 flpfrion; 
Whether the 12(b)(1) order was supported by the Findings 
of Fact and the Conclusions of Law; 
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4. Order Denying Respondents8 12(bH61 Motion: 
Whether denial of the 12(b)(6) motion was supported by 
the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of Law; 
5. Order Granting the Divisions Motion to Dismiss 
Respondents' Counterclaim: 
Whether the order dismissing Respondents' Counterclaim 
was supported by the Findings of Fact and the Conclusions 
of Law; 
6. Order Denying Respondents8 Motion for Summary Judgement: 
Whether the order denying Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgement was supported by the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law. 
The Final Order 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Division presented evidence in the hearing through 
the testimony of Kathleen McGinley, Director of Licensing for the 
Division. For Respondents, Respondent Marlen Johnson testified; as 
did Don Sorenson, a Certified Public Accountant who performed some 
accounting services for Respondent; and David King, who offered 
testimony as an expert regarding "dishonest or unethical practices" 
under the Utah Uniform Securities Act. Also entered into evidence 
were certain stipulations of fact; an order issued by the Federal 
District Court for the District of Utah which went to some of the 
issues herein; correspondence regarding the USA Medical stock; and 
other documents reflecting the transactions complained of herein. 
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2. All of the Findings of Fact in the Final Order were 
supported by sufficient and credible testimony and evidence 
presented at the hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
3. It appears that there is no basis to modify or overturn 
the Conclusions of Law in the Final Order, for the following 
reasons: the findings are supported by substantial and credible 
evidence; no evidence supporting a contrary finding was presented 
by Respondents1 counsel; the Board and the Director did not 
misinterpret applicable law or rules, and the conclusions do not 
reflect an abuse of discretion by the Board and the Director. 
Order Granting Division's Motion to Convert to Formal Proceedings: 
FILINGS or FACT 
4. Division rules designate all proceedings as informal. 
Although Respondents argue that the Division waived any right it 
had to convert the proceedings from informal to formal, nothing in 
the record indicates that the Division waived this right. In their 
original objection to the Division's motion to convert, Respondents 
argue that simply by the act of filing the petition, the Division 
waived its right to convert. However, this act by itself does not 
indicate that the Division wished to waive conversion, especially 
since there is no way for an agency to convert proceedings before 
they have even commenced. Both Division and Department rules are 
silent as to the ability to convert proceedings from formal to 
informal; the Utah Administrative Procedures Act does allow 
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conversion where it is in the public interest and does not unfairly 
prejudice a partyfs rights. 
CQyqfryglQNS QF tJVW 
5. The order allowing the proceedings to be converted from 
formal to informal did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge's ruling that conversion was 
in the public interest was not improper because the significant and 
complicated issues in this case could be more fully and competently 
disposed of with the expertise of the Board, pursuant to the 
greater discovery and other rights granted under formal 
proceedings, and because conversion would allow for this matter to 
be disposed of with one full and fair hearing at the administrative 
level. One of the most important issues in this case was whether 
Respondents1 behavior constituted unethical and dishonest conduct. 
These issues could better and more properly be explored within the 
context of a formal proceeding. 
7. Conversion did not unfairly prejudice Respondents1 
rights. Respondents are not harmed merely because they receive 
only one full hearing, at the administrative level, rather than two 
hearings — one in the administrative forum, one in the judicial. 
8. Respondents argue that the order granting conversion was 
erroneous but assigned no grounds for error. Based on a review of 
the record, and for the reasons noted above, I find that conversion 
was not erroneous. 
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Order Denying Respondents' Rule 12(b)(1) Motiont 
FINPtfrGg QF FACT 
9. Respondents1 Request for Review assigns no grounds for 
error or issues on appeal of the Administrative Law Judge's denial 
of Respondent's motion to dismiss based on the Division's lack of 
jurisdiction. 
10. Respondents were licensed by the Division at all times 
relevant to these proceedings. As are most other licensees 
licensed by the Division, Respondents are subject to additional 
regulation by the federal Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
self-regulatory organizations such as the NASD which are under SEC 
oversight. 
11. Respondents were charged in the Amended Petition with 
violating Utah law emd Division rules. 
qoyCfrV$ION5 QF LAW 
12. Concurrent regulation in these circumstances is not 
improper or illegal and any applicable federal law or rules did not 
supersede Utah law and rules. 
13. The Administrative Law Judge could reasonably conclude, 
based on the facts before him at the time, that the Division had 
subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents based on their license 
and their alleged violation of Utah law and rules, and therefore 
did not improperly decline to dismiss the Petition. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
14. Respondents1 Motion to Dismiss based on failure to state 
a claim was denied. Respondents' Request for Review alleges no 
particular grounds for error or issues on appeal. 
15. The Amended Petition indicated that Respondents purchased 
securities of USA Medical Corporation during a time when all 
transactional exemptions from registration for that stock were 
suspended; that Respondents purchased the securities within Utah, 
from Utah residents; that Respondents knew of the order suspending 
exemptions; and that Respondents knew that the USA stock in fact 
had been unlawfully issued, had never been registered and had no 
exemption from registration and was traded illegally; and that 
Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell 
their stock to Respondents. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
16. The Amended Petition and other documents in the record at 
the time Respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on failure 
to state a claim indicated that there were disputed issues of 
material fact. Specifically, Respondent denied soliciting any of 
the sales, and disputed the amount of profits from the sales; also, 
questions of fact remained to be resolved regarding whether the 
transactions by Respondents1 customers were "unsuitable". Finally, 
based on the pleadings, it did not appear as a matter of law that 
the Division could not recover under the theories alleged (aiding 
and abetting and unsuitability). 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
17. Respondents9 Counterclaim alleges various wrongdoings by 
the Division and concludes with a request for an ciward of costs, 
attorney's fees and expenses, alleging in support of the request 
that the Division's petition is in violation of Rule* 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
Ann.; and that an awaird is proper under the federal Equal Access to 
Justice Act (no citation given). 
18. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Division's 
motion to dismiss the counterclaim, holding that Section 63-46b-
7(1) does not authorize filing of a counterclaim in these 
proceedings, hence that there was no subject matter jurisdiction 
over Respondents' counterclaim. Thus, the Administrative Law Judge 
did not address whether Section 78-27-56 or Rule 11 applied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
19. Section 63-46b-7(l) does not clearly bar Respondents' 
counterclaim. It refers to the "claims or defenses" of parties and 
read expansively, could be meant to refer to counterclaims. 
Moveover, Section 63-46b-6 requires that a response be filed, which 
must include a statement of the relief sought. Again, read 
expansively, "response" and "relief" could be extended to cover a 
request for costs and attorney's fees. However, it is noted that 
nowhere does the Utah Administrative Procedures Act incorporate 




20. Furthermore, Section 63-46b-6 states that the presiding 
officer or the agency by rule "may* permit pleadings in addition to 
the notice and response. Nowhere does the record reflect that the 
presiding officer permitted this counterclaim. Neither Department 
nor Division rules permit the counterclaim. Department Rules do 
not "expressly" adopt Rule 11; Respondents1 assertion in its 
counterclaim that it did is patently incorrect. Department Rule 
151-46b-7 only partially quotes a passage from Rule 11 (that 
signing pleadings constitutes certification that good grounds 
exist) and does not quote the portion regarding award of fees, 
costs or expenses. Therefore, Respondents9 counterclaim was not 
permitted Department rules. 
21. The proper forum for raising a Rule 11 claim, if at all, 
would be upon motion, not through a counterclaim. Regardless, 
Respondents did not prevail below and therefore a Rule 11 claim is 
moot. Finally, the Divisionfs actions — the signing of any 
pleadings by its employees or by the Assistant Attorney General — 
did not violate Rule 11 because each allegation was substantiated 
through documentary evidence or testimony of witnesses, or by 
stipulation. 
Order Denying Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgement: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
22. The Administrative Law Judge denied Respondents9 Motion 
for Summary Judgement, finding that sufficient factual issues 
remained for resolution. 
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23. The various motions filed — both before and after 
disposition of the Motion for Summary Judgement — as well as 
testimony at the hearing bear this out. Several important factual 
issues were in dispute. Specifically, the parties did not agree on 
whether Respondents knew of the precise terms of the Division's 
March 1 order when they purchased the USA Medical Securities; or, 
if they did, on whether the order extended to Respondents and the 
transactions complained of in the Petition; and on whether 
Respondents may have solicited shareholders of USA Medical to sell 
their stock to Respondents. In addition, although some of the 
unresolved issues perhaps may be better characterized as legal 
issues rather than factual disputes, refusal to grant summary 
judgement was not improper where the Administrative Law Judge 
wished to allow the* Board to hear the evidence and lend their 
expertise in determining whether Respondents1 actions did 
constitute violations of the Division's law and rules. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
24. A review of the record indicates that there were 
sufficient disputed issues that denial of the motion for summary 




IT IS ORDERED THAT the Final Order dated August 13, 1990, be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
Dated this *Z4 day of Oc-faber , 1990 
David L. Buhler, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of 
this Order. Any Petition for such Review shall comply with the 
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16. 
CERTIFICATE OF HMEINg 
I certify that on the day of 
1990, I caused to be mailed (except as otherwise noted) a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Marlen Johnson 
Johnson-Bowles Co., Inc. 
430 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Earl S. Maeser, Director 
Utah Securities Division 
P.O Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
(HAND DELIVERED) 
Craig S. McCullough 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Kennecott Building 
8th Floor 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
John Michael Coombs 
72 East 400 South 
Suite 220 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark Griffin, Assistant A.G, 
115 State Capitol 




EXHIBIT " J J " 
* , 
H*,x U W* 9 DEE BENSON, United States Attorney (#0289) ^ 
STEWART C. WALZ, Assistant United States Attorne^(#3374) 
Securities and Commodities Fifaud' Task-Ecrce 
Chief, Criminal Division 
MARY BETH WALZ, Special Assistant United States Attorney (#3373) 
Attorneys for the United States of America 
476 United States Courthouse 
350 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES LYNN AVERETT, 
Defendant. 
90-CR-129S 
A M E N D E D 
FELONY INFORMATION 
VIO. 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(Conspiracy to Commit 
Securities Fraud) 
The United States Attorney charges: 
COUNT ONE 
Conspiracy to Commit Securities Fraud 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT, at times material to this 
felony information, was an attorney working and residing in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
2. U.S.A. Medical Corporation, at times material to this 
felony information, was a private Utah corporation. 
3. S.M.I., Inc., at times material to this felony 
information, was a Wyoming corporation that purportedly was a 
public company. 
4. At times material to this felony information, S.M.I., 
Inc. acquired U.S.A. Medical Corporation and changed its name 
from S.M.I., Inc. to U.S.A. Medical Corporation. 
THE CONSPIRACY 
5. From on or about an unknown date in November, 1987, 
until the date of this felony information, in the Central 
Division of the District of Utah and elsewhere, 
JAMES LYNN AVERETT, 
defendant herein, together with others, did conspire, combine, 
confederate, and agree together, with each other and with other 
persons unknown to the United States, to commit offenses against 
the United States of America in violation of one (1) or more of 
the following groups of statutes: 
a. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 77x (fraud in 
the offer and sale of securities) ; 
b. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff (fraud in the purchase and sale of any security); 
and 
c. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) and 15 U.S.C. § 77x (securities 
registration violation). 
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FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY 
1. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators to obtain three hundred 
thousand dollars ($300,000.00) to develop a public company to 
manufacture and sell aspirators. 
2. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators to purchase all of the 
stock of a corporation. 
3. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that defendant JAMES 
LYNN AVERETT would contribute an asset (the aspirator), would 
prepare merger documents for a corporate acquisition and name 
change (for S.M.I., Inc. to acquire U.S.A. Medical Corporation 
and for S.M.I., Inc. to change its name to U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation), would secure a legal tradeability opinion letter, 
and would arrange for a company to be listed in the "pink sheets" 
published by the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. 
4. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that the other co-
conspirators would promote the company and its stock so as to 
raise the above-mentioned three hundred thousand dollars 
($300,000.00). 
5. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT and other co-conspirators agreed that a controlled market 
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manipulation would take place to artificially raise the price of 
the stock of the company. 
6. In furtherance of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN 
AVERETT agreed with other co-conspirators that the three of them 
would obtain one million (1,000,000) shares of the stock of the 
company and would equally divide the one million (1,000,000) 
shares of stock among themselves. 
OVERT ACTS 
The United States Attorney further charges that in 
furtherance of said conspiracy and to effect the means and 
objectives of the conspiracy, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT and 
his co-conspirators committed and caused to be committed within 
the Central Division of the District of Utah and elsewhere the 
following overt acts: 
1. On or about an unknown date in November, 1987, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT observed the 
delivery of one hundred percent (100%) of the stock of S.M.I., 
Inc. (the box). This delivery took place between two co-
conspirators in the office of Efficient Transfer, Inc., a stock 
transfer agency located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. On or about some unknown date or dates in November, 
1987, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared the acquisition and 
name change documents for S.M.I., Inc. (purportedly a public 
corporation) to acquire U.S.A. Medical Corporation (a private 
corporation) and for S.M.I., Inc. to change its name to U.S.A. 
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Medical Corporation. The "Agreement and Plan of Reorganization" 
is dated December 7, 1987. 
3. On or about an unknown date in November, 1987, 
defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT requested another attorney to 
prepare the legal tradeability opinion letter for U.S.A. Medical 
Corporation. The legal tradeability opinion letter is dated 
December 7, 1987. 
4. On or about some unknown date or dates in November, 
1987, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared the N.Q.B. Form 211 
and prepared the bulk of the S.E.C Rule 15c2-ll package to 
submit to the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. to get U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation listed in the "pink sheets." The N.Q.B. Form 
211 is dated December 17, 1987. 
5. On or about an unknown date in November, 1987, 
defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT prepared and sent from Salt Lake 
City, Utah, to Cheyenne, Wyoming a letter requesting a 
certificate of good standing from the corporations authorities in 
Wyoming. 
6. On or about an unknown date in November, 1987, 
defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT conducted a meeting in defendant 
JAMES LYNN AVERETTfs office in Salt Lake City, Utah. At this 
meeting, defendant JAMES LYNN AVERETT informed the individuals in 
attendance, some of whom are co-conspirators, that the initial 
stock transactions for U.S.A. Medical Corporation would be 
illegal; 
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all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
This amended felony information is submitted on this ^ 
day of July, 1990. 
DEE BENSON 
United States Attorney 
- • 
I hereby certify that the annexed document Is a true 
and correct copy of the original on file in this office. 
ATTEST MARKUS B 2IMMER 
Clerk, US Di^ 
DfStrxrt of Utfe 
' / / > 
Date ^ / ^ / ^ ^y 
/
 / 
STEWART C. WALZ 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Securities arid-Cbmmodities Fraud 
Task Force 
Chief, Criminal Division 
MARY7BETH WAfft 
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney 
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L X r U N ^ s r ^ s l ^ f E D S T A T E s DISTRICT COL _JT 
0FUTAH
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
SEP19 
u^,,, — JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE 
ev-____^M5?. CLERK 
^ ' ' ^ a S T 90-CR-129S 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case No. 
y. 
James Lynn Averett 
Stephen R. McCaughey 
Defendant Defendant's Attorney 
230 E a s t Broadway #1005 528
 / 48 ^0162 
Defendant's SSN 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 u n a v i l a b l e 
Defendant's Mailing Address 
Dependent's Residence Address 
TglE DEFENDANT ENTERED A PLEA OF: I o f t h e F e l o n y I n f o r m a t i o n 
[ guilty nolo contendre] as to coont(s)
 } and 
not guilty as to count(s) 
TOERE WAS A: F e l o n y I n f o r m a t i o n 
[A findin£ verdict] of guilty as to count(s) . 
THERE WAS A: 
I finding verdict] of not guilty as to oount(s) . 
judgment of acquittal as to count(s) 
The defendant is acquitted and discharged as to this/these counts(s). 
^^S^^^W^XS^SLV^mff-'iii violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 
IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT THAT: . . 
Defendant is placed on two (2) years probation with special conditions 
(listed on back). 
1 hereby cert.fy *«• «* annexed d°cum«"*'* * *"* 
_ ; < W / 
In addition to any conditions imposed above, IT IS ORDERED that the conditions of supervised release or probation set 
forth in PROBATION FORM 7A are imposed. In addition, IT IS ORDERED that the special conditions of supervised 
release set out on the reverse of this judgment are imposed. 
SPECIAL <\ JITIONS OF PROBATION OR SUPERY £D RELEASE 
(1) Do not commit crimes, federal, state or local. (2) Obey standard 
conditions of probation (3) No fine is imposed due to defendant's 
inability to pay. (4) Defendant must complete five hundred (500) 
hours of community service as directed by the United States Probation 
Office. (5) Do not possess firearms or dangerous weapons. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay a total SMdal assessment of $ 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT count(s)_ 
the motion of the United States. 
are DISMISSED on 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay to the United States attorney for this district any amount 
imposed as restitution. The defendant shall pay to the clerk of the court any amount imposed as a fine, special assessment, 
or cost of prosecution. Until all fines, restitutions, special assessments, and costs are fully paid, the defendent shall notif) 
the United States attorney for the District of Utah of any change in name immediately and any change of address within 
30 days of the change. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of the court deliver a certified copy of this judgment to the United States 
attorney and the United States marshal for the District of Utah. 
The Court orders commitment to the custody of the Attorney Genera) and recommends: 
9/19/90sm Stewart C. Walz, AUSA 
9 / 7 / 9 0 Stephen McCaughey, Esq, 
Date of Imposition of Sentence 
>^  Date 
/t)U<^^m/CVd -,, 
Signature of Judicial THficer 
D a v i d Sam 
Name and Title of Judicial Officer 
I have executed this Judgment as follows: 
RETURN 
Defendant delivered on to at 
Date 
of this Judgment In a Criminal Case. 
, the institution designated by the Attorney General, with a certified copy 
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of Probation and Supervised Release 





DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORIHERN DIVISION 
&r: 
James L. Averett Docket No. 90-CR-00129-S 
Address 230 East Broadway, Sa l t Lake City, UT 84111 
Under the terms of your sentence, you have been placed on probation 8^QS0QS©Pfi51SffiX(strike one) by the 
Honorable David Sam , United States District Judge for the District of 
Utah . Your term of supervision is for a period of two (2) years , 
commencing September 7 . 1990 
While on probation/§CpS5QS9QS39fii^ strike one), you shall not commit another Federal, state, or local crime 
and shall not illegally possess a controlled substance. Revocation of probation and supervised release is mandatory for 
possession of a controlled substance. 
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: 
• As a condition of supervision, you are instructed to pay a fine in the amount of-
it shall be paid in the following manner 
• As a condition of supervision, you are instructed to pay restitution in the amount oL 
; it shall be paid in the following manner 
to 
|5C] The defendant shall not possess a firearm or destructive device. Probation must be revoked for possession of a 
firearm. 
• The defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 
72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. 
• The defendant shall report in person to the probation office in the district of release within 72 hours of release from 
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. 
It is the order of the Court that you shall comply with the following standard conditions: 
(1) You shall not leave the judicial district without permission of the court or probation officer; 
(2) You shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officer, and shall submit a 
truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month; 
(3) You shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation 
officer; 
<*v*. 
(4) You shall support your dependents and meet other family responsibilities; / * ' " ' - . 
• ^ 
(5) You shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, 
training, or other acceptable reasons; ~"^ ^ \ 
(6) You shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of any changBSuxesidence or employment; 
(7) You shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, user distribute, or 
administer any narcotic or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as 
prescribed by a physician; 
(8) You shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or 
administered; 
(9) You shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any 
person convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer; 
(10) You shall permit a probation officer to visit you at any time at home or elsewhere, and shall permit 
confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer; 
(11) You shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law 
enforcement officer; 
(12) You shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency 
without the permission of the court; 
(13) As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by your 
criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications 
and to confirm your compliance with such notification requirement. 
The special conditions ordered by the court are as follows: 
1. Do not commit crimes, federal, state or local . 
2. Obey standard conditions of probation. 
3. No fine i s imposed due to defendant's inability to pay. 
4. Defendant must complete 500 (five hundred) hours of community servxce as directed 
by the United States Probation Office. 
5. Do not possess firearms or dangerous weapons. 
6. Defendant s h a l l pay a t o t a l spec ia l assessment of $50.00. 
Upon a finding of a violation of probation or supervised release, I understand that the Court may (1) revoke 
supervision or (2) extend the term of supervision and/or modify the conditions of supervision. 
These conditions have been read to me. I fully understand the conditions, and have been provided a copy of them. 
I here" 'ocument is a true 






D a t t
 ——" U.S. ProbationOfficef/DesienatedWitness / Date 
EXHIBIT "KK" 
<?Tfev. 
Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
David L Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C Baldwin 
Director 
1 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 East 300 South 
P 0 Box 45802 
Salt Lake C ty Utah 84145 0802 
(801) 5306600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Stipulation and Order of Cregg Cannon found in the records of 
the Utah Securities Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 28 
day of December, 1990. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
EARL S. MXESER 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
me 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same, 
i 
tmui ^L\ < nipvih 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHIE K. SCHWAg 
160 East 300 South 
S.LC..UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 9, 1991 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF SECURITEES 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR 
KATHLEEN C. MCGINLEY, DIRECTOR 
BROKER-DEALER SECTION 
P.O. BOX 45802 
160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414 5-0802 
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Registration : STIPULATION & ORDER 
of Cregg Cannon : 
to Act as a Securities Agent : CASE NO. SD-042-AG 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah (the division), by and through its Director, John C. 
Baldwin, and Cregg Cannon a registered securities agent hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows: 
STIPULATION 
1. Cannon is and has been a registrant of the Division at all 
times relevant to this case, holding Registration NO. 1031203. 
2. A complaint in the matter has been brought and properly 
filed pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
61-1-1, et seq., (1953, as amended). 
3. Cannon admits the jurisdiction of the Division over him 
and over the subject matter of this action. 
4. Cannon specifically waives the right to confront adverse 
witnesses and the right to a hearing pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 61-1-1, et sea.. (1953, as amended), and the 
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
5. The Division and Cannon recognize and agree that this 
Stipulation alone shall not be binding upon the Advisory Board, 
If the Advisory Board and the Executive Director of the Department 
of Commerce do not concur in the disciplinary action proposed 
herein, this Stipulation shall be of no further force or effect and 
a formal hearing shall be scheduled for this licensure action. 
6. Cannon acknowledges that upon approval by the Advisory 
Board and the Executive Director, this Stipulation shall be made 
a part of the attached final Order, and shall be the final 
compromise and settlement of this registration action. 
7. Cannon acknowledges that he enters into this Stipulation 
voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever has been made 
by the Division, or any member, officer, agent, or representative 
of the Division to induce him to enter into this Stipulation. 
Cannon, without admitting or denying the allegations, consents 
to the following Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
8. On March 15, 1989, the Division served a Subpoena Duces 
Tecum on Cannon requesting a complete list of all the investors in 
two limited partnerships in which Cannon was a general partner. 
9. The Subpoena required that Cannon provide the information 
to the Division by March 24, 1989. The information has not been 
provided to the Division. 
10. Cannon served as a general partner of a limited 
partnership known as ATC-Stanfield Limited Partnership (hereinafter 
referred to as ATC.) Cannon knew, prior to soliciting investors, 
that annual payments would be required from individual 
investors. 
11. During the time relevant to the facts of this 
stipulation, Cannon was associated with Private Ledger as a 
securities agent. Cannon did not inform Private Ledger that he 
was selling interests in ATC. Cannon had no written or verbal 
authorization from Private Ledger to sell interests in ATC. 
12. Cannon solicited Mr. and Mrs. Robert Cox to invest in 
ATC. The Coxes were unaware that an annual payment was required 
and Cannon did not inform the Coxes of the required annual payment. 
13. Cannon knew that the required annual payments made the 
investment unsuitable for the Coxes. Cannon knew the Coxes would 
not have purchased the securities if they had known about the 
annual payments. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
14. The above acts and practices constitute violations of the 
following sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
a. 61-6-6 (b) "willfully violated or willfully failed 
to comply with any provision of this chapter or a predecessor act 
or any rule or order under this chapter or a predecessor act.11 The 
sections willfully violated under this chapter are: 
1. 61-1-1 (2) which states that it is unlawful for 
a person to make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to 
state a material fact that would make the statements made 
misleading. 
2. 61-1-1 (3) which states that it is unlawful for 
a person to engage in any act, practice or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
b. 61-1-6 (g) "engaged in dishonest or unethical 
practices in the securities business." The rule violated was: 
1. Rule 177-6-1 (g) (b) (2) which states that it 
is dishonest or unethical conduct to effect transactions not 
recorded on the regular books or records of the broker-dealer which 
the agent represents unless the transactions are authorized in 
writing by the broker-dealer. 
15. The Division and Cannon propose that Cannon's 
registration to act as a securities agent be suspended for a period 
of two years and immediately at the end of the suspension period, 
Cannon's registration be on probation for 1 year, for a total of 
three years of sanctions. The sanction is to begin on the date set 
by the Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director 
of the Department. 
16. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between 
the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior 
negotiations, representations, understandings, or agreements 
between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify, 
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement. 
VJKSHN C. BALDWIN, Director DATED 
Utah Securities Division 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing stipulation and for good cause 
appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that effective 
Cregg Cannon's registration to act as 
Afr n 1989, 
agent a securities 
suspended for two years and placed on probation for one year 
immediately following the end of the suspension period. 
be 




EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DEPT. OF COMMERCE 
DAVID BUHLER 
.*""*"'*» /#>/"!**> /<$<*.*>&\ 
I DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L. Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C. Baldwin 
Director 
160 East 300 South 
P 0. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145-0802 
(801) 530-6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Notice of Agency Action, Petition, Exhibit A of Paul W. Jones 
found in the records of the Utah Securities Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 28 
day of December, 1990. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
EARL S. 4#AESER 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
-WLc j<-^hi uca 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHIE K. SCHWAB 




STATE OF UTAH 
COPY 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
MARK J. GRIFFIN #2773 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1331 
BEFORE THE UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Registration 
of Paul W. Jones, to Act as ; 
Securities Agent. ] 
CRD NO. 1494831 ] 
| PETITION 
I Case No. EN-00059-17 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah ("the Division"), hereby complains and alleges as 
follows: 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Facts supporting this cause of action were investigated by 
the Division pursuant to §61-1-5 and §61-1-19 of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act ("the Act"), following complaints regarding the 
sale of U.S.A Medical stock to Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., in 
violation of §61-1-7 of the Act. 
JURISDICTION 
1. Jurisdiction in this action is vested in the Executive 
Director and the Securities Advisory Board at the Department of 
Commerce pursuant to §61-1-6(1) of the Act. 
2. Paul W. Jones is a Securities Agent registered with the 
State of Utah under §61-1-4 of the Act and Rule R177-4-1 of the 
Division, CRD registration number 1494831. 
3. Paul W. Jones ("Jones") is an agent of Wasatch Stock 
Trading Company, broker-dealer registered with the Division. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
4. Prior to March 1, 1989, Jones, as an agent for Wasatch 
Stock Trading, was actively trading in the stock of U.S.A. 
Medical Corporation. 
5. On or about March 1, 1989, the Division issued a Summary 
Order (Case No. SD-89-030) denying the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration for the securities of 
U.S.A. Medical Corporation, pursuant to the authority granted to 
the Division in §61-1-14(3) of the Act. A copy of the Summary 
Order was delivered to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on or about 
March 1, 1989. The Order is and has been in effect continuously 
since its issuance on March 1, 1989. The Summary Order is 
attached hereto. (Exhibit A) 
6. On or about March 3, 1989, a compliance meeting was held 
at Wasatch Stock Trading Company at which Mr. Jones was present. 
At that meeting, were present several agents who had traded 
U.S.A. Medical stock. In that meeting, the compliance officers 
of Wasatch Stock Trading Company notified the agents of the 
existence of the Division's Order of March 1, 1989 and made 
available a copy of that Order for the agents' examination. 
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7. On March 1, 1989 the Division commenced an 
administrative action to deny the availability of all 
transactional exemptions from registration pursuant to §61-1-
14(3) of the Act for the securities of U.S.A. Medical (Case No. 
SD-89-031). A copy of the Notice Agency Action and Petition was 
mailed to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on March 2, 1989. 
8. Upon approval of the Securities Advisory Board, the 
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce accepted, 
confirmed, and approved the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Default Order on March 27, 1989. The Default Order denied 
the availability of the transactional exemptions from 
registration contained in §61-1-14(2) of the Act for the 
securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation, any affiliate or 
successor to U.S.A. Medical organized by or on behalf of U.S.A. 
Medical. A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Default Order was mailed to Wasatch Stock Trading Company on 
March 27, 1989. 
9. On or about April 18, 1989, Jones sold to Johnson-Bowles 
Company through Marlen Vernon Johnson 100,000 shares of U.S.A. 
Medical at $.08 per share. 
10. The sale of 100,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock on 
April 18, 1989 was not recorded on the regular books and records 
of Wasatch Stock Trading Company. Jones did not secure before 
the sale the written permission of Wasatch Stock Trading to 
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engage in the sale of U.S.A. Medical stock and the Wasatch Stock 
Trading Company did not know at the time of Jones' sale of U.S.A. 
Medical stock. 
COUNT I 
11. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference 
the Facts set forth in paragraphs 1-10 above. 
12. §61-1-6(1) of the Act provides that the Division may 
issue an Order suspending or revoking the registration of an 
agent if it finds that such Order is in public interest and the 
agent: 
(b) Has willfully violated or willfully failed to comply 
with any provision of this chapter or predecessor act or any 
Rule or Order under this chapter of predecessor act; . . . 
13. The above-described sales of U.S.A. Medical were sales 
effected in willful violation of §61-1-7 of the Act which 
provides as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security 
in this state unless it is registered under this chapter or 
the security or transaction is exempted under §61-1-14. 
14. The actions of Jones in selling the 100,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical during the pendency of the Division's Order 
amounts to a willful violation of §61-1-7, and is grounds for 
revocation under §61-1-6(1)(b). 
COUNT II 
15. The petitioner realleges and incorporates by reference 
the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 10 above. 
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16. §61-1-6(1)(g) provides that the Division may issue and 
Order suspending or revoking the Registration of an agent if it 
finds that such Order is in the public interest and the* agent has 
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the Securities 
business. 
17. Rule R117--6-lg(b) (2) of the Division, promulgated under 
the authority of §61-1-24 and §61-1-6(1)(g) of the Act 
establishes that the following acts and practices by agents 
constitute grounds for suspension or revocation of registration: 
(2) Effecting securities transactions not recorded on the 
regular books or records of the broker-dealer which the 
agent represents, in the case of agents of broker-dealers, 
unless the transactions are authorized in writing by the 
broker-dealer prior to the execution of the transaction. 
18. Jones, in selling the 100,000 share of U.S.A. Medical stock 
to Johnson-Bowles, effected securities transactions not recorded 
on the regular books or records of the broker-dealer which the 
agent represented. In addition, the broker-dealer did not 
supply, prior to the execution of the transaction, permission in 
writing to effect those transactions. 
19. The above action by Jones constitutes dishonest and 
unethical practices within the meaning of §61-1-6(1)(g) of the 
Act and Division Rule R177-6-lg and is grounds for revocation. 
COUNT III 
20. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference 
its allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 as 
specifically set our herein. 
- 5 -
4. For such other relief as the Division deems appropriate. 
DATED this 2L $L of July, 1989. 





Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
David L Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C Baldwin 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 East 300 South 
P O Box 45802 
Sal* Lake C ty U'ah 84145 0802 
(801)530 6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Undertakings of Respondent 
William R. Lambert found in the records of the Utah Securities 
Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 
day of December, L990. 
28 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
EARL S. MANSER 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
me 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 




KATHIE K. SCHWAB 
160 East 300 South 1 
S.L.C..UT 84111 1 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 1 
DEC. 9, 1991 I 
STATE OF UTAH | 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 





FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
UNDERTAKINGS OF RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. 88-01-06-01 
The Utah Division of Securities having received a written 
complaint against the above named Respondent, having investigated 
the facts thereof and determined thereby that Respondent has 
engaged in conduct which violates the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
amd has so advised Respondent. Respondent is desirous of resolving 
the charges against him without a formal hearing and the Utah 
Securities Division is agreeable to such resolution, provided 
Respondent agrees to certain sanctions and to undertake certain 
corrective action with respect to the violations which have been 
committed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
The Utah Division of Securities and the Respondent above 
named, do hereby agree to the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Respondent does hereby agree to the 
following Undertakings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. William R. Lambert is a resident of Provo, Utah, engaged 
in the business of providing financial advice and receiving fees 
therefor. Lambert has never registered as an investment advisor 
with the Utah Division of Securities as required by Section 61-1-
3, Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
2. Commencing on or about October 16, 1985, Respondent, 
William R. Lambert, undertook to provide financial advice to Evelyn 
H. Lofgran of Springville, Utah for which Lofgran paid him a fee. 
Lambert engaged in market activity involving margin purchases of 
options which were beyond the experience, understanding and 
financial capacity of, and therefore, unsuitable for, Lofgran who 
invested approximately $70,000 through Lambert. 
3. As a result of the actions of the Respondent herein 
described, by October 30, 1987, the Lofgran had lost approximately 
$38,500, a loss which she, an elderly widow, could not afford. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the conduct of Respondent William R. Lambert was a 
violation of Section 61-1-3(3} of the Utah Uniform Securities Act 
in that Lambert did engage in the business of acting as an 
investment advisor, as defined in Section 61-1-13(10) of the Act, 
without being duly registered. 
UNDERTAKING OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondent William R. Lambert agrees as follows: 
a. to refrain from engaging in the sale of securities, 
providing investment advice or acting as a broker deaker until 
properly and duly licensed with the appropriate authorities, and 
b. to refrain from future violations of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
c. to contribute to the public education fund of the 
Securities Division of the State of Utah the amount of $500.00 
JDATED this /7 day of Ce^Vi^ ,1989. 
RESPONDENT UTAH DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
f(oh?fiwC. Baldwin 
D i r e c t o r 
W i l l i a m R.Lamber t 
^ -ru^J <~0~ f^<-^ / J^n^ ^L^ ^ W 
/u*t c^fHjM^A^^ • 
+*TJ3PI*} I D E P A R T M E N T 0 F COMMERCE 
^C^x'V'* 1 Division of Securities 
N o r m a n H Bangerter 1 
Governor f 
~ , T TI LI f 160 East 300 South 
Dav id L B u h l e r | 
Executive Director j P ° B o * ™2 
John C Baldwin " Salt Lake Cty Utah 84145 0802 
Director 801)530 6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Order and Stipulation of Brahman Finanical Corp, found in the 
records of the Utah Securities Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 28 
day of December, 1990. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
EARL S. 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
* £ I H J E K SCHWAB 
160 east 300 South 
S L.C. UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC 9, 1991 

























RICHARD C. CAHOON - #A535 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 




BRAHAM FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
a Nevada corporation, dha 
BRAHMAN SECURITIES, MARK 
EAMES, MICHAEL COOPER, GARTH 
POTTS, DAN W. PULLEY, LARRY 
R. SIMMONS, ROBERT EAMES, and 
GEORGE B. STARKS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 890901303AA 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Upon Stipulation of the parties hereto and good cause 
appearing it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if the Defendants 
substantially comply with the terms of the Stipulation 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof by 







pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation. 
DATED this / 3> day of March, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
7
 /s/Sd^^ «D^^s^ 








































RICHARD C. CAHOON - #A535 
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
the UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 




BRAHMAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
a Nevada corporation, dba 
BRAHMAN SECURITIES, MARK 
EAMES, MICHAEL COOPER, GARTH 
POTTS, DAN W. PULLEY, LARRY R. 
SIMMONS, ROBERT EAMES, and 
GEORGE B. STARKS, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 890901303AA 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The State of Utah by and through the Utah Security Division 
of the Department of Business Regulations, hereinafter referred 
to as the "Plaintiff," and the Defendants, Brahman Financial 
Corporation, a Nevada corporation, Mark Eames, Michael Cooper, 
Garth Potts, Dan W. Pulley, Larry R. Simmons, Robert Eames and 
George B. Starks, hereby stipulate, so long as the Defendants are 
ZxiUJ^-' 
employed as independent contractors of the Investment Center, 
Inc•, as follows: 
1. All of the business forms, business cards and stationary 
will clearly indicate that the Investment Center, Inc. is the 
Broker-Dealer. 
2. All new account forms for Brahman, the Investment 
Center, Inc. will be signed by a duly authorized principal of the 
Investment Center, Inc. and a copy bearing the principals' 
signature will be maintained in the Brahman office of the 
Investment Center. 
3. There will be kept in the Brahman office of the Invest-
ment Center, Trie, in a centi'al location for the inspection of the 
Utah Securities Commission the following: 
(a) Daily Trade Blotter of al] trades; 
(b) An alphabetical listing of all new accounts; 
(c) Check ledger; 
(d) Copies of all checks received and forwarded to the 
Investment Center, Inc.; and 
(e) Copies of all stock certificates received and 
forwarded to the Investment Center, Inc. 
4. Each individual Defendant will keep his own personal 
copy of the new account form and a record of all trades which he 
has made with regard to each of his clients. 
5. All monies received from the sale of stock will be 
2 
forwarded to the Investment Center, Inc. 
9 6. The Investment Center, Inc. will issue a check to 
~ Brahman, the Investment Center, Inc. and Brahman will issue 
A checks to the other Defendants for services rendered pursuant to 
c an assignment of commission form executed with the Investment 
^ Center, Inc. by each of the Defendants after deducting a propor-
7 tionate share of the cost of the operations of the branch office, 
g No additional compensation shall be recei\ed for supervisor} 
9 activities unless the individual assuming those responsibilities 
10 meets N.A.S.D. requirements to act in that capacity. 
11 7. The Defendants agree that the Investment Center, Inc. is 
12 the Broker-Dealer having supervisory responsibility over securi t\ 
13 transactions made b> Brahman, the Investment Center, Inc. The 
14 Defendants shall have the right to sell all securities which the 
15 Investment Center, Inc. has approved for sale. 
16 8. The Defendants agree that in all solicitations for the 
17 sale or purchase of securities they will inform their clients of 
18 the bid and ask prices and indicate to their customer that the 
19 Investment Center, Inc. will not repurchase the securities at a 
20 price greater than the bid price. 
21 9. The Defendants agree that they will not use any informa-
22 I  tion in connection with the purchase or sale of any securities 




10. The Defendant, Michael Cooper, shall not work at the 
Investment Center branch office until such time as he has been 
duly registered by the N.A.S.D. and the Utah Securities Division. 
11. Brahman, the Investment Center, Inc., shall not allow 
any individual to work as a broker until such time as he or she 
is duly registered with the N.A.S.D. and the Utah Securities 
Division. 
12. The parties acknowledge and agree that this Stipulation 
has been made for the purpose of compromising the disputed 
allegations set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint and shall not 
be construed as an admission by any party of the allegations set 
forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
13. This Stipulation shall be • in effect for a period of 
twelve (12) months or so long as the Defendants are independent 
contractors employed by the Investment Center, Inc., whichever is 
longer. Unless the Plaintiff fiJes an objection with the Court 
within three (3) days after a Defendant delivers to the Plaintiff 
and the Court an Affidavit stating the Defendant is no longer 
employed as an independent for the Investment Center, Inc., the 
Plaintiff's Complaint against the Defendants shall be dismissed 
with prejudice. At the end of the twelve (12) month period, if 
the Defendants have substantially complied with the terms of this 
Stipulation, this action shall be dismissed with prejudice upon 
motion of the Defendants. 
4 
of March, 1989 
Ridhard C. Cahoon 
Attorney for Defendants 
lark J. Griy 
Attorney fdjp/ PlaintifJ 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH SECURITIES 
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
BUSINESS REGULATION 






Dan W.^  Pulley / 
George/B. "61:arks 
Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
David L Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C Baldwin 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 East 300 South 
PO Box 45802 
Salt Lake C ty Uta^ 84145 0802 
(801) 530 6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Settlement Agreement of Mark K. Hesterman found in the records 
of the Utah Securities Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 
day of December, 1990. 
28 
/ 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
< ^ ^ 
EARL S. 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
me 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the Scime, 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHIE K. SCHWAB 
160 East 300 South 
S.LC.UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 9, 1991 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
JOHN C. BALDWIN, DIRECTOR 
KATHLEEN C. MCGINLEY, DIRECTOR 
BROKER-DEALER SECTION 
P.O. BOX 45802 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-0802 
TELEPHONE: (801) 530-6600 
& /, 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Registration 
of Mark K. Hesterman 
to Act as a Securities Agent 
CRD No. 1537637 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
CASE NO. EN-00549-16 
The Securities Division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah (the Division) , by and through its Director, John C 
Baldwin, and Mark K. Hesterman, a registered securities agent, 
nereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
STIPULATION 
1. Hesterman is and has been a registrant of the Division at 
all times relevant to this case, holding CRD No. 1537637. 
2. Hesterman admits the jurisdiction of the Division over 
him and over the subject matter of this action. 
3. Hesterman specifically waives the right to confront 
adverse witnesses and the right to a hearing pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 61-1-1, et seq. (1953, as amended), and the rules 
and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
4. Hesterman acknowledges that upon approval by the Division 
Director, this Stipulation shall be the final compromise and 
settlement of this registration action. 
5. Hesterman acknowledges that he enters into this 
Stipulation voluntarily, and that no promise or threat whatsoever 
has been made by the Division, or any member, officer, agent, or 
representative of the Division to induce him to enter into this 
Stipulation. 
Hesterman, without admitting or denying the allegations, 
consents to the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
6. At all times relevant to the facts of this case, 
Hesterman was a registered representative at Main Street Securities 
or Covey & Co. 
7. On or about June 26, 1987, Hesterman sold Paul Stephan 
(purchaser) 8,000 shares of Peanuts, Inc. at $1.25 per share. 
Peanuts later became Covest, Inc. 
8. During the first quareter of 1988, Hesterman told 
purchaser that Covest shares were trading at approximately $1.60 
per share. The actual trading price at this time was between .460 
and .87^0 per share. 
9. Also during the first quarter of 1988, Hesterman told 
purchaser that Covest shares had gone through a 2 for 1 forward 
stock split causing purchaser to own 16,000 rather that 8,000 
shares. The stock split never occurred. 
10. In January 1989, Hesterman told purchaser that Covest, 
Inc. shares were trading for approximately $1.00 per share. The 
actual trading price of Covest, Inc. at this time was approximately 
.12^0. At this time, purchaser requested that Hesterman sell 2,500 
shares of Covest. Hesterman attempted to make the trade but could 
find no buyers for more than .12^0 per share. The trade was never 
executed, but Hesterman verbally confirmed to purchaser that the 
trade had been executed and that purchaser would receive payment in 
approximately one week. 
11. On March 15, 1989, Hesterman sent purchaser $948 from 
Hestermanfs personal funds. Hesterman told purchaser the funds 
were from the sale of a portion of purchaser's Covest, Inc. shares. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
12. The above acts and practices constxtute violations of the 
following sections of Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended): 
a. 61-1-6 (g) "engaged in dishonest or unethical 
practices in the securities business.11 
13. The Division and Hesterman agree: 
a. that Hestermanfs registration to act as a securities 
agent be suspended for ten (10) days from June 27, 1990 through 
July 6, 1990; preventing Hesterman from engaging in any activity in 
any capacity as a securities agent during that time: and 
b. that Hesterman1s registration to act as a securities 
agent be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year beginning 
July 7, 1990 through July 7, 1991; and 
c. that during the time of the probation, Hesterman 
will receive daily supervision of all trades as follows: Mark 
Hesterman, while associated with any broker-dealer registered in 
the state of Utah, shall have all trade tickets he has written that 
day reviewed and initialed on a daily basis by the firm's principle 
or the Head Trader so that such review is completed prior to the 
time confirmations of sale are mailed to the customers; and 
d. that failure to comply with the provisions of 
Paragraph 14 (c), above, shall constitute a separate violation of 
Hesterman1s probation and this Settlement Agreement; and 
e. that Hesterman shall pay a $500 fine, by July 6, 
1990 to the Division. The fine will be placed in the Securities 
Investor Training and Education Fund. 
14. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between 
the parties herein and supersedes and cancels any and all prior 
negotiations, representation, understandings, or agreements between 
the parties. There are no verbal agreements which modify, 
interpret, construe, or affect this agreement. 
K m> 
DATED C. BALDWIN, Director 
Utah Securities Division 
I, Mark K. Hesterman, swear under oath that I have not 
knowingly participated in the practice of trading in nominee 
accounts for the purpose of unfairly manipulating market prices or 
to hide or disguise the beneficial ownership of stock or for any 




County of Salt Lake ) 
) 
State of Utah ) 
On this IS**\ day d>f rcr(JA\l , 1990, before me personally 
appeared Mark K. Hesterman, to me known to the pesrson described in 
and who^jgettg&ed the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that 
she e^o^t^dPfch^Scime as her free act and deed. 
My es: 
Notary Public 
Norman H Bangerter 
Governor 
David L Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C Baldwin 
Director 
Sta^ 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 East 300Soufh 
PO Box 45802 
Salt Lake C ty Utah 84145 0802 
(801)530 6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct statement 
of the order suspending the license of Paul Ira Nixon as a 
registered securities agent found in the records of the Utah 
Securities Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 
day of December, 1990. 
28 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
me 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same, 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHIE K. SCHWAB 
160 East 300 South 
SL.C ,UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 9,1991 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITIES AGENT SUSPENDED... 
SOLD SECURITIES TO INVESTORS AT UNFAIR MARKUPS 
The Securities Division in the Utah Department of Commerce 
issued an Order suspending the license of Paul Irai Nixon as a 
registered securities agent for eighteen (18) months and placing 
him on probation for two years. The Order was part of a 
Stipulation agreement wherein Mr. Nixon admitted the allegations 
and consented to a finding that he had engaged in dishonest or 
unethical practices in the securities business. 
The Division's Stipulation and Order was based on a previous 
action taken by the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) against Mr. Nixon. 
The NASD complaint alleged Mr. Nixon effected 78 principle 
sale transactions in the securities of Rimrock Industries, Inc. 
with retail customers at prices that included unfair markups. The 
complaint also alleged that 77 of those transactions were executed 
at prices that reflected markups exceeding 10 percent. A markup is 
the profit earned by the brokerage firm and the agent on the sale 
of securities. 
In a stipulation with the NASD, Mr. Nixon, without admitting 
or denying the charges, agreed to pay a fine and to the suspension 
of his securities license by the NASD. In order to act as a 
securities agent in this state, an individual must be licensed with 
both the state of Utah and the NASD, a self-regulatory organization 
of the securities industry. 
Nixon was a securities agent with Western Capital & 
Securities, now out of business, at the time the alleged acts took 
place. 6 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L. Buhler 
Executive Director 
John C. Baldwin 
Director 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Securities 
160 East 300 South 
P 0 Box 45802 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-0802 
(801) 530-6600 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
I CERTIFY that I am custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah 
Securities Division and that I am a public officer of the State of 
Utah by virtue of Title 61-1-18 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the attached is a true and correct copy of 
the Stipulation and Order, Petition for Suspension of Warren & 
Brown Associates found in the records of the Utah Securities 
Division. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 
day of December, 1990. 
28 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
EARL S. 
DIRECTOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss 
On the 28 day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
me Earl S. Maeser, the signer of the foregoing certificate, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KATHIE K. SCHWAB 
160 East 300 South 
S.L.CUT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 9, 1991 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITIES DIVISION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building, Second Floor 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
t h e R e g i s t r a t i o n of 
Warren & Brown 
A s s o c i a t e s I n c . and 
Thomas R. Warren 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Case No. $H?Ay?/J? 
STIPULATION 
Come now t h e p a r t i e s in t h i s p r o c e e d i n g and s t i p u l a t e 
and a g r e e as f o l l o w s : 
1 . The p e t i t i o n e r i s a d i v i s i o n of t h e Depar tment of 
B u s i n e s s R e g u l a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by Utah Code Ann. § 6 1 - 1 - 1 3 
(1983) , as amended, of t h e Act and i s empowered under t h e Act t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e v i o l a t i o n s of t h e Act and t o b r i n g a c t i o n s t o e n f o r c e 
t h e Act by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and c i v i l a c t i o n s . Utah Code Ann. § 
6 1 - 1 - 1 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , a s amended, e t s e q . 
2 . Respondent Brown i s a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n r e g i s t e r e d 
w i t h the p e t i t i o n e r a s a b r o k e r - d e a l e r . F o r m e r l y , r e s p o n d e n t 
Brown was known a s Edward Brown S e c u r i t i e s . 
3. Respondent Warren is an individual registered with 
the petitioner as agent* Warren also acts as a principal and is 
president of respondent Brown. 
M. On or about February 11, 1986, Robin Hales applied 
with the petitioner to become a registered agent of respondent 
Brown. 
5. On or about February 19, 1986, and continuing until 
July 1986, while her application for registration was pending 
with the petitioner, Robin Hales represented Warren & Brown in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities for certain existing Warren & Brown customers and for 
certain customers which Robin hales introduced to the firm. 
6. During the period of February 1986 through August 
1986, Robin Hales took the required practice knowledge 
examination and passed said examination on the eighth attempt. 
7. On or about September 20, 1986, Robin hales passed 
the required practice knowledge examination, and October 1, 
1986, she was registered with the petitioner as an agent of 
respondent Brown. 
8. During the period of February 1986 through June 
1986, respondent Warren was aware of and supervised Hales1 
activity at the firm. 
9. By allowing Hales to represent Warren & Brown in 
effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities for certain existing Warren & Brown customers and for 
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certain customers which Robin Hales introduced to the firm, 
respondents violated Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (1983), as amended. 
10. The parties consent to the entry of the following 
order. ^-
DATED this <*1 day of May, 1987. 
WARREN & BROWN AfSSOpIATES, INC, 
/ 
C(/\{Cd 
By Thomas R. Warren, President 
_Jko4* 
THOMAS R. WARREN, Individually 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for ^ Respondents 
UTAH SECURITIES DIVISION 
1ARK C-r-MC 
Assistant Attorney General 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the above stipulation, which is incorporated 
herein by reference, and for good cause appearing therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the licenses of Warren & Brown 
Associates, Inc. and Thomas R. Warren are suspended for a period 
of one day, which suspension shall take place on May 25, 1987, 
and; 
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Warren & Brown w i l l pay an amount of $1,000 to the 
S t a t e of Utah, $250 of which w i l l reimburse the Utah S e c u r i t i e s 
Div i s ion for the cos t of i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n and $750 to which w i l l 
go the Department of Business Regulat ion Consumer Education Fund. 
DATED t h i s _jAJjt^^"i of Jta?, 1987. 
EKLUND 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge 
Conf i rmed , a p p r o v e d , and adopted by t h e Advisory Board 
t h i s L r ^ day of ^ W ^ J L . , 19 8 7 . 
D i r e c t o r . 
Conf i rmed , a p p r o v e d , and adopted by t h e E x e c u t i v e 
r ^ N 
WILLIAM E. DUNN 
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